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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to ascertain what the status of the human foetus should be in 
Libyan law where it is currently inadequately determined.  Specifically, is the foetus a 
person, a type of property, or something else, and is humanity significant for such a 
determination?  Additionally, is moral status related to legal status, and if so, how?  Also, 
what implications does this have for foetus-related dilemmas such as abortion and foetal 
research?  These questions will be addressed by examining relevant Western moral and 
legal arguments and theories from an Islamic perspective, which will provide an 
assessment of their compatibility with the Shari’a based Libyan legal system.  This will 
also help to assess the capability of Shari’a to meet challenges posed by new reproductive 
technologies.  
The thesis argues that legal personality, moral personality, and humanity are 
identical and find their foundations in moral agency, which is understood in Shari’a as an 
attribute residing in the soul.  It claims that the foetus acquires ultimate moral agency 
along with an active potentiality for actualising it, at the twentieth week of gestation, 
which, according to this analysis, is when ensoulment occurs.  At this point the foetus is 
held to have the attributes of a person, but prior to this the foetus is considered to have a 
passive potentiality for moral agency, entitling it to respect proportional to its proximity 
to having ultimate moral agency.  Accordingly it is argued that, while non-therapeutic 
applications harmful to the foetus should be absolutely prohibited after ensoulment, they 
can be legitimate prior to that if the benefits outweigh the harm. 
These conclusions demonstrate that Shari’a is capable of tackling the challenges 
of modern reproductive technologies.  They also provide a plausible basis for reforming 
Libyan law on the status of the foetus, and show that Western moral and legal arguments 
can be compatible with Shari’a.  This may pave the way for further studies that 
incorporate principles from both the West and Islam. 
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1 Introduction  
This thesis is about the moral and legal status of the human foetus.  It discusses 
what this status is, specifically, whether it is that of a person, that of a species of property, 
or something else.  It also examines whether it is essential to know this status for solving 
foetus-related moral and legal dilemmas revived or created by new reproductive 
technologies, such as abortion, foetal research, and the enforceability of prenatal invasive 
therapy.  In dealing with these two questions, the thesis has to tackle other important 
issues such as that of whether humanity is sufficient or necessary, or neither, for being a 
person rather than a species of property, and that of whether the moral status and legal 
status of the foetus are related and, if so, how.1 
The importance of undertaking such research is apparent.  The moral and legal 
status of the foetus is widely and reasonably argued to be the starting-point for solving 
foetus-related moral and legal dilemmas.2  That is to say, it is often argued that solving 
these dilemmas, and any others involving the foetus requires having a particular 
understanding about what the foetus is.  Is it a subject of rights that others should 
recognise and respect, or an object of those others’ rights?  Therefore, by verifying such a 
claim, the thesis constitutes a first step towards solving these dilemmas.  This holds true 
even if this claim is found implausible, as the thesis should, in such a case, identify 
alternative approaches to these dilemmas.   
In addition, the importance of the current thesis transcends these foetus-related 
issues.  The discussion of other issues is implicit in the discussion of the moral and legal 
                                                 
1 Detailed explanation of these issues and the importance of discussing them is the theme of Chapter One.   
2 See  2.1 Foetus-related new technological applications and their associated moral and legal dilemmas.   
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status of the foetus, hence the thesis can help with any future discussion of these issues as 
well.  One of these issues is the importance of humanity in conferring and withdrawing 
moral and legal personality.3  If such a claim is proven plausible, it will be sufficient for 
the foetus to be human in a morally and legally relevant sense, in order to be a moral and 
legal person.  In addition, if humanity is deemed to be a necessary condition for such a 
standing, the moral and legal status of non-humans will be greatly affected; animals, for 
instance, will be deprived of moral and legal personality.4  
What adds to the importance of examining the moral and legal status of the foetus, 
is the fact that this status is not adequately determined in Libyan law, which is the law of 
this researcher’s home country.  The legal standing of the foetus there is decided in the 
light of the outdated born alive rule, which deprives it of the status of legal persons.5  This 
thesis, therefore, hopes to influence the understanding of the status of the foetus in Libyan 
law by ascertaining what this status should be in that law.  It will do so by examining 
moral and legal Western literature on the issue of the status of the foetus from an Islamic 
perspective.  Three points need to be clarified here, namely, why moral literature, why 
Western literature, and why an Islamic perspective?  The reliance on moral literature is 
based on an assumption, which will be proven plausible later in the thesis, that law should 
be assessed from and built upon ethics, hence the legal status of the foetus should be 
examined and re-established according to its moral status.  The recourse to moral and 
legal Western literature is justified by the simple fact that the West’s early experience of 
foetus-related new reproductive technologies, and the associated moral and legal 
dilemmas, has resulted in early debate over these dilemmas, and in turn has generated rich 
                                                 
3 See  2.2.3 The humanity-personality relationship. 
4 Besides section  2.2.3 The humanity-personality relationship, see  4.2.2 Basing moral personality on moral 
agency and how such a criterion, being human-specific, affects the status of animals.   
5 For a detailed discussion of the born alive rule and the standing of Libyan law, see  4.1.2.3 below. 
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and diverse literature on them.  The moral status of the foetus, in particular, has been 
debated in the West since the commencement of bioethics in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.6  Referring to this literature, therefore, increases the chances of this thesis of 
reaching a plausible conclusion on the issue.   
However, adopting Western arguments and views in an Islamic country such as 
Libya is not uncontentious.  On the one hand, it is repeatedly claimed that, under the 
umbrella of flexibility, Moslem countries and people should benefit from Western ways 
of thinking.  For instance, S.  Mohammed Ghari Fatemi claims that: 
The ethical heritage of Muslims clearly indicates that they have balanced products of 
other normative systems into their own legacy.  It is not difficult, for instance, to 
identify concepts and even arguments of a Neoplatonic moral perspective in Nasir al-
Din al-Tusi’s The Nasirian Ethics…or the Aristotelian notion of moderation in Naraqi’s 
Mi raj al-saada…, both of which are renowned Shiite moral workers [Islamic sect].  
The challenge to contemporary Muslims is to maintain a vital link with the great 
thinkers of the past and approach new moral and moral developments with a similar 
openness.7  
On the other hand, other writers such as Ataullah Siddiqui have expressed doubt about the 
acceptability of new ideas in the Moslem world: 
Today, Muslim scholarship is re-examining Muslim history and tradition, looking in 
depth at how far its flexibility will permit a change within Islamic tradition.  They are 
also examining how far western experiences and western models can be of help and 
could be accommodated in the contemporary Muslim moral discourse.  Muslims are 
                                                 
6 Søren Holm, "Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy," Bioethics 16, no. 6 (2002): 493-507, 506.  
Colin Edwin Hart, "The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus: A Systematic and Critical Survey of 
the Discussion in the English-Speaking World between 1960 and 1995 from a Theological Perspective" 
(University of Manchester, 1998), (unpublished Ph.D thesis), 14, 16. 
7 S. Mohammed Ghari  Fatemi, "Egg and Embryo Implantation: A Comparative Study of Shi'ite Teachings 
and Kantian Ethics.," Islam & Christian-Muslim Relations 16, no. 3 (2005): 297-312, 310. 
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cautious about accepting ideas of “new theology”, “new values” and “new philosophy”.  
They perceive these as “shallow” and unrealistic, and believe these could be fatal.8 
Therefore, it is important to assess whether arguments and views deployed in 
Western moral and legal literature on the status of the foetus, in particular, and other 
bioethics and biolaw issues in general, can be accepted in Islamic countries, specifically 
Libya.  The best way to do that, I believe, is to tackle one of these issues and examine 
whether Western views and arguments concerning it are applicable in these countries.  
The moral and legal status of the foetus can be used as a test-case, and conclusions about 
it can then be generalised with regard to other related issues.  
The question that inevitably arises from this is how the adoptability of Western 
arguments and views in Islamic countries can be assessed, which leads to the third point 
about the reliance of this thesis on an Islamic perspective.  The answer is that Shari’a9  
will be used as the yardstick against which these views and arguments will be measured.  
In Islamic countries, Islam constitutes the official religion and, in many of them, it is the 
main source of law, hence the acceptability of any conclusion reached is subject to their 
acceptability from an Islamic perspective.  This is particularly important in Libya where 
Islam is constitutionally the official religion and the source of all laws;10 suggesting any 
conclusion for implementation there requires therefore that it be acceptable to Islam. 
The reliance on Shari’a in examining the moral and legal status of the foetus as 
present in Western literature should also help to assess its capacity to solve problems 
                                                 
8 Ataullah Siddiqui, "Ethics in Islam: Key Concepts and Contemporary Challenges," Journal of Moral 
Education 26, no. 4 (1997), retrieved from 
http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=9418, at 23/12/2005.    
9 See  3.2.1 The definition of Shari’a.  
10 ʿbwdh, al-Kwny ʿly. Āsāsyāt al-Qānwn al-Wḍʿy al-Lyby al-Mdkhl lā ʿllm 
al-Qānwn al-Qānwn. Tripoli: al-Mrkz al-Qwmy ll-Bḥwth  w al-Drāsāt al-
ʿlmyt, 2003. 38, 41.  
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associated with this issue in particular, and those posed by new reproductive technologies 
in general.  The significance of such assessment derives from the persistent claim that 
because Shari’a dates from the sixth century, it is incapable of dealing with current moral 
and legal dilemmas, and should therefore be disregarded in favour of secular 
understandings.  Considering such arguments in the light of the fact that Shari’a is the 
main, or the only, source of law in many Islamic countries should make clear the 
importance of verifying these arguments.  It might be suggested that, if its incapability is 
proven, Shari’a should be disregarded from the discussion of these dilemmas, at least the 
discussion of those concerning the status of the foetus.  However, if the reverse is the 
case, Shari’a should be deemed the first reference point for solving them. 
Being conducted in this manner, the thesis should be able to reach conclusions 
regarding the legal personality of the foetus that are not only valid in Libya and other 
countries whose legal systems are derived from Islamic tradition, but can also be used in 
England and other legal systems.  That is to say, whilst being compatible with Shari’a 
makes these conclusions applicable in the former, being based on philosophical 
arguments present in Western moral and legal literature makes them valid in the latter as 
well.            
The thesis is designed in a way that should enable it to achieve these objectives.  It 
is divided into four chapters, followed by a conclusion.  Chapter One expands on this 
introduction by citing examples of the new reproductive technologies related to the 
foetus, and the moral and legal dilemmas that these technologies have provoked or 
revived.  It also explains the controversies surrounding the status of the foetus, and details 
the main views concerning it as present in Western moral and legal literature.  It shows 
the importance of discussing each controversy, and the effect any conclusion about it has 
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on the issue of the status of the foetus.  As such, this chapter demonstrates the framework 
of the thesis, and justifies the way the following chapters are divided. 
Chapter Two introduces Shari’a as the basis of analysis and assessment in this 
thesis.  It aims to demonstrate the criteria upon which this analysis and evaluation will be 
conducted, that is, the standards against which the acceptability of ideas and theories can 
be determined from an Islamic perspective.  It focuses, therefore, on Shari’a’s definition, 
nature, and sources.  Since the full comprehension of these points requires an 
understanding of the Islamic view of the nature of human beings, and the rationale behind 
their creation, these two last points will be explained first.   
Chapter Three focuses on the definition of legal personality.  It aims to define it 
and determine the criteria by which it can be conferred, because being a legal person, as 
opposed to a form of property, is the first possible embodiment of legal status.11  The 
discussion of the definition and criteria of legal personality is essential for solving the 
controversy about whether the foetus is a legal person because whatever criteria are 
chosen will be applied to it in a later chapter.  The assumption is that, if the foetus fails to 
meet the criteria for being a person, it will then be necessary to ascertain whether it can 
instead be deemed a species of property.  The second aim of this chapter is to decide on 
the controversy concerning the relationship between the moral and legal status of the 
human foetus, and the third is to determine the relationship between these two types of 
status on the one hand, and humanity on the other. 
To achieve these aims, Chapter Three is divided into two sections.  In the first, the 
two current definitions of legal personality will be explained and evaluated.  The first one 
                                                 
11 See page 18 below. 
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is the positivist definition that bases legal personality on no extra-legal considerations, 
and its examination should reveal the plausibility of detaching legal personality from 
moral personality, hence detaching legal status from moral status.  The second current 
definition of legal personality is that which bases it on humanity as a biological concept.  
Discussing this should reveal the accuracy of the current legal determination of the status 
of the foetus since it is adopted, as will be shown in this section, through a rule known as 
the born alive rule by many laws, English and Libyan laws included.   
The second section of Chapter Three is about a suggested definition of legal 
personality.  Based on the analysis of the previous section, it will propose a new 
definition that will overcome the flaws demonstrated in the existing definitions.  In this 
way, it is also argued that legal personality should be based on moral personality.  The 
latter should, in turn, be based on a criterion of moral agency that is deemed human-
specific, that is, one that cannot be met except by human beings.  Therefore, it regards the 
three concepts of legal personality, moral personality, and humanity as interchangeable; 
all find their foundation, either directly or indirectly, in moral agency.  The concept of 
ensoulment is also proposed as a solution to the problem that with such a highly 
demanding criterion, moral agency will not be met by some humans which will mean that 
they will be deprived of personality.  It is maintained that, despite the lack of actual moral 
agency, having it as an ultimate capacity is enough for attaining personality, and that this 
happens when the soul, as the seat of all ultimate mental capacities, infuses the body.   
Chapter Four is about the application of moral agency to the foetus, as the 
criterion of moral personality and indirectly, legal personality.  It attempts to achieve two 
aims.  The first is to determine whether the foetus meets that criterion and hence is a 
person.  The second is to assess the importance of its status in deciding on how it is 
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treated.  Since in the previous chapter it is argued that moral agency, as the criterion of 
personality, finds its seat in the soul, in this chapter it is claimed that whether the foetus is 
a moral agent depends on whether it has a soul infused in its body.  Thus, it starts by 
setting out the principles upon which the ensoulment event, or moment, can be 
determined.  After that, it moves to discuss whether ensoulment occurs during foetal life 
and, if so, whether the precise timing can be established.  Following that, the status of the 
foetus before and after ensoulment is assessed.  The possibility of classifying it as a 
property species when personality is unattributable will be discussed here, as well as the 
way it ought to be treated, and whether that treatment should differ in accordance with its 
status will also be considered.   
The final part of the thesis is the conclusion wherein the main arguments will be 
summarised.  In addition, an explanation of whether the aims of the thesis have been 
achieved, and what the conclusions reached may mean for legal reform in Libya will be 
provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2. Setting the Scene 
 
2 Setting the Scene  
This chapter introduces the issue of the moral and legal status of the human 
foetus.  In section one, examples of the new technological advances surrounding it, and 
the moral and legal dilemmas these advances have raised or revived are given.  In section 
two, the view that the moral and legal status of the foetus is essential for resolving related 
dilemmas is examined.  The controversies that arise between the proponents of this view 
about what status can be attributed to the foetus, and from when, the importance of being 
human in determining that status, and the relationship between moral status and legal 
status, will be demonstrated in this section.  Section three is devoted to explaining the 
views that dismiss the moral and legal status of the foetus from the discussions of related 
dilemmas, their importance, justification, and the alternative approaches to the foetus-
related dilemmas they propose.   
However, before proceeding any further, it is necessary to clarify the terminology 
that will be used to refer to the unborn human entity.  Several terms are used to denote 
that entity.  While some writers use the term embryo to refer to it during the entire period 
of gestation,12 others prefer to use the term foetus in the same sense.13  However, another 
group follows the scientific classification and so refers to that entity from the ninth week 
until birth as foetus and as embryo before that.14  The term unborn child is also used to 
refer to the human entity in its early stages.15  In this thesis, for the sake of simplicity, the 
                                                 
12 John Harris, the Value of Life, an Introduction to Medical Ethics (London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1985), 117.  
13 See Hart, "The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus", 8. Ronald Munson, Intervention and 
Reflection: Issues in Medical Ethics, 6th ed. (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 1999), 78. Francis J. Beckwith, 
"Abortion, Bioethics and Personhood: A Philosophical Reflection," (2001), retrieved from 
http://www.cbhd.org/resources/bioethics/beckwith_2001-11-19_print.htm#fn4, at 11/01/2006.   
14 Hart, "The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus", 8.    
15 See for example the use of this term in Duval v Seguin, (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 418, 433.  
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term foetus will be used to denote the unborn human16 entity regardless of the phase of 
development it occupies since, in this thesis,17 the scientific distinction between the 
embryo and foetus has no effect on the moral and legal status.  However, the terms used 
to denote the foetus in the scholarly quotations included will not be altered.   
2.1 Foetus-related new technological applications and their associated 
moral and legal dilemmas  
Many foetus-related scientific applications are associated with moral and legal 
dilemmas.  In this section, examples of these applications and the dilemmas associated 
with them will be given.  These examples, for the purpose of illustration, can be divided 
into two groups: those concerning the foetus when treated as a means, and those 
concerning it when treated as an end.   
2.1.1 Applications concerning the foetus as a means  
A clear example of an application where the foetus is being treated as a mere 
means is the use of embryonic stem cells (ESCs).  ESCs have many promising 
applications such as in the research aiming to discover the causes behind the early failure 
of pregnancy, the failure of pregnancy in older women where genetic defects in the 
oocyte appear to be significant, and the possible toxic effects of new drugs.18  More 
importantly, they may also be used in developing cell replacement therapies that could be 
effective in treating diseases such as diabetes, Parkinson's disease, stroke, arthritis, 
                                                 
16 The adjective human here means nothing more than being born to human parents.  Whether the foetus is 
human in a morally and legally relevant sense is another issue and, as will be explained later, not all 
foetuses may be called human in this sense.  See  4.2  Suggesting a new definition of legal personality.   
17 See  5.2 Assessing the status of the foetus. 
18 Guido de Wert and Christine Mummery, "Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Research, Ethics and Policy," 
Human reproduction 18 no. 4 (2003): 672-682, 672.  See also Gulam Bahadur, "The Moral Status of the 
Embryo: The Human Embryo in the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) 
Regulation 2001 Debate," Reproductive BioMedicine Online 7, no. 1 (2003): 12-16, 13.  
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multiple sclerosis, heart failure, and spinal cord lesions.19  Further potential uses involve 
making tailor-made organs or parts of organs, cloning damaged parts of the body such as 
the brain, enhancing the growth of damaged tissues,20 and rejuvenating therapies that are 
designed to prolong life span.21 
However, although a number of such uses are currently still in the early stages of 
development, they are associated with a range of moral and legal problems.  For instance, 
in view of the fact that the destruction of foetuses after generating their stem cells is part 
of the ESC research procedure, questions have been posed about the legitimacy of the 
whole procedure.22  In short, using them in this way raises questions about creating 
foetuses solely for their use as a source of stem cells, or as a subject of research in 
general.  They are treated in such cases as mere means not as ends in themselves.23  
Moreover, heated moral and legal debate has been provoked on the possibility of owning 
intellectual and actual property rights over human stem cell lines, and the techniques used 
in producing them.24  Alternatively, but no less controversially, there are, as will be 
shown presently, other examples of applications in which the foetus is treated as an end.   
2.1.2 Applications concerning the foetus as an end 
Advances in detecting and treating foetal illnesses exemplify those applications in 
which the foetus is treated as an end.  These advances, such as those in ultrasound 
                                                 
19 Mummery, "Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Research, Ethics and Policy," 672. 
20 Cooper DKC, Lanza RP, Xeno, 2000, the Promise of Transplanting Animal Organs into Humans, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, as mentioned in S Aksoy, "Making Regulations and Drawing up 
Legislation in Islamic Countries under Conditions of Uncertainty, with Special Reference to Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research," Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (2005): 399-403, 400. 
21 Holm, "Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy," 496, 497. 
22 Ibid.  496.  Roger A. Pedersen, "Embryonic Stem Cells for Medicine," Scientific American 280, no. 4 
(1999), retrieved from http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&an=1657866, at 19 January 
2006.  Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
764. 
23 Mummery, "Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Research, Ethics and Policy," 672, 677.  
24 Holm, "Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy," 493. 
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imaging, amniocentesis, and foetal heart monitoring, have helped with the understanding 
of the reasons behind some of the harm that the foetus faces, and so can be used to help 
prevent it.  They have shown, for instance, the link between such harm and the pregnant 
woman’s behaviour, illnesses, and the medicine she takes.  Additionally, they have shed 
light on the effect of the genetic make-up inherited from the parents of the foetus.25  More 
importantly, the ability to predict and detect this harm has made it possible to prevent it 
by, for example, changing the underlying behaviour, or treating it in utero.26   
Nevertheless, these advancements have led to heated moral and legal discussions.  
They have caused significant changes to the perception of the foetus and the way in 
which it should be treated.27  That is to say, they have indicated the idea of the foetus as a 
patient separate from the pregnant woman in nature and needs.  As stated succinctly by a 
Harvard Law Review editorial:  
The technological limitations of medicine once dictated the treatment of the pregnant 
woman and her unborn child as a single medical entity.  The increasing ability to 
diagnose and treat the fetus and the greater awareness of the effects of maternal conduct 
on fetal health, however, have led doctors to perceive the fetus as an individual patient 
with needs distinct from those of its mother.28  
To show the effects on the perception of the foetus caused by the new technology, 
Marie Fox compares the Parliamentary discussions prior to the Abortion Act 1967, and 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990.29  According to her, some 
                                                 
25 Ibid.   
26 C Wellman, "The Concept of Fetal Rights," Law and Philosophy 21, no. 1 (2002): 65-93, 65.  
27 John Seymour, Childbirth and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 190. Marie Fox, "Pre-
Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the Embryo," Health 
Care Analysis 8 (2000): 171-188, 173, 174.   
28 "Developments in the Law. Medical Technology and the Law," Harvard Law Review 103, no. 7 (1990): 
1519-1556, 1556. 
29 Fox, "Pre-Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the 
Embryo," 173.  
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feminist viewpoints played a role in the former proceedings, hence women’s needs for 
abortion were met.  However, the representation of the foetus as a separate entity was 
dominant in the HFEA discussions, to the extent that it displaced women from the central 
position in the debate, hence women’s needs were only selectively taken into account.30  
 Recently, in 2004, this same moral and legal controversy about the issue of 
abortion was again brought to the public attention, when a new ultrasound scanner 
showed a 12-week-old foetus apparently walking in the womb.31  This brought calls for 
the upper time limit for abortion to be reduced from 24 weeks to 12 weeks;32 yet others 
objected to such a suggestion.33  Many medical professionals, in particular, voiced their 
opposition to any proposal to reduce the abortion time limit even from 24 to 20 weeks.34  
This trend has been further indicated in the latest British Parliamentary refusal to reduce 
the legal limit of abortion from 24 to any of the proposed alternatives: 12, 16, 20, or 22 
weeks.35   
A further example of the tensions provoked by the advances in technology in this 
area, is related to the treatment of in vivo foetuses.  Technology has made it possible to 
use invasive therapy to save the life of a foetus, or to protect it from serious and 
irreversible disease, injury, or disability.  However, the potential conflict with the 
pregnant woman’s right to autonomy has led to questioning whether such an application 
                                                 
30 Ibid.  
31 BBC, "Viewpoints: Abortion” retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3894245.stm, at 
20/01/2006. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. See Ellie Lee, "The Abortion Debate Today," in Human Fertilisation and Embryology Reproducing 
Regulation, ed. Kirsty Horsey and Hazel Biggs (London and New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).   
34 This was shown in a conference organised in Manchester in 2005 by the British Medical Association, 
BBC, "Abortion Time Limit Cut Rejected” retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4636991.stm, at 
10/03/2006. 
35 BBC, "MPs Reject Cut in Abortion Limit" retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7412118.stm, at 10/06/2008. 
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is legitimate.36  In other words, the pregnant woman has a right to take control over her 
own body, and so make decisions concerning it including that of declining medical 
treatment aimed at treating the foetus, and physicians in such cases are obliged to respect 
her choices, and assist her in putting them into effect.  As stated in Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) by Lord Donaldson:  
An adult patient who … suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to 
choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than 
another of the treatments being offered.  …  This right of choice is not limited to 
decisions which others might regard as sensible.  It exists notwithstanding that the 
reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.37  
 However, the potential benefits of the invasive therapy to the foetus, including 
saving its life, might be said to justify the intervention no matter what conflict it may 
have with the pregnant woman’s right to autonomy.38  This was regarded as a potential 
complication by Lord Donaldson in the same case:  
The only possible qualification [about his previously mentioned acknowledgment] is a 
case in which the choice may lead to the death of a viable foetus.  That is not this case 
and, if and when it arises, the courts will be faced with a novel problem of considerable 
legal and moral complexity.39    
 Not long after Re T, courts in the UK started facing this novel problem, and the 
manner in which they have dealt with it, indicates the complexity that Lord Donaldson 
mentioned.  The first of these cases involving a woman who declined a medically 
indicated caesarean section, was Re S,40 which occurred just two months and a half after 
                                                 
36 F A Chervenak and L B McCullough, "Ethical Issues in Recommending and Offering Fetal Therapy," 
The Western Journal of Medicine 159, no. 3 (1993): 396–399. 
37 Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), (1993) Fam 95, 102.  
38 Chervenak, "Ethical Issues in Recommending and Offering Fetal Therapy". 
39 Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), 102. 
40 Re S, (1992) 4 All ER 671. 
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Re T.41  It was swiftly followed by Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W, 
42Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v Ch (a Patient)43 and Re MB44 in all of 
which caesarean sections were allowed despite the pregnant women’s refusal.  In Re MB, 
though the Court of Appeal made it clear that the pregnant woman’s autonomy should be 
respected and so no caesarean section could be imposed on her, it allowed such an action 
in that particular case because the woman was deemed incompetent: 
The law is, in our judgment, clear that a competent woman who has the capacity to 
decide may, for religious reasons, other reasons, or for no reason at all, choose not 
to have medical intervention, even though … the consequence may be the death or 
serious handicap of the child she bears or her own death.  She may refuse to consent 
to the anaesthesia injection in the full knowledge that her decision may significantly 
reduce the chance of her unborn child being born alive.  The foetus up to the 
moment of birth does not have any separate interests capable of being taken into 
account when a court has to consider an application for a declaration in respect of 
caesarian [sic] section operation.  The court does not have the jurisdiction to declare 
that such medical intervention is lawful to protect the interests of the unborn child 
even at the point of birth.45   
However, the court concluded that since, in that particular case, MB temporarily lacked 
capacity because of her fear of needles, the doctors were permitted to administer the 
anaesthetic in an emergency if it was in her best interests for them to do so.46  
Emphasising the pregnant woman’s autonomy while allowing, in the end, the caesarean 
section reflects “[a] continued ambivalence of the courts towards such cases”, and 47 “…a 
                                                 
41 J K Mason and R A Mccall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 5 ed. (London, Edinburgh, Dublin: 
Butterworths, 1999), 265. 
42 Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W, (1996) 2 F.L.R 613. 
43 Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v Ch (a Patient), (1996) 1 F.L.R 762. 
44 Re Mb (Caesarean Section), (1997) 2 F.L.R 426. 
45 Ibid., 444. 
46  Ibid., 438, 439. 
47 Mason, “Law and Medical Ethics,” 139. 
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divergence of theory and practice”, as some commentators have rightly said.48  Hence, it 
can be seen as an indication of the possibility of conflict between the pregnant woman’s 
and the foetus’s interests.  
A further conflict that may arise between the interests of the pregnant woman and 
those of the foetus concerns the prevention of the former from certain behaviour, for 
example, taking drugs or drinking alcohol, when that is thought to harm the foetus.  This 
potential conflict with the pregnant woman’s right to autonomy has raised moral and legal 
debates about whether such prevention is legitimate.49  
The previously mentioned applications such as ultrasound imaging and treating 
foetuses in vivo have led to conceptualising the foetus as an entity distinct from the 
pregnant woman, and therefore suggesting that new foetal rights should be added to 
existing legal systems.50  It has been proposed, for example, that the foetus should have a 
right not to be born if expectant life, in the light of genetic defects or medical difficulties, 
would be “wrongful”.51  In addition, it has been argued that the foetus should be attributed 
a right to medical care independent from, but alongside, that of the pregnant woman, and 
a right not to be subject to parental malpractice.52 
One more application regarding which moral and legal dilemmas have arisen is in 
vitro fertilisation (IVF), and some of its aspects such as freezing foetuses.  For instance, 
the possibility of the clash over the use of frozen foetuses between the different parties’ 
interests, including those of the foetus itself, has attracted heated debate, not only at 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law,  202. 
50 Wellman, "The Concept of Fetal Rights," 65. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid,. See also Nicolette Priaulx, "Beyond Health and Disability: Rethinking the 'Foetal Abnormality' 
Ground in Abortion Law," in Human Fertilisation and Embryology Reproducing Regulation, ed. Kirsty 
Horsey and Hazel Biggs (London and New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
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academic conferences, but also in court cases such as the American case, Kass v Kass.53  
The status of frozen foetuses as potential children under the will of their parent(s) when 
one or both of them die(s) has also been discussed.54                 
Resolving these dilemmas55 is claimed by the majority of researchers and 
authorities to be based on the moral and legal status of the foetus, and in the following 
section their views will be articulated and discussed. 
2.2  Relying on the status of the foetus in solving its related dilemmas 
Many moral and legal researchers and authorities agree on the importance of the 
status of the foetus in solving problems related to it in reproductive technology.  Their 
agreement, however, ends when they come to determine the type of status that should be 
attributed to it, the importance of humanity in such a determination, and the relationship 
between the moral and legal concepts of that status.  Each of these points will be 
discussed below.   
2.2.1 The importance of the status of the foetus  
Solving the foetus-related dilemma has been claimed, as will be shown shortly, to 
be based upon its moral and legal status.  With regard to moral discussion, this has been 
the case since the commencement of bioethics in the late 1960s and early 1970s.56  The 
rationale behind this is that making decisions and judgements about many moral issues in 
                                                 
53 Kass v Kass, (1998) 91 NY 2d 554 .  In this case, a man refused to let his ex-wife use the cryopreserved 
foetuses.  For a more recent case that was quite similar, see Evans v the UK page 38 below.   
54 Cameron Stewart, "Legal Constructions of Life and Death in the Common Law," Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 2, no. 1 (2002): 67-91, 77.   
55 Wherever the phrases ‘foetus-related issues’ or ‘dilemmas’ are used in this thesis, they refer to the issues 
or dilemmas explained in this section.   
56 Holm, "Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy," 506. Hart, "The Moral Status of the Human 
Embryo and Fetus", 14-16. 
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health care, requires an opinion about whether the entities whose lives are involved have 
any moral importance upon which moral rights and obligations can be attributed.  
Admitting that particular entities have that moral worth implies a series of moral 
obligations towards them.  As Mary Anne Warren says: 
[T]he claim that all persons have full and equal moral status implies that we must not 
murder other persons, assault them, cheat them, torture them, imprison them unjustly, 
or fail to help them when help is needed and we have the means of providing it.  Such 
minimum standards represent a floor below which we ought not to allow our actions, or 
those of other moral agents, to fall.  When such standards of behaviour are violated, we 
are justified in protesting, objecting, and sometimes using force to prevent or deter 
further violations.57 
 Applying this to the foetus affects greatly the conclusions about its related 
dilemmas.  If it is discovered to have the status of a person, any act harming it in its life or 
body will be deemed immoral unless that act is in its own favour.  Terminating its life, for 
example, will be considered a case of killing that cannot be justified on grounds other 
than those justifying the killing of born persons such as self-defence.58  On the other hand, 
if the foetus is discovered to lack such a standing, ending its life will not be considered a 
case of killing and might be justified on less restrictive grounds such as benefiting 
persons.  Furthermore, destroying it might be considered just the same as destroying an 
appendix.59           
Similar justification has been given for relying on the legal status of the foetus.  
The evaluation of any conduct concerning the foetus is said to be built on a clear 
                                                 
57 Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13. In a similar meaning, see John Harris, "The Concept 
of the Person and the Value of Life," Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal 9, no. 4 (1999): 293-308, 294, 295. 
58 Munson, Intervention and Reflection: Issues in Medical Ethics, 78. 
59 Ibid.   
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determination of its status.60  Being a person, on the one hand, means being able to have 
rights, assume duties, and enjoy any protection the law offers to its subjects.  Its life will 
be protected by the laws prohibiting offences against persons and so applications such as 
abortion and embryonic stem cell research will be outlawed; the former might even be 
considered murder or manslaughter.61  On the other hand, being categorised as a species 
of property, means being the object of others’ rights and having no rights oneself.62  It 
means being stripped of any legal protection the law offers its subjects.  Applications like 
abortion or foetal research might then be legitimised.63  In the words of Margaret Davies 
and Ngaire Naffine:     
To be visible in law, and thus to have a legal standing, to attract legal rights and to 
assume legal obligations, one must be a legal person.  If a being is not a person in 
law, she can be treated as a species of property: she can be bought and sold.  It is 
because animals are not legal persons that their owners, almost with legal impunity, 
can destroy them.  The offences against the person are not designed to afford legal 
protection or dignity to the family pet.64 
However, the dichotomy of persons and species of property has not been immune 
from criticism.  Its inclusiveness has been questioned since some entities do not readily fit 
within these categories,65 while others can be classified under both at the same time.  This 
is the case regarding corporations that, according to Naffine “… are created as both 
persons and property and so have a dual status.  Thus they can both trade as persons and 
                                                 
60 Wieslaw Lang, "The Status of the Human Fetus," Criminal law forum 3, no. 3 (1992): 419-440, 421.  
61 Munson, Intervention and Reflection: Issues in Medical Ethics, 78. 
62  Daniel N. Hoffman, "Personhood and Rights," Polity 19, no. 1 (1986): 74-96, 74. In his words, “[i]n any 
policy those who are not recognized as persons are accorded no rights.”  
63 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 185. 
64 M. Davies and N. Naffine, Are Persons Property? (Aldershot Burlington USA Singapore Sydney: 
Ashgate/Dartmouth 2001), 51.  In a similar meaning, see Stewart, "Legal Constructions of Life and Death 
in the Common Law," 67, 69. 
65 Fox, "Pre-Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the 
Embryo," 184. 
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be traded as property.”66  In terms of the foetus, the dichotomy has been criticised as 
being unhelpful since the foetus is often claimed to acquire neither the status of a person 
nor that of a species of property because it is something in between.67 
As earlier outlined, in solving foetus related dilemmas, the proponents of the 
importance of the status of the foetus have differed over the type of status it should be 
attributed. 
2.2.2 The dispute over the status attributed to the foetus  
In solving its related dilemmas, the proponents of the centrality of the status of the 
foetus differ over which status should be attributed to it.  With regard to the moral status, 
significant differences have been raised amongst ethicists about whether the foetus should 
be granted personality.  Firstly, while some of them, as will be presently demonstrated, 
agree on attributing such status to the foetus, they differ over the stage of development at 
which that should be done.  Examples of the different points suggested are conception;68 
the fourteenth day as the point at which twinning is no longer possible and the 
differentiation of the embryonic cells starts;69 quickening as the stage at which the 
pregnant woman feels the foetus’s movements,70 or viability as the phase at which the 
foetus becomes able to live outside the womb.71  However, other ethicists deny that 
                                                 
66 Ngaire Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects," The Modern 
law review 66, no. 3 (2003): 346–367, 347. 
67 Fox, "Pre-Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the 
Embryo," 181 and 184. 
68 Noonan J T, John, 1970, “an Almost Absolute Value in History, the Morality of Abortion: Legal and 
Historical Perspectives”.  Ed.  John T.  Noonan Jr.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970: 51.59.  In 
Munson, Intervention and Reflection: Issues in Medical Ethics, 83. 
69 See for example Bahadur, "The Moral Status of the Embryo: The Human Embryo in the UK Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulation 2001 Debate," 12.  
70 In explaining this view, see Hart, "The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus", 253.  The timing 
of quickening is variously determined.  See 198 below. 
71 Lawrence C. Becker, "Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept," Philosophy & public affairs 4, no. 
4 (1975): 334-359, 337. 
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personality may start at a particular developmental stage.  Instead, they believe that it is 
acquired gradually.72 
Other ethicists, while believing in the centrality of the status of the foetus in 
resolving its related issues, argue that no personality should be attributed to it.  For 
instance, as the foetus meets none of the criteria believed to be essential for having the 
moral status of persons such as sentience, rationality, and self-consciousness, writers like 
Peter Singer73 and John Harris74 deprive the foetus of such a standing.  Other writers 
including Mary Anne Warren believe that while no actual moral status of person can be 
attributed to the foetus, it is possible to grant it a potential status on account of what it is 
going to be in the future, if its development is not interrupted.75  However, the idea of 
potentiality has attracted heavy criticism.76  
 In the same vein, legal researchers and authorities differ over what legal status the 
foetus should be granted.  First, the majority of legal researchers and authorities have 
declined to grant the foetus any personality.  This is what can be understood from the 
refusal of Australian and English courts to grant injunctions sought to stop pregnant 
women from performing abortions, on the basis that the foetus has its own legal rights.77  
For instance, in Paton v British Advisory Services Trustees,78 the court stated that: “[t]he 
                                                 
72 Norman C. Gillespie, "Abortion and Human Rights," Ethics 87 no. 3 (1977): 237-243. 
73 Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, "Individual, Humans and Persons: The Issue of Moral Status," in Embryo 
Experimentation, Ethical, Legal and Social Issues, ed. Helga Kuhse Peter Singer, Stephen Buckle,Karen 
Dawson, Pascal Kasimba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990), 65-71. 
74 Harris, "The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life," 305. 
75 Mary Anne Warren, "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," The Monist (1973), retrieved from 
http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/cole253/Abor.pdf, at 28/03/2006. 
76 See for example, Harris, "The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life," 11.  Karen Dawson and 
Peter Singer, "IVF Technology and the Argument from Potential” in Embryo Experimentation, Ethical, 
Legal and Social Issues, ed. Helga Kuhse Peter Singer, Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, Pascal Kasimba 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 767.   
77 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 145. 
78 Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees and Another, (1979) Q.B 276. 
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foetus cannot, in English law … have a right of its own at least until it is born and has a 
separate existence from its mother”.79  
Nonetheless, the born alive rule has been heavily criticised.80  In addition, the 
legal authorities depriving the foetus of personality have been criticised for their 
ambiguity with regard to what the foetus is, if it is denied personality.81  They have stated, 
as John Seymour indicates, what the foetus “is not” but not what it “is”.82  An example of 
such an ambiguity can be found in the Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994),83 the 
case in which the House of Lords rejected the view adopted by the Court of Appeal that 
the foetus is solely a part of the pregnant woman’s body; still, the House of Lords gave no 
precise statement about what it is.  In Lord Mustill’s words: 
I would … reject the reasoning which assumes that since (in the eyes of English law) 
the foetus does not have the attributes which make it a ‘person’ it must be an adjunct of 
the mother.  Eschewing all religious and political debate I would say that the foetus is 
neither.  It is a unique organism.  To apply to such an organism the principles of a law 
evolved in relation to autonomous beings is bound to mislead.84    
Secondly, in contrast to the view held by the majority, a minority of legal 
authorities and researchers do grant the foetus personality.  This is the position held, for 
instance, by the State of Missouri where the legislation considers conception as the onset 
of every human being’s life.  This was understood to extend the legal definition of person 
to include the foetus, and as an application of that, a drunken driver was held guilty of 
manslaughter after colliding with a car driven by a pregnant woman and killing her viable 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 279. 
80 See the discussion of the born alive rule page 108 below.   
81 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law,  183. James Richard Grant, "Should the Human Foetus Have Human 
Rights?" (University of Kent at Canterbury, 2002), (unpublished LLM dissertation), 19. 
82 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 183. 
83 Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), (1998) AC 245. 
84 Ibid., 255.  
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foetus.85  The other example is that of Commonwealth v Cass,86 the case in which a 
woman who was eight months pregnant was attacked in a way that resulted in her being 
injured, and her baby being stillborn.  The majority decided that the law of homicide 
should be extended to cover that case, and so held that ending the life of the foetus was 
homicide.87  Furthermore, regarding the issue of suing women for using illegal drugs 
during their pregnancy, in Whitner v State88 a woman was found guilty of child abuse 
because she had taken cocaine at a late stage in her pregnancy.  In reaching this decision, 
the Court interpreted the relevant Act’s definition of a child as a “… person under the age 
of eighteen”89 as including a viable foetus, a decision that was later upheld by the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina.90 
As should be clear from the above discussion, humanity is used to decide on 
personality, that is, whether and when an entity becomes a human is used to decide on 
whether and when it is a person.  However, the relationship between the two attributes is 
not always constructed in this way.  The different views concerning this issue will be 
presented as follows:   
                                                 
85 State v Knapp  843 SW 2d 345 (1992).  The Statutory provision was § 1.205, RSMo, as mentioned by 
John Seymour, "The Legal Status of the Fetus: An International Review," Journal of Law and Medicine 10, 
no. 1 (2002): 28-40, 32.  
86 467 NE 2d 1324 (Mass, 1984).  As cited by Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 140. 
87 467 NE 2d 1324 (Mass, 1984) at 1329.  As cited by Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 140.  In 
California, the definition of murder in the Panel Code was amended to be “… the unlawful killing of a 
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought”; however, the foetus was not defined in that law (Ibid., 
141).  The question asked is, does the definition’s mention of ‘a human being, or a fetus’ reflect a view that 
the foetus is not a human being? If so, on what basis was  the change then made?   
88 492 SE 2d 777 (1997).  As cited by Seymour, "The Legal Status of the Fetus: An International Review," 
32.  
89 S C Code Ann # 20-7-30 (1985).  As cited by Seymour, "The Legal Status of the Fetus: An International 
Review," 32. 
90 Whitner v State, 492 SE 2d 777 (SC, 1997), as mentioned in Seymour, "The Legal Status of the Fetus: An 
International Review," 32. 
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2.2.3 The humanity-personality relationship  
As previously stated, the relationship between humanity and personality, the latter 
being the first possible embodiment of the moral and legal status of the foetus, is 
controversial.  From a moral perspective, some writers have seen humanity as a sufficient 
condition for personality, hence they have deemed all humans, persons.91  However, 
others, like Mary Anne Warren,92 have separated the two concepts and denied that being 
human is a necessary or a sufficient condition for being a person.93   
Two reasons have been given for the preference of the term “person”.  The first is 
that the term “human” is unclear as it is considered a synonym for both “Homo sapiens” 
and “person,” whereas these terms cannot be synonyms of each other.  The second reason 
is that the term “person” allows the possibility of including non-human entities such as 
higher animals, extra-terrestrials, and robots within the moral community.94  Furthermore, 
some writers such as John Harris consider it “speciesism”, equal to the other types of 
discrimination such as racism and sexism, to restrict the moral standing embodied in 
moral status to human beings.  Accordingly, they avoid using the term “human”.95 
Nevertheless, there is real doubt about the accuracy of the differentiation between 
personality and humanity.  While talking about its meaning and criteria, many proponents 
                                                 
91 Johannes H C Sun, "Are All Human Beings Persons?," in The Moral Status of Persons: Perspectives on 
Bioethics, ed. Gerhold K. Becker (Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000). He quotes Loren Lomasky 
saying that “the question ‘how many persons are there in the room?’ is answered by counting the number of 
human individuals.  So understood, personhood is constituted by membership in the biological species 
Homo sapiens.” (Lomasky, Loren E.  (1992), "Concept of Person." In: Lawrence C.  Becker (ed.).  
Encyclopedia of Ethics, Vol.  2, pp.  950-956.  New York, London: Garland Publication, Inc.   950). As 
cited by Sun, "Are All Human Beings Persons?," 29. 
92 Warren, "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion."  Harris, The Value of Life, an Introduction to 
Medical Ethics, 22, 25. 
93 The significance of this issue is detailed when discussing the definition of legal personality as a 
humanity-based concept.  See page 103 below.   
94 Hart, "The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus", 169, 170. 
95 Harris, The Value of Life, an Introduction to Medical Ethics, 9, 10.  ———, "The Concept of the Person 
and the Value of Life," 296, 297.  
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of the concept of personality use a ‘humanity’ language.  This is apparent in Mary Anne 
Warren’s discussion of Albert Schweitzer’s view that life per se is a sufficient condition 
for full moral status, hence all living beings should enjoy it equally.  As to Mary Anne 
Warren, the main criticism levelled against this view is that it claims that each living 
being has a will to live, which necessitates having an ability to experience a desire to 
pleasure and a fear of pain, i.e. being sentient.  Since experiencing such feelings requires 
having equipment such as a nervous system and a brain processing that system’s input, 
beings that lack this equipment, such as plants and bacteria, cannot be attributed full and 
equal moral status.96  
However, as she herself notices, the standards used to measure the ability of plants 
and bacteria to experience pleasure and pain are human specific so their plausibility is 
questioned: 
[H]ow can we know that plants and microbes are not sentient?  Might they not have 
pleasant or painful experiences of which we know nothing, but which are as vivid to 
them as ours to us?  Perhaps they even have a conscious will to live.  How can we 
know that they do not, when we cannot experience their existence ‘from inside’, as we 
do our own?97  
In spite of this, she concludes that in the absence of an alternative way to measure how 
sentient such entities are, we should rely on the best available evidence depriving them of 
such an ability.98    
                                                 
96 Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, 34, 36. 
97 Ibid., 36.  
98 Ibid., 36, 37. 
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 Norman Ford justifies relying on ‘humanity’ language while discussing 
personality-related matters, on the fact that the human being is the paradigm of the 
person.  He argues that: 
Our ordinary concept of human persons is based on our understanding of a human 
being, a human individual.  None of us has ever met a person that was not an individual 
human being.  We cannot explain what a person is without reference to our knowledge 
of human being gained through experience.  It is only by analogy that we extend this 
notion to divine persons or persons by legal fiction, e.g.  colleges, corporations, 
political parties, etc.99   
 Still, building ‘personality’ on ‘humanity’ criteria raises questions about the 
reality of the differentiation made between them, and the plausibility of the allegation that 
‘personality’ is a neutral theory compared to ‘humanity’, which is said to be 
discriminatory,  preferring the human species to others.   
Regarding the legal discussion, the relationship between personality and humanity is 
also debatable.  On the one hand, there are legal positivists who deem personality a mere 
device that lawmakers can use to achieve any purpose they may want.  As such, it can be 
conferred on any being or thing regardless of their intrinsic qualities.  Humanity for those 
thinkers is unimportant in the conferral or withdrawal of personality.100  However, there are 
legal writers and authorities who consider humanity as sufficient and even necessary for 
personality, at least for the real legal personality.101 
 The other controversy is about the relationship between the moral and legal status 
of the foetus. 
                                                 
99 Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin?: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy, and 
Science (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 66. 
100 See  4.1.1 Defining legal personality as a purely legal concept.   
101 See  4.1.2 Defining legal personality as a humanity-based concept.   
 26
2. Setting the Scene 
 
2.2.4 The relationship between the moral and legal status of the foetus 
The question of the linkage between the moral and legal status of the foetus is, as 
Lung rightly observes, an initial question entailing a discussion of the relationship 
between morality and law.102  It has been suggested that this relationship can take one of 
three possible forms.  Firstly, the law is said to be predominated by morality and so the 
validation of legal orders and rules depends on how moral they are.  The reverse is true, 
according to the second model: morality is said to be subordinate to the law and so it is 
the latter that decides what is moral and immoral.  In the third model, morality and law 
are autonomous normative structures each of which has an impact on the other.103   
An echo of this classification can be found in the three models proposed to form 
the relationship between the moral and legal status of the foetus.  The first model is that 
the legal status is entirely determined by the moral one, and should be built on it, whilst 
the second suggests that the moral status is wholly determined by the legal one and 
should be based on that.  The third perspective, however, may be interpreted in two ways: 
in the first, legal status is a value-free technical term determined arbitrarily by lawmakers 
without considering moral status, which then has no influence on it.  In the second, the 
moral status and legal status have distinct relations with one another in the sense that each 
one has an impact on the other.  That is to say, granting an entity legal status has 
consequences that must be considered when deciding whether that entity should be 
granted moral status, if that status is attributed on consequential grounds.104  
Similarly, Ngaire Naffine states that there are three notions about the nature of the 
legal personality as the first possible embodiment of legal status.105  The first one adopts 
                                                 
102 Lang, "The Status of the Human Fetus," 427. 
103 Ibid., 427, 428. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects," 349. 
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what can be called the idea of purity of a person in law.  That is to say, the legal person is 
a purely artificial legal concept applied without regard to metaphysical presumptions.  
Accordingly, there is no linkage, and should not be one, between legal personality and 
non-legal grounds.106  The second notion claims that the legal person has inherent non-
legal characteristics making him morally important in a way that the law should take into 
account, by attributing legal personality to that entity.  Legal personality in this case is 
rooted in moral considerations.107  The third notion considers moral agency108 a 
precondition for being a legal person.  Moral personality, in this meaning, is essential for 
legal personality.109  
The question that might be asked is which of the above-mentioned models of 
linkage between the moral status and the legal status should be adopted.  The answer to 
this question is of great importance for the status of the foetus and also, if that status is 
proven essential in resolving its related issues, for the dilemmas surrounding it.  If either 
the legal status or the moral status is deemed the basis for the other, it is the one that 
should be established first.  The other can be easily determined afterward.  If, however, 
they are shown to be independent of one another, no such reliance, and so, no such 
establishment, is needed.  In this thesis, although the legal status of the foetus is that 
which is sought, the moral status is extensively studied because it is deemed the basis 
upon which the former should be based, as will be explained later.110 
The second position on the issue of the essentiality of the status of the foetus is 
one that sidesteps it, while discussing its related issues.  This will be discussed in the next 
section.   
                                                 
106 Ibid.   
107 Ibid., 349, 350. 
108 See the definition of moral agency page 129 below.   
109  Ibid., 350.  
110 See  4.2 Suggesting a new definition of legal personality.   
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2.3  Sidestepping the moral and legal status of the foetus  
In both moral and legal discussions regarding issues related to the foetus, there has 
been a tendency towards disregarding its status.  Hence the determination of that status is 
no longer the aim.  It is, rather, the determination of relationships that concern the foetus, 
or the interests of other parties, as will be shown shortly.  Obviously, studying such a 
trend is of great importance since discovering its accuracy should result in sidestepping 
the status of the foetus, and emphasising instead the alterative factors suggested by its 
followers.  As outlined in the introduction, this thesis will attempt to ascertain the status 
of the foetus first, before assessing its significance in determining the way in which the 
foetus should be treated.  In the following paragraphs, the tendency to sidestep the status 
of the foetus will initially be discussed in relation to the moral discussion, and then with 
regard to legal discussion.   
2.3.1 Moral discussions  
The status of the foetus has been excluded from the discussion about its related 
issues for different reasons.  As will presently be shown, it is firstly, claimed to be 
unimportant in solving these issues, and secondly, though it might be of considerable 
importance, it is said to be irresolvable, and so it is better to sidestep it.  Thirdly, it is 
claimed that being neutral requires ignoring such a controversial issue.   
Judith Jarvis Thomson relied on the first reason in her article entitled "A Defense 
of Abortion”.  In contrast to what has been indicated by the proponents of the status of the 
foetus, she claims that the issue of the legitimacy of abortion can be resolved no matter 
what the moral status of the foetus.  The fulfilment of the pregnant woman’s rights and 
welfare can be used as a basis for legitimising abortion even if the foetus is granted full 
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moral status and so, a right to life.111  In a similar vein, other feminists criticise 
approaches that emphasise the moral status of the foetus when tackling the issue of 
abortion.  Instead, they suggest an approach depending on the pregnant woman’s right to 
autonomy since in such an approach, women’s needs concerning abortion are more likely 
to be met.112   
The view that the question of moral status is irresolvable can be found in Mary 
Warnock’s statement on personality, as a suggested embodiment of moral status.  
According to her, the question of personality seems to imply that it is a question of fact, 
that is, by examining whether the foetus has particular traits, non-controversial answers 
can be reached.  Nonetheless, she insists, it is a question of value in the same way as the 
question of when the foetus begins to matter morally.  This is so because both need to be 
answered from a specific moral standing, and so different answers can be given, 
according to the different moral standings.113  The two questions, as she indicates, share 
another feature, which is the difficulty of comprehension, and so the better approach is to 
sidestep them and directly question whether the foetus can be granted rights of its own, as 
this is the aim of asking both questions: 
[T]he only way out of the difficulty is the short one: to bypass the concept of the person 
altogether.  After all, the notion was introduced only on the grounds that persons are the 
bearers of rights.  Since there seems no separately satisfactory way of distinguishing a 
person from a non-person, apart from their supposedly having rights, it seems better to 
take the direct route forward and ask whether or not human embryos have rights.114 
                                                 
111 Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," in The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, ed. Thomas 
Nagel Marshall Cohen, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974). 
112 Hart, "The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus", 152. 
113 Mary Warnock, "Do Human Cells Have Rights?," Bioethics 1, no. 1 (1987): 1-14,  2, 3. 
114 Ibid.  
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However, the question that might be asked here is whether it is possible to attribute rights 
to the foetus without discussing whether it is a person since personality is claimed to be 
the basis upon which such rights can be acquired.115   
Similarly, but without suggesting any alternative solutions, Søren Holm claims 
that:  
If we believe that our regulation of ES cell research, and all other matters involving 
embryos, should be consistent with and/or be derived from the correct view of the 
status of the embryo, then we will either have to wait a very long time for consensus on 
the correct view to emerge, or we will have to say that the correct view is the view held 
by the majority, which is rather disappointing interpretation of 'correct’.116  
Though Søren Holm is right about the difficulty, or impossibility, of reaching a consensus 
on the status of the foetus, his view is problematic in implying that views on that status 
can be classified as ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’.  In other words, this issue, as should be clear 
from this chapter, has philosophical, moral, and religious roots and so, opinions on it 
differ from one place and time to another.  Therefore, deeming a particular concept of the 
status of the foetus incorrect seems to be implausible.  Views may vary in their 
plausibility and some may be considered more reasonable than others because of, for 
instance, their efficiency in resolving practical problems, but considering other views 
incorrect seems to be far from being precise.   
As a consequence of the claim that the issue of the status of the foetus is difficult 
to solve and so should be sidestepped, the Warnock Committee in the UK did not make a 
                                                 
115 See for instance, Hoffman, "Personhood and Rights," 74.  Vardit Rispler Chaim, "The Right Not to Be 
Born, Abortion of the Disadvantaged Fetus in Contemporary Fatwas," in Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, 
War, and Euthanasia, ed. Jonathan E. Brockopp (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2003), 81, 82. 
116 Søren Holm, "Embryonic Stem Cell Research and the Moral Status of Human Embryos," Ethics, Laws 
and Moral Philosophy of Reproductive Bioethics 1, no. 1 (2005): 63-67, 67. 
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definitive statement about when an individual human being begins, or the precise status of 
the foetus.117  This has led to ambiguity in the position of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990, which is based on the Committee’s recommendations, on 
the issue.118 119    
The third view does not deny the significance of moral status in solving foetus-
related issues, yet it tries to sidestep the issue on a claim of neutrality.  By way of 
illustration, in the USA, a panel called the National Institutes of Health Embryo Research 
Panel was created in 1993 to decide on the permissibility of federal funding for 
experimentation on pre-implanted foetuses.  The Panel's main concern was the legitimacy 
of creating foetuses solely for use in experimentation.  It tried to do the task without 
considering the moral status of the foetus, as this, according to the Panel, is what is 
required to be independent from any religious or philosophical perspectives.120  Yet, the 
Panel was unable to sidestep the issue and instead concluded that some research on the 
pre-implanted foetus could be founded on a claim that foetuses do not have the 
appropriate moral status.  The foetus, in their words: 
[D]oes not have the same moral status as infants and children “because [it] lacks” 
developmental individuation …, the lack of even the possibility of sentience and most 
other qualities considered relevant to the moral status of persons, and the very high rate 
of natural mortality at this stage.121 
This tendency to sidestep the status of the foetus has also been shown by legal 
researchers and authorities.   
                                                 
117 Ford, When Did I Begin? : Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy, and Science, 5. 
118 Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 776, 777. 
119 For more details, see 42 below.   
120 National Institutes of Health, "Executive Summary", in Final Report of the Human Embryo Research 
Panel (27 September 1994), as reprinted in Do the Right Thing: A Philosophical Dialogue on the Moral 
and Social Issues of Our Time, ed. Francis J. Beckwith (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1996) 285.  As cited by 
Beckwith, "Abortion, Bioethics and Personhood: A Philosophical Reflection." 
121 Ibid. 
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2.3.2 Legal discussions  
Some legal researchers and authorities have tried to disregard the status of the 
foetus while discussing its related moral and legal dilemmas.  The first example of this is 
the American Supreme Court in the famous case of Roe v Wade,122 in which the Court 
was asked to decide on the legitimacy of abortion, and the authority that States have to 
prohibit it.  The Court claimed that:  
[We]…need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins [the point at which 
the personality of the foetus is claimed to begin].  When those trained in the respective 
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, 
the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position 
to speculate as to the answer.123 
According to this logic, the Court should have avoided the legal status of the foetus but 
this was not the case, as it then conceded a right to abortion to the pregnant woman on the 
premise that the foetus is not a human person by claiming that: “[i]f the suggestion of 
personality [of the foetus] is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the 
fetus' right to life is then guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth Amendment]”.124  The 
Court then, contradictorily to its previous announcement, adopted and built its verdict on, 
a viewpoint that denies that the foetus has legal personality.125  
A further example that shows this tendency to sidestep the issue of the legal status 
of the foetus, is that of negligence law, in which courts have responded to damages claims 
                                                 
122 Roe v Wade, (1973) 410 U.S. 113. 
123 Ibid., 159.   
124 Ibid., 156.  The Fourteenth Amendment says that: “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws protects persons’ right to life as mentioned above”.  U.S.C.A.  Const.  Amend.  
XIV.  S.  1.   
124 Beckwith, "Abortion, Bioethics and Personhood: A Philosophical Reflection."  
125 Ibid  
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concerning prenatal negligence resulting in the birth of injured or disabled children.  
Instead of considering the legal status of the foetus at the moment when the attack took 
place, in order to decide whether there had been a duty of care towards the foetus, courts 
in England, Canada, and Australia have decided to accept such claims on the grounds that 
one has a duty to take sensible care when one’s behaviour is likely to cause harm to a 
person who is intimately affected by that behaviour.  Applying this to the cases concerned 
requires holding the defendants responsible, because their behaviour was likely to cause 
harm to a pregnant woman, and result in her foetus being born injured or disabled.  
However, the courts have insisted that the foetus be born alive as a precondition for 
accepting the allegations.126  In Duval v Seguin, the High Court of Ontario judge stated 
that: 
[An unborn child] falls well within the area of potential danger which the driver is 
required to foresee and take reasonable care to avoid.  …  [I]t is not necessary in the 
present case to consider whether the unborn child was a person in law or at which stage 
she became a person.127    
The same approach was adopted by the English Court of Appeal in Burton v Islington 
Health Authority; De Martell v Merton and Sutton Health Authority.128  
A further example is that related to the position of some courts in the US, on the 
issue of the possibility of forcing a pregnant woman to take medicine or undergo invasive 
medical treatment against her will, in order to safeguard the life of the foetus.  They have 
issued decisions ordering pregnant women to undergo caesarean sections, and justified 
                                                 
126 Seymour, "The Legal Status of the Fetus: An International Review," 36, 37. 
127 Duval v Seguin, (1972) 26 D.L.R (3d) 418 and 433. 
128 Burton v Islington Health Authority; De Martell v Merton and Sutton Health Authority, (1992) 3 W.L.R. 
637. 
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that by relying on the state's right to protect the potential human life of the foetus.129  John 
Seymour indicates that the courts in these cases have not generally relied on the legal 
status of the foetus because the cases of medical treatment have been of an urgent nature, 
and there has been no time to consider definitional issues such as the legal status of the 
foetus.130 
The other important example of discarding the status of the foetus from the 
discussion concerning its related issues, is that of the European Court and Commission of 
Human Rights.  According to Article 2/1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),131 “…  [e]veryone's right to life shall be protected 
by law”.  The Commission and the Court have been asked whether the foetus is included 
under that Article, and so be entitled to a right to life protected by the Convention.  
Neither has given an answer, as was seen in X v United Kingdom,132 Paton v United 
Kingdom,133 and Vo v France.134   
In Paton v United Kingdom, in order to prevent his partner from having an 
abortion, the applicant claimed that by allowing abortion, United Kingdom law infringed 
the foetus’s right to life protected by Article 2 of the Convention.  The Commission stated 
that though used extensively, the term “everyone” is not defined in the Convention, and in 
the light of other Articles using the same term, (such as that protecting the right to liberty 
and security, that protecting the right to a fair trial, and that protecting the right to respect 
                                                 
129 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 154, 155. 
130 Ibid., 155-156.  
131 Which was included, like the rest of the Convention articles, in UK national law in 2000 by the Human 
Rights Act 1998,  R A McCall Smith's and J K Mason, Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 43-44. 
132 X v United Kingdom, Judgement dated July 27, 1979, as mentioned in Grant, "Should the Human Foetus 
Have Human Rights?”  70.  
133 Paton v United Kingdom, (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 408. 
134 Vo v France (2005) 40 E.H.R.R.12 259.   
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for private and family life), the term could not, except in rare cases, be applied to the 
foetus as it is linked to rights that could not be enjoyed prenatally.135  
After that, the Commission moved to examine three alternatives: whether Article 
2 gives the foetus no right to life at all, a right to life subordinate to the pregnant woman’s 
right to autonomy, or an absolute right to life.  It excluded the third alternative as it would 
be in conflict with the pregnant woman’s right to autonomy, and risk her life if the 
pregnancy was to continue on account of respecting the foetus’s right to life.  Regarding 
the other two alternatives, the Commission avoided giving an answer to whether the 
foetus has any right to life during the whole period of gestation.  Instead, it restricted 
itself to the circumstances of the case in hand where the woman was ten weeks pregnant, 
and her physical and mental health were endangered by the continuation of pregnancy.  It 
concluded that the abortion was justified even if the foetus at this early stage has a right to 
life.136  In its words: 
The Commission considers that it is not in these circumstances called upon to decide 
whether Article 2 does not cover the foetus at all or whether it recognises a 'right to life' 
of the foetus with implied limitations.  It finds that the authorisation, by the United 
Kingdom authorities, of the abortion complained of is compatible with Article 2 (1), 
first sentence because, if one assumes that this provision applies at the initial stage of 
the pregnancy, the abortion is covered by an implied limitation, protecting the life and 
health of the woman at that stage, of the 'right to life' of the foetus.137 
The Commission drew the same conclusion on the same basis in X v United Kingdom.138   
The other example is Vo v France139 in which a doctor’s negligence caused the 
applicant to have her five-month foetus aborted.  The doctor was cleared of a charge of 
                                                 
135 Paton v United Kingdom, 410. 
136 Ibid., 414, 415. 
137 Ibid., 416. 
138 Grant, "Should the Human Foetus Have Human Rights?" 70. 
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unintentional homicide on the basis that the abortus was not a human person within the 
meaning of the criminal code that protects against unintentional homicide.  This decision 
was upheld by the highest national court and the applicant then brought her case to ECHR 
on the basis that France had violated Article 2 of the convention.140  After mentioning the 
dispute on the legal status of the foetus in France, as well as in the other European states, 
the ECHR preferred not to tackle that issue and concluded that even if the foetus was 
considered a human person and so granted a right to life, France could not be held guilty 
of the violation of the requirements of Article 2, as it had sufficiently fulfilled them in the 
present case.  It concluded: 
[T]he Court is convinced that it is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, 
to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the 
purposes of Art.2 of the Convention.  As to the instant case, it considers it unnecessary 
to examine whether the abrupt end to the applicant's pregnancy falls within the scope of 
Art.2, seeing that, even assuming that that provision was applicable, there was no 
failure on the part of the respondent state to comply with the requirements relating to 
the preservation of life in the public health sphere.141 
The Court attracted strong criticism for its failure to address the main issue in the 
case, the legal status of the foetus.  In Tanya Goldman’s words:  
[T]he role of a judge sitting on the ECHR is to interpret the Convention, and that 
responsibility does not change according to the difficulty or the implications of 
an issue.  In Vo, the ECHR judges failed to address the main issue at bar, and in 
so doing may have side-stepped their judicial role to interpret the language of the 
Convention.142   
                                                                                                                                                  
139 Vo v France (2005) 40 E.H.R.R.12 259. 
140 Ibid.   
141 Ibid., 295. 
142 Tanya Goldman, "Vo v. France and Fetal Rights: The Decision Not to Decide," Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 18 (2005), retrieved from http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss18/goldman.shtml#fn1, 
at 13.04.2006. 
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 Furthermore, some of the judges in that case believed that it was the Court’s duty 
to tackle the issue of interpretation of the Convention’s terms, and reach a conclusion on 
whether the foetus is included in the meaning intended by the Convention’s drafters.  
Judge Costa declared: 
It is the task of lawyers, and in particular judges, especially human-rights judges, to 
identify the notions … that correspond to the words or expressions in the relevant legal 
instruments.  .  .  .  Why should the Court not deal with the terms "everyone" and the 
"right to life" (which the European Convention on Human Rights does not define) in 
the same way it has done from its inception with the terms "civil rights and 
obligations", "criminal charges" and "tribunals", even if we are here concerned with 
philosophical, not technical, concepts?143   
 However, in a more recent case, the Court declined again to clarify its position 
regarding the issue, but on another account.  In the case of Evans v the UK,144 Natallie 
Evans and her ex-partner Howard Johnston had created foetuses using their own eggs and 
sperm prior to Ms Evans being rendered infertile by cancer treatment.  As her ex-partner 
refused to let her use the frozen foetuses, and asked for them to be destroyed because he 
no longer wanted children with her, Ms Evans applied to the UK courts asking to be 
allowed to use the foetuses without her ex-partner’s consent.  One of the grounds for her 
application was the claim that the destruction of the frozen foetuses would breach their 
right to life.  However, the UK courts refused her application and declared, in replying to 
her last mentioned claim, that the foetus is not a person, and so has no rights including 
that to life.145  Evans applied to the ECHR claiming that, by allowing frozen foetuses to be 
destroyed, when one of the partners withholds his or her consent, UK law infringed their 
right to life protected by Article 2 of the Convention.  As in the previous cases, the ECHR 
                                                 
143 Vo v France 300. 
144 Evans v the UK, (2006) No.  6339/05 E.C.H.R. 
145 Ibid., para. 7-22. 
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declined to give a clear indication on its position on that claim, and upheld the UK courts’ 
refusal to grant the foetus personality and a right to life, because the issue is included in 
“the margin of appreciation,” the area within which each State has the authority to apply 
its own national law.  In the Court’s words:        
The applicant complained that the provisions of English law requiring the embryos to 
be destroyed once J withdrew his consent to their continued storage violated the 
embryos’ right to life, contrary to Article 2 of the Convention …, however, … in the 
absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the 
beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of 
appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this 
sphere.  Under English law, as was made clear by the domestic courts in the present 
applicant’s case … an embryo does not have independent rights or interests and cannot 
claim—or have claimed on its behalf—a right to life under Article 2.  There has not, 
accordingly, been a violation of that provision in the present case.146  
What can be concluded here is that, in the light of the unwillingness of the Court 
to resolve the dispute over the meaning of Article 2, the position of the European 
Convention of Human Rights on the legal status of the foetus remains unclear.  It is still 
controversial whether that Article includes the foetus, as the applicants in the above-
mentioned cases claimed, or excludes it, as alleged by the defendants in those cases, some 
researchers,147 and the supreme courts in some of the Convention’s signatories, such as 
those in Austria and Norway.148  
The other illustration of the disregard of the legal status of the foetus is that held 
by John Seymour who distinguishes between two approaches adopted by courts to cases 
involving the foetus.  The first of these is what he calls “the definitional approach”, in 
                                                 
146 Ibid., para. 45-47. 
147 Like Goldman, "Vo v. France and Fetal Rights: The Decision Not to Decide,"  
148 Lang, "The Status of the Human Fetus," 429. 
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which the emphasis is placed on defining whether the foetus is a person, a body part, a 
potential life, or a life, i.e. the legal status of the foetus.  This status is, according to this 
approach, the basis on which the foetus-related cases can be solved.  The example he cites 
for the approach is that some courts in the US have tried to look at whether wrongful 
death statutes apply to stillbirths, by examining whether the foetus can be considered a 
person in the meaning intended in those statutes.149   
The second approach is what he calls “the relational approach”, where, instead of 
the emphasis being placed on the characteristics of the foetus, it is put on principles and 
concepts of a particular law and the consequences of applying it.  In this regard, the foetus 
is considered a distinct entity with intrinsic values, yet deciding whether a particular law 
should be applied to it and whether its interests should be protected, depends on the 
relationships between the pregnant woman and third parties, if there are any.  In the light 
of such relationships, it might be appropriate to protect the interests of the foetus as, for 
instance, in the case where there is a doctor or a midwife caring for the pregnant woman.  
It is reasonable to regard these professionals as owing a duty of care towards the pregnant 
woman and the foetus, and entitle the latter to a damages claim if that duty is neglected.  
It is the nature of the relationship that makes the law acknowledge the existence of the 
foetus, rather than the nature of the latter.150  The practical instance of this approach, 
according to him, is that the court in the cases of Merrill151 and Gentry v Gilmore152 
differentiated clearly between allowing the pregnant woman to abort her foetus, and 
destroying it without her consent.  In the first case, the court declared that the state's 
interest lies in regulating and facilitating the woman's exercise of her right to autonomy, 
                                                 
149 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law,  185. 
150 Ibid.  
151 Ibid., 186.  He does not mention the case details.    
152 613 So.2d 1241 (Ala. 1993).  As cited by Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 186.   
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whereas in the second case it was found to lie in protecting the pregnant woman and the 
foetus from the wrongdoing of a third party.  Such judgements cannot be reached if the 
definitional approach is adopted, since the emphasis will be on whether the foetus is a 
potential life or whether it is a person.153   
Adopting the relational approach is claimed to imply changing the nature of the 
issue, because reaching an agreement on the legal status of the foetus is no longer the aim.  
This is because reaching a consensus on such a matter is unlikely, and insisting on 
reaching that consensus misconstrues the real problem encountered by the law.  That is to 
say, attributing legal personality and rights and duties associated with it to the foetus is, as 
the Supreme Court of Canada has declared, a classificatory task aiming towards a 
certainty that cannot be reached in the light of the normative nature of the law.154  The 
relational approach is more suitable because it allows the law to consider relative factors 
in each case a claim is being made on behalf of a foetus, such as the context, the parties 
involved, their relationships, and the principles upon which the considered law is based.  
In such an approach, the inconsistency embodied in the treatment of foetus-related issues 
in law is acceptable, even desirable, as it allows the law to be flexible while considering 
whether it should intervene and to what extent, to protect the interests of the foetus.  The 
task that should be dealt with here, John Seymour insists, is the illustration of the 
principles underlying the variation in the law's response to claims made on behalf of the 
foetus.155    
A similar approach is held by Hanson, who justifies it on account of the 
pragmatism of the law in allowing it to deal with problems in a practical way, without 
                                                 
153 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 186.  
154 Tremblay v Daigle (1989) 62 DLR (4th) 634, 650, as mentioned in Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 
186.  
155 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 186, 187. 
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following a rigid set of ideas.  This pragmatism, when applied to abortion, enables the law 
to permit it, no matter what the status of the foetus: 
A lot of ink has been spilt on the status of the foetus.  Whilst this raises very interesting 
philosophical and moral questions, the law deals with this in a wholly pragmatic way.  
The law is not metaphysical, and the quasi-theological idea of “two persons in one” is 
not one that the law can take in.  This amongst other things enables abortion to be 
carried out.156           
As explained above, positions concerning foetus-related issues can be divided into 
two groups: those that regard the issue of the moral and legal status of the foetus as a 
starting point for tackling its related issues, and those that disregard that issue for 
different reasons.  Nevertheless, some positions, though of paramount importance, seem 
to be unclassifiable because of their ambiguity.  For example, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990, which governs foetal research in the UK,157 takes the 
position that any research in the UK involving creating, keeping, or utilising foetuses 
outside the human body must be licensed by the Authority created by the Act,158 and in 
order for the Authority to issue such a license, several conditions must be met.  First, the 
research project must be necessary or desirable according to the categories specified in 
the Act.159  Second, no license can be issued to research projects involving the prohibited 
                                                 
156 B, Hanson, 'The Rights of the Individual in Maternity Care' at 'Whose Right is Right? Joint Conference 
of RCOG/RCM Standing Committee Meeting, 24 June 2002, RCOG.  As mentioned in Grant, "Should the 
Human Foetus Have Human Rights?" 63. 
157 Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 762. 
158 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 Chapter.  37, 5 (1).  
159 These categories according to Schedule 2, paragraph 3(2) of the HFEA 1990 are:   
(a) promoting advances in the treatment of infertility, (b) increasing knowledge about the causes of 
congenital disease, (c) increasing knowledge about the causes of miscarriages, (d) developing more 
effective techniques of contraception, or (e) developing methods for detecting the presence of gene or 
chromosome abnormalities in foetuses before implantation.  And the there additional categories added by 
2(2) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001 are: (f) increasing 
knowledge about the development of foetuses; (g) increasing knowledge about serious disease, or (h) 
enabling any such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments for serious disease. 
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activities listed by the Act,160 and third, explicit consent must be given by the providers of 
the gametes (ova and sperm).  This consent must be given in writing161 for research162 
after the donators have been informed about all the relevant information,163 and the 
consent can be withdrawn at any time before the use of the gametes.164  The only foetuses 
that can be used in research are those that are spare following IVF, and those created 
solely for the purpose of research.165  Finally, the research must not be undertaken on 
foetuses of more than 14 days gestation.166    
Such terms and conditions have been given different readings by commentators 
attempting to grasp the Act’s position on the legal status of the foetus.  Some researchers 
such as Steinberg see the protection provided to the foetus by the Act as a basis upon 
which legal personality might be attributed to it.  In Steinberg’s words: 
[W]hile the Act might not, in itself, establish embryo personhood … it serves as a 
powerful basis for extending the embryo 'protectionist' principle that characterises it … 
the language used … creates a legal (precedential) basis for arguing that embryos in or 
outside the IVF context are legal persons (after implantation).167   
However, some researchers, like Robertson, see the control given over the foetus's fate as 
an expression of ownership.168  This ambiguity might be explained by referring to the fact 
that the Act was based on the Warnock Committee Report 1984, on the embryo research 
                                                 
160 Examples of these activities, according to Section 13 3 HFEA 1990, are: (a) keeping or using a foetus 
after the appearance of the primitive streak, (b) placing a foetus in any animal, (c) keeping or using a foetus 
in any circumstances in which regulations prohibit its keeping or use, or (d) replacing a nucleus of a cell of 
a foetus with a nucleus taken from a cell of any person, foetus or subsequent development of a foetus. 
161 Sched.  3 (1) of HFEA 1990. 
162 Sched.  3 (2) of HFEA 1990. 
163 Sched.  3  (3) of HFEA 1990. 
164 Sched.  3 (4) of HFEA 1990. 
165 Sched.  2 (1) of HFEA 1990.   
166 S.  3, 3(a), 4.   
167 Steinberg, D.L.  (1997) Bodies in Glass: Genetics, Eugenics, Embryo Ethics.  Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 168–169.  As in Fox, "Pre-Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and 
Representation of the Embryo," 176. 
168 JA Robertson, "In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos," Virginia Law Review 76, no. 3 
(1990): 437-517, 454, 455.  His statement is fully quoted later in this thesis.  See page 227. 
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and fertility treatment,169 which, according to Marie Fox,170 failed to resolve the issue of 
the juridical status of the foetus. 
In summary, four conclusions can be drawn.  The first is that it is controversial 
whether it is necessary to determine the status of the human foetus in order to resolve its 
related legal and moral dilemmas, such as abortion and foetal research.  That is to say, 
whilst the majority think that such status is essential for resolving these issues, others 
oppose this view and suggest alternative solutions like the relational approach adopted by 
John Seymour.171  The second conclusion reached is that, though agreeing on the 
importance of the status of the foetus in resolving its related issues, the majority of moral 
and legal researchers and authorities differ over which status should be attributed.  
Thirdly, there are moral and legal controversies over the relationship between personality, 
as the first embodiment of the moral and legal status of the foetus, and humanity.  Finally, 
it is clear that the relationship between the moral and legal status of the foetus is 
debatable.   
One more thing worth mentioning concerns the use of the term status.  In the 
previous discussions, the status of the foetus is perceived to be either that of a person or 
of a property species, according to the distinction generally adopted by modern law.172  
However, for some writers, like Søren Holm,173 the term status implies having moral or 
legal worth.  Therefore, questioning whether the foetus has any moral or legal status 
means questioning whether it has moral or legal worth.  This understanding of the term 
                                                 
169 Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 776, 777.  
170 Fox, "Pre-Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the 
Embryo," 171. 
171 See 40 above.   
172 Davies and Naffine, Are Persons Property?, 51.  P. Ducor, "The Legal Status of Human Materials," 
Drake Law Review 44 (1996): 195-260, 198.  In the words of the latter, “[T]he distinction between subject 
of rights and object of rights [the terms he uses to denote persons and property] underlies the existence of 
and is a prerequisite to every legal system.”  
173 Holm, "Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy," 497. 
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moral and legal status can be found in other writings.  For example, after defining moral 
status as: “… a continuum of values ranging from nothing to that of a normal human adult 
who is unquestionably a person and a moral agent”,174 Mary Mahowald proceeds to define 
moral status in the same way as Søren Holm.  That is, in order to prove the distinction she 
holds between moral agency and moral status, she gives an example of an entity that, 
though it lacks moral agency, has some moral status:     
Moral agency is … distinguishable from moral status or moral standing because the 
latter concepts are applicable to entities whose personality is questionable or absent.  
…  Consider, for example, human embryos or profoundly retarded humans.  The 
fact that such entities are not capable of exercising moral agency does not imply 
that they have no moral status or standing, or that those who are moral agents have 
no moral responsibility toward them.175 
Regardless of the accuracy of the distinction she attempts to make between moral 
agency and moral status,176 it is obvious that Mary Mahowald uses moral status to refer to 
a particular moral value that contradicts her previous indication that moral status is “… a 
continuum of values ranging from nothing”.  Having nothing, or being a species or 
property, is perceived, in her preceding definition of moral status, to be an entity’s status, 
while that cannot be the case in light of her subsequent example.177  In this thesis, 
however, the terms moral status and legal status will be understood as the mere 
                                                 
174 Mary Mahowald attributes this definition to Summer, L.W (Summer, L.W.  1981, Abortion and Moral 
Theory, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  As cited by Mary B. Mahowald, "Person" in 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Rev. Ed, ed. W. T. Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1995), 
1938).  However, she apparently supports it.  See Mahowald, "Person", 1938.   
175 Mahowald, "Person", 1938.    
176 If moral agency is understood as a necessary condition for the status of persons, associated by an 
understanding of moral obligations as a transaction between moral agents, that is, from one agent to 
another, no moral value can be attributed to any entity that lacks moral agency.  See Section  4.2.2 Basing 
moral personality on moral agency.       
177 The probability that the phrase ‘legal status’ may be understood as an indication of a particular legal 
standing seems to be the reason behind John Seymour’s clarification at the beginning of a chapter entitled 
‘The legal status of the fetus” that the use of that term has no such implication Seymour, Childbirth and the 
Law, 135.   
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description of an entity’s standing that might be that of a moral or legal person, i.e. moral 
or legal worth, or that of a species of property, i.e. stripped of any moral or legal worth.   
In summary, this chapter has shown the controversies surrounding the moral and 
legal status of the foetus as encountered in the relevant Western literature.  The 
importance of the issue in resolving the moral and legal dilemmas provoked or revived by 
reproductive technologies such as abortion and foetal research, is hotly debated.  While it 
is widely regarded by many legal and ethical authorities and writers as the starting-point 
for solving these dilemmas, it is sidestepped by others because of its unimportance or 
irresolvability, as they claim.  Furthermore, amongst those believing in its essentiality, the 
status that should be accorded to the foetus and from when, the significance of humanity 
in determining it, and the relationship between its moral and legal concepts, are contested.  
This thesis tackles these controversies as its theme in the way outlined in the introduction 
and starts by introducing Shari’a as the basis for analysis and evaluation. 
3. Introducing Shari’a  
3 Introducing Shari’a                         
As indicated earlier, the perspective adopted in this thesis is based upon Shari’a, 
which is frequently and misleadingly translated into English as Islamic law.178  The 
clarification of this perspective requires an explanation of the concept of Shari’a.  
However, in order to adequately explain this concept and show how it can be relied on in 
the discussion of the moral and legal status of the foetus, the Islamic concept of human 
beings must be illustrated.  Thus, the latter will be explained first, followed by a 
discussion of the concept of Shari’a.   
3.1 The Islamic concept of human beings 
In Islam, the nature of human beings and the mission they are required to fulfil are 
inextricably intertwined.  The former constitutes the rationale behind choosing human 
beings by God to fulfil the latter.  Therefore, it seems quite plausible to explain the nature 
of human beings first, and then proceed to elucidate how this nature has come to entitle 
them to that mission.  These two points, as will presently be shown, are, besides being of 
significance for understanding the concept of Shari’a and so clarifying the basis of 
analysis and evaluation in this thesis, important too in solving several issues related to the 
determination of the moral and legal status of the foetus.   
3.1.1 The nature of human beings  
 In Islam, human beings are regarded as beings of multidimensional nature: 
biological and intellectual.  This is indicated in the following Qur’anic verses: 
                                                 
178 Mawil Y. Izzi Deen Samarrai, "Islamic Environmental Ethics: Law and Society," in Ethics of 
Environment and Development: Global Challenge, International Response ed. J. Ronald Engel and Joan 
Gibb Engel (Tucson University of Arizona Press, 1990), 189.    
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Such is He, the Knower of all things, hidden and open, the Exalted (in power), the 
Merciful.  He who has made everything which He has created most good: He began 
the creation of man with (nothing more than) clay.  And made his progeny from a 
quintessence of the nature of a fluid despised.  But He fashioned him in due 
proportion, and breathed into him something of His spirit.  And He gave you (the 
faculties of) hearing and sight and feeling (and understanding): little thanks do ye 
give!179  
 The body, which is referred to in these verses as clay, is the biological 
component.180  It is indicated to be perfect in creation: “… fashioned … in due 
proportion,” as the previous verses stated, or “… created … in the best of moulds,” 181 as 
in another verse.  It is also believed to be a degree-admitted object, that is, not one that 
comes into existence as we know it and ceases to exist as such at once, but rather 
undergoes a series of stages that end in its existence or disappearance.  The Qur'an reads:   
Verily We created man from a product of wet earth; Then placed him as a drop (of 
seed) in a safe lodging; Then fashioned We the drop a clot, then fashioned We the 
clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones 
with flesh, and then produced it as another creation.  So blessed be Allah, the Best 
of creators!182    
Despite its perfection in creation, the human body resembles, to some extent, the 
bodies of other entities, higher animals in particular.183  This very fact rules out the 
possibility that the body might be the distinguishing element of human beings since what 
                                                 
179 32: 6, 9.  The first number refers to the chapter (swrh in Arabic) while the second refers to the verse(s) 
(āyt/ ʾāyāt in Arabic).  
180 Jamal A. Badawi, "Humanity and Creation, an Islamic Perspective," (paper presented at the International 
Seminar on Human Genetic and Reproductive Technologies: Comparing Religious and Secular 
Perspectives, Cairo, 6-9/02/2006 2006), 3. 
181 95: 04.   
182 23:12-14.  
183 Hassan Hathout, "Human Genetic and Reproductive Technologies: Comparing Religious and Secular 
Perspectives, an Islamic Perspective," (paper presented at the International Seminar on Human Genetic and 
Reproductive Technologies: Comparing Religious and Secular Perspectives, Cairo, 6-9/02/2006 2006), 3. 
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distinguishes a thing or a being from other things or beings, must be that which is peculiar 
to itself not the aspects that it shares with others.184  As Ibn Miskawaih puts it: 
Every existent, be it animal, plant, or inanimate object, as well as their simple 
elements,/namely: water, fire, earth, and air, and also the celestial bodies - every 
one of these has certain faculties, aptitudes, and actions which make it what it is and 
distinguish it from everything else, and other faculties, aptitudes, and actions which 
it shares with the rest.  As man is the only existent whose desired end is a 
praiseworthy character and satisfactory actions, it is necessary that we do not 
consider at this time those of his faculties, aptitudes, and actions which he shares 
with the other existents, for this falls within the scope of another art and another 
science called “Natural Science.”  As for the actions, faculties, and aptitudes which 
characterize him as man and by which his humanity and virtues are realized, they 
are the voluntary matters which are related to the faculty of reflection and 
discernment.185    
In this way, Ibn Miskawaih indicates that what differentiates human beings from 
other entities is their existence as intellectual beings.  They have rationality, cognition, 
volition and aesthetic taste, which are referred to in the following Qur’anic verse, “… and 
He [God] gave you (the faculties of) hearing and sight and feeling (and 
understanding).”186  These intellectual faculties are believed to be an expression of a 
supra-biological component, i.e. the spirit that is attributed to God, “… something of His 
spirit”.187    
                                                 
184 Yasin, Mḥmd Nʿym. "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ 
w al-Tjārb al-ʿlmyt." In Abḥāth Fqhyh fy Qḍāyā Tbyh Mʿāṣrt, edited by 
Mḥmd Nʿym Yasin, 49-133.  Amman: Dār al-Nfāʾs, 1999. 57. 
185 Ahmad ibn Muhammad Miskawaih, The Refinement of Character: A Translation from the Arabic of--'S 
Tahdhib Al-Akhlaq by Constantine K. Zurayk, trans. Constantine K. Zurayk (Beirut: The American 
University of Beirut, 1968), 11. 
186 The Qur'an  32: 9. 
187 32: 9.  See Jaafar S. Idris, "Our Humanness Unalterable Essence and Changeable Actuality," (paper 
presented at the International Seminar on Human Genetic and Reproductive Technologies: Comparing 
Religious and Secular Perspectives, Cairo, 6-9/02/2006 2006), 11. 
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The spirit or the soul 188 is the metaphysical component of human beings and the 
trait that grounds their cognitive and voluntary capacities.  Being metaphysical makes it 
virtually impossible to define substantively, in terms of what it is; therefore, many 
Moslem scholars define it functionally, in terms of what it does.  For example, Al-Jurjani 
in his book of al-Ta’rifat (the Definitions), defines the human spirit as “… that nicety of 
the human creature which knows and perceives and which is superimposed on the animal 
spirit derived from the world of ordinance.”189  Abu Hamad Al-Ghazali gives a similar 
definition when he says that, “[t]he spirit is that aspect of man which acquires knowledge 
                                                 
188 In the Qur’an and Sunnah, there are two terms used to refer to the incorporeal constituent of the human 
being, viz.  ‘ruh’ and ‘nafs’, that are translated into English as spirit and soul respectively (See for example, 
E.  E.  Calverley, "Doctrines of the Soul (Nafs and Roh) in Islam1," The Muslim World 33, no. 4 (1943).).  
The use of the term ‘ruh’ or spirit to denote the spiritual part of man can be found in the Qur'anic verse 
(38:72) when the story of Adam’s creation is told, “[a]nd when I have fashioned him and breathed into him 
of My Spirit [ruh], then fall down before him prostrate”.  In the same meaning the term ‘nafs’ or soul is 
used in the following Qur'anic verses: “… but ah! thou soul [nafs] at peace!”, (89:27)  “… when the wrong-
doers reach the pangs of death and the angels stretch their hands out (saying): deliver up your souls 
[anfusakum],” (6:93) “… but as for him who feared to stand before his Lord and restrained his soul [nafs] 
from lust,” (79:40) and “[l]o! the soul [nafs] enjoineth unto evil, save that whereon my Lord hath 
mercy.”(12:53) However, the terms are not always synonymous.  In addition to referring to the incorporeal 
constituent of the human being, each of the terms ‘ruh’, spirit, and ‘nafs, soul, has other uses.  Several 
Qur'anic verses can be cited to show this.  Concerning the term ‘ruh’ or spirit, it is used to mean the Qur’an, 
(42:52) the inspiration that comes from God to His messengers, (40:15) and command or ordainment of 
God.  The Qur'an read, “[t]hey are asking thee concerning the Spirit.  Say: the Spirit is by command of my 
Lord, and of knowledge ye have been vouchsafed but little.” (17:85) The term ‘nafs’ or soul is utilised to 
refer to self or person, that is, man as a whole, as in the Qur’anic verse that reads, “When ye enter houses, 
salute one another [anfusakum] with a greeting from Allah, blessed and sweet”, (24:61) and “[e]very soul 
[nafs] is a pledge for its own deeds.” (74:38) Unlike the soul ‘nafs’, ‘the spirit, ‘ruh’ cannot be used to 
denote self or person (Ibn Al-Qaiyim, Mḥmd bn Aby Bkr al-Dmshqy. Al-Ruh. (n.p.): 
al-Rḥmh ll-Nshr w al-Twzyʿ w al-Āntāj, (n.d.)). Incorrectly, Francis T.  Cooke 
attributes Ibn al-Qaiyim to saying that one of the term nafs’ uses is the body (Francis T. Cooke, "Ibn Al-
Qaiyim’s Kitab Al-Ruh," The Muslim World 25, no. 2 (1935): 129-144, 143).  After referring to all these 
different uses of the terms ‘nafs’, soul and ‘ruh’, spirit, Ibn al-Qaiyim points out that both share the 
meaning of being the source of life the body enjoys, and concludes that the difference between the two lies 
in qualities not in essence (Ibn Al-Qaiyim, Al-Ruh, 288, 289). Cooke, "Ibn Al-Qaiyim’s Kitab 
Al-Ruh,” 143.)  Thus, they can be interchangeably used to denote the spiritual part of the human being by 
which he/she is alive as human in a morally relevant sense. (Ibn Al-Qaiyim, Al-Ruh, 288, 
289).  The same manner will be followed in this thesis, that is, the terms soul and spirit will be used 
interchangeably.  A clarification will, however, be made if either is used to refer to a thing other than the 
spiritual part of the human being.   
189 A-Ta’rifat (Al-Halabi Publication, 1357 H., 1938 A.D.), p.  99.  As cited by Mohammed Na'im Yasin,, 
"The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings," in 
Human Life - Its Inception and End as viewed by Islam ed. Ali Al-saif Khaled Al-Mazkur, Ahmad Raja'ii 
Al-Gindi, Abd Al-Sattar Abu Ghuddah (Kuwait: The Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences, 1985b), 
379. 
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and experiences the sufferings or sorrow and the joys of happiness.”190  Muhammad 
Na’im Yasin gives a more detailed description of the spirit in light of its cognitive 
capacities.  The spirit, according to him, is the substance:  
[T]hat grasps the various meanings that can be grasped, … learns the various 
branches of knowledge, grasps their analytical findings, and deduces details from 
generalities, generalities from details, and so on.  It is also … [that] that experiences 
the various emotions of pain, joy, happiness, and sorrow; and it is … that is pleased 
and displeased, enjoys and feels miserable, happy or angry, hopes and despairs, 
loves and hates, knows and denies, etc.191  
Besides rational acts, the spirit is also defined as being the seat of all voluntary or 
autonomous acts.192  
 Being at this level of importance does not deny the soul’s need of the body.  In 
spite of the soul being able to perform some functions like “… experiencing the pains of 
sorrow, grief, and melancholy, and the joys of happiness and pleasure” independently of 
the body,193 the interference of the body is necessary with regard to its other functions.194  
The body is construed here as the servant of the soul that receives and implements its 
orders and instructions.  As Abu Hamed Al-Ghazali puts it, “[t]he organs are vehicles for 
the spirit.  It strikes with hands, hears with ears, sees with eyes, and learns the truth about 
                                                 
190 Abu Hamed Al-Ghazali, Ihaya’ Ulum Al-Din, vol.  4 (Beirut: Dar Al-Ma’rifah), p.  494.  As cited by  
Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
379. 
191 Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
379.  
192 Ibid., 380.  As he expresses it, “[o]ne of its most important effects [of the spirit] is voluntary movement.  
Every voluntary activity performed by man is an effect of the spirit.  Every human artifact in this world is a 
result of the effect the spirit has on the body, for human bodies are the machinery and the troops of spirits.”  
193 Abu Hamed Al-Ghazali, Ihyay’ Ulum Al-Din, vol.  4, Beirut: Dar Al-Ma’rifah, p 494.  As cited by 
Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
379, 380. 
194 Ibid.   
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things by itself.”195  This concept is crucial in ascertaining the status of the foetus as will 
be explained later in this thesis.196 
 Human beings, then, are viewed in Islam as entities composed of bodies and 
souls, and distinguished from others by the capacity for cognition and volition that they 
acquire by virtue of their souls.  Determining this nature in this way helps in 
understanding the rationale behind the selection of human beings to be God’s vicegerents 
on earth, hence the revelation of Shari’a and its nature as the basis of analysis and 
assessment in this thesis.  It also helps solve some important issues related to ascertaining 
the moral and legal status of the foetus, namely, replying to the criticism levelled at 
choosing moral agency as the criterion of personality,197 and determining the timing of the 
ensoulment event.198       
3.1.2 The human beings’ raison d’être  
Understanding the rationale behind the creation of the human being is 
indispensable for understanding Shari’a as the yardstick against which ideas and 
arguments discussed in this thesis are measured.  In addition, it is extremely significant in 
deciding on some issues related directly to the moral and legal status of the foetus, such 
as the criterion of personality as the first possible embodiment of the moral and legal 
status of the foetus.199  This rationale is intimately connected to the Islamic concept of the 
universe as a teleological phenomenon.  Everything in this universe is created to fulfil 
ends determined by the metaphysical or ethical arms of the Will of God.  Regarding the 
metaphysical part, everything, literally speaking, is believed to be created for an aim 
                                                 
195 Ibid.  
196 See  5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event.  
197 See  4.2.2.4 The nature of being human and the marginal humans dilemma.   
198 See  5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event.   
199 See  4.2.2.2 The justification of the selection of moral agency as the criterion of moral personality. 
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whose fulfilment is essential for the existence of others.  The existence of the whole 
universe is, in turn, contingent on the harmony between its mutually dependent parts.200  
The Qur’an reads: “... everything We have created and assigned to it its measures, its 
character and destiny.”201  In addition: “[c]ertainly, His will be done.  To everything He 
prescribed a measure.”202  As Ismail al-Faruqi succinctly states:  
From the inanimate little pebble in the valley, the smallest plankton on the surface 
of the ocean, the microbial flagellate in the intestine of the woodroach, to the 
galaxies and their suns, the giant redwoods and whales and elephants-everything in 
existence, by its genesis and growth, its life and death, fulfils a purpose assigned to 
it by God, which is necessary for other beings.203  
The essence of the metaphysically determined purposes is the absence of freedom 
in pursuing them.  All creatures ‘have’ by their very nature to fulfil the tasks they have 
been created to perform because their existence depends on that.  As Al-Faruqi puts it, 
“[the metaphysical] will of God is realized with the necessity of natural law.”204  This 
compliance with the laws of nature, or the metaphysical imperatives, is considered an act 
of obedience.  All creations regardless of whether they are animate or inanimate are 
believed to be in a continuous state of submission to God for they must all comply with 
His rules and commandments, i.e. the metaphysical imperatives. 
Many verses of the Qur'an demonstrate this point.  For example, all are believed to 
submit to Him.  The Qur'an reads: “[d]o they seek for other than the Religion of Allah.-
while all creatures in the heavens and on earth have, willing or unwilling, bowed to His 
                                                 
200 Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life 3ed. (Herndon, Virginia: 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995), 55 and 59. 
201 54: 49.  As translated by Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 56.  
202 65: 3.  As translated by Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 56.  
203 Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 55. 
204 Ibid., 5. 
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Will (Accepted Islam), and to Him shall they all be brought back.”205  Also, all bow down 
to Him: “[s]eest thou not that to Allah bow down in worship all things that are in the 
heavens and on earth,- the sun, the moon, the stars; the hills, the trees, the animals; and a 
great number among mankind?”206  Further, all creatures glorify Him: “[w]hatever is in 
the heavens and on earth, let it declare the Praises and Glory of Allah, for He is the 
Exalted in Might, the Wise”,207 and obey Him: “[t]o Him belongs every being that is in 
the heavens and on earth: all are devoutly obedient to Him.”208  
 Human beings are no exception.  Like all other creatures, they have to obey the 
laws of their existence.  In growing and fulfilling their instinctive needs of food, shelter 
and sex, for example, they obey imperatives of a metaphysical nature.209  As al-Faruqi 
puts it, “[m]an equally shares the necessity of natural causation in his vegetative and 
animal life, in his physical presence as a thing among things on earth.”210  However, 
fulfilling metaphysical imperatives is not the only mission human beings have.   
 Besides metaphysical imperatives, the divine will has laid down imperatives of an 
ethical nature that cannot be fulfilled by any entity except human beings.  The core of 
these ethical imperatives is complying willingly with God’s commandments.  That is, 
obeying these imperatives when disobeying them is equally possible.211  This obedience 
transcends ritual and devotional acts of worship, extremely important though they are, to 
cover any act performed purely for the sake of pleasing God within the limits He has set 
                                                 
205 3: 83. 
206 22: 18. 
207 59: 1.  
208 30: 26. 
209 Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 66. 
210 Ibid., 6. 
211 Ibid., 65, 67. 
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out.  Life in its ideal form can be a continuous act of obedience or worship.212  Hence, the 
very nature of this obedience necessitates freedom to obey or disobey God, to purify the 
intention in the manner described, limit oneself to the boundaries set out, and to be 
accountable for all that.  Human beings possess this capacity; indeed, they are the only 
creatures known to possess it. 
In the Qur’an, voluntary obedience and its associated accountability is called ‘the 
vicegerency’, and fulfilling it is considered the rationale behind the creation of human 
beings, their “raison d’être.”213  However, it is mentioned that appointing them to this 
position was objected to by the angels because of their capacity for committing evil while 
the angels, due to of their nature, are not.  God, nevertheless, turned down the objection.  
The Qur’an reads: 
Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I will create a vicegerent on earth.”  They said: 
"Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood?- 
whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)?”  He said: "I know 
what ye know not.”  And He taught Adam the nature of all things; then He placed 
him before the angels, and said: "Tell me the nature of these if ye are right.”  They 
said: "Glory to Thee, of knowledge We have none, save what Thou Hast taught us: 
In truth it is Thou Who are perfect in knowledge and wisdom.”  He said: "O Adam!  
Tell them their natures.”  When he had told them, Allah said: "Did I not tell you 
that I know the secrets of heaven and earth, and I know what ye reveal and what ye 
conceal?”214 
 The capability of human beings for committing good and evil, which is indicated 
in the previous verses, is extremely important.  Despite proving through the ability of 
human beings to learn, their capability to be vicegerent, God did not deny the possibility 
                                                 
212  Badawi, "Humanity and Creation, an Islamic Perspective”, 6, 7. 
213 Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 61, 62. 
214 2: 30, 33.   
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that they may commit the evil mentioned by the angels.  The equal possibility that they 
may fulfil the task and so bring the ethical imperatives of the divine will into actuality 
justifies the risk.  As al-Faruqi puts it:  
In cosmic economy, man’s capacity for evil is indeed a risk.  But this risk is 
incomparable with the great promise which he may fulfil if endowed with freedom.  
… only man may realize ethical value because only he has the freedom necessary 
therefore; that only he may pursue the totality of values because only he has the 
mind and vision requisite for such pursuit.215     
The Qur’an regards the mission of human beings as grave.  This is demonstrated 
through the fact that other imposing creatures were too fearful of its implications to 
accept it.  In other words, the willing obedience, called the trust this time, was offered to 
the skies, the earth, and mountains but they refused.  Only human beings accepted it.  In 
the words of the Qur’an: “We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and 
the Mountains; but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook 
it.”216  
Upon the acceptance of the trust, human beings have entered into a covenant with 
God to obey Him alone, and be accountable for that.  The Qur’an reads:   
When thy Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam - from their loins - their 
descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): "Am I not 
your Lord (who cherishes and sustains you)?"- They said: "Yea! We do testify!" 
(This), lest ye should say on the Day of Judgment: "Of this we were never mindful.  
Or lest ye should say: "Our fathers before us may have taken false gods, but we are 
                                                 
215 Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 67. 
216 33: 72.   
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(their) descendants after them: wilt Thou then destroy us because of the deeds of 
men who were futile?217 
What is noticeable in this verse, which is called the verse of the covenant, as in that of 
the trust,218 is the insistence on the prominence of worship in the God-human beings 
relationship and the role that the latter’s free will plays in this relationship.  The 
agreement of human beings was essential for holding the trust and entering the 
covenant.219  
Three important results follow from the covenant.  Firstly, every human being 
is believed to be born with a primordial monotheistic nature or inherent disposition, 
fitrah as it is called in Islam,220 to be aware of the existence of God and to be obliged 
to worship Him.221  Since this nature may be changed because of post-birth external 
effects, messengers or prophets were sent to remind human beings of the promise they 
made when entering the covenant.222         
Another result of the covenant is the endowment of human beings with dhimmah 
or personality.  To enable them to join the covenant by which they have become 
vicegerents, on the one hand, and exercise the stipulations of that covenant, as detailed in 
Shari’a, on the other, human beings have been endowed with a capacity for doing so, that 
is, with personality.  This capability is known in Shari’a as dhimmah; the term that has 
been taken from its linguistic meaning of covenant to refer to the covenant human beings 
                                                 
217 07: 172, 173.   
218 These are the names used to denote the verses in Islamic literature.  See W.  W. Kadi, "The Primordial 
Covenant and Human History in the Qur’n”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 147, no. 4 
(2003), 333. 
219 Ibid., 334. 
220  Ibid. 
221 Idris, "Our Humanness Unalterable Essence and Changeable Actuality”, 5. 
222 Kadi, "The Primordial Covenant and Human History in the Qur’n”, 336, 337. 
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entered into with God in pre-existence.223  As will be demonstrated, the Shari’a concept 
of dhimmah or personality is significant in defining personality as the first possible 
embodiment of the status of the foetus.  Being a form of property is the second possible 
embodiment.224   
As a capacity for acquiring rights and obligations, dhimmah is associated with 
other capabilities.  It is firstly associated with ahliyyat al-wujub.  The term ahliyyat in 
Arabic means ability or capacity,225 and is used technically to refer to the capacity for 
acquiring rights and duties.226  Despite the similarity of definition, ahliyyat al-wujub is 
distinct from dhimmah.227  The distinction lies in that ahliyyat al-wujub is a condition that 
                                                 
 
223 Al-Tftāzāny, Msʿwd bn ʿmr. Shrḥ al-Tlwyḥ ʿlā al-Twḍyḥ.  Vol. 2: Mktbh 
Sbyḥ bmṣr, (n.d.), 324.   
224 See  4.2.1 Basing legal personality on moral personality.   
225 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law (ISlamabad Islamic Research Institute and 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1994), 75. 
226 Ibid., Zahraa, Mahdi.  "The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law" Arab Law Quarterly 11, no. 3 
(1996): 245-263, 245, 247.   
227 The distinction adopted in this research is my stance on the controversial issue of the relationship of 
dhimmah and ahliyyat al-wujub.  Being identical in definition (Hsyn, Aḥmd Frāj. Al-Mlkyh w 
Nẓryh al-ʿqd.  Alexandria: Mʾssh al-Thqāfh al-Jāmʿyt, (n.d.).  224, 
Khlāf, ʿbd al-Whāb. ʿlm Swl al-Fqh. 12 ed. Kuwait: Dār al-Qlm, 1978.  
136, Al-Bkhāry, ʿbd al-ʿzyz bn Aḥmd bn Mḥmd. Kshf al-Āsrār ʿn Aṣwl- Fkhr 
al-Āslām al-Bzdwy.  Vol. 2.  Beirut: Dār al-Ktāb al-ʿrby, 1974.  237, 
Al-Zarqā, Mṣṭfā Aḥmd. Al-Fqh al-Āslāmy fy Thwbh al-Jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-
Fqhy al-ʿām.  vol. 2, 7 ed. Damascus: the University of Damascus, 1963. 
742, Azbydh, ʿl-y Rmḍān Mḥmd. Al-Nẓryh al-ʿāmh ll-Āhlyt.  1st edition, 
Tripoli: al-Mnshʾh al-ʿāmh ll-Nshr w al-Twzyʿ w al-Āʿlān, 1984.  23, 24) 
has provoked controversies over the relationship between dhimmah and ahliyyat al-wujub.  While some 
writers have argued that they are synonyms for each other, (In mentioning these ideas see for example, 
(Azbydh, Al-Nẓryh al-ʿāmh ll-Āhlyt, 25, 26. Rḍā, Hsyn Twfyq.  Ahl-yh al-
ʿqwbh fy al-Shryʿh al-Āslāmyh w al-Qānwn al-Mqārn. Cairo: (n.p.), 1964.  
24), the majority, as Nyazee has reported (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business 
Organization Corporations.  Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 2 (Islamabad: The Islamic Research 
Institute, 1998), have claimed that they are different in that dhimmah is the basis upon which ahliyyat al-
wujub is conferred, (Al-Bkhāry, Kshf al-Āsrār ʿn Aṣwl- Fkhr al-Āslām al-Bzdwy, 
238.) or the imaginary repository wherein it resides (Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business Organization 
Corporations.  Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, 90).  In Nyazee’s words, “[d]himmah is considered a 
requisite condition for the existence of the capacity for acquisition [ahliyyat al-wujub].”  ———, Islamic 
Law of Business Organization Corporations.  Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, 90.  For me, a distinction 
should be made between the two concepts but not in this ambiguous way.  That is to say, stating that 
ahliyyat al-wujub is based on dhimmah while giving them the same definition and providing no practical 
benefit from the distinction renders it useless.  The distinction that should be made is that adopted by some 
other scholars on the basis that dhimmah, unlike ahliyyat al-wujub, is indivisible.( Al-Sabouni, Abd Al-
Rahman, Al-Madkhal Lidirasat Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, Al-Matba’ah Al-Jadidah, Damascus, 4th edn, 1978, vol. 
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is required for the acquisition of individual rights or duties.  It then varies in accordance 
with the rights and duties concerned.  Dhimmah, on the other hand, is a prerequisite for 
having any right or duty.  To put it another way, dhimmah is a condition in the entity to 
whom the right or duty is being attributed, that is, the entity must have dhimmah.  The 
capacity for acquisition or ahliyyat al-wujub, on the other hand, is a condition in the right 
or duty concerned, that is, meeting that right’s or duty’s conditions of acquisition.  Within 
this, we could have equal subjects with different abilities for acquisition or ahliyyat al-
wujub.   
                                                                                                                                                  
2, pp. 25-26.  As cited by Zahraa, "The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law”, 246.  This is evident in 
the differentiation established in Islamic jurisprudence between two types of ahliyyat al-wujub, full and 
restricted or complete and incomplete (Zahraa, "The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law”, 246.  
Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 76, 77).  The full or complete capacity for acquisition enables the subject 
to have all rights and duties and is acquired by all humans after birth (Zahraa, "The Legal Capacity of 
Women in Islamic Law”, 247.  Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 76).  The incomplete or restricted one is 
that acquired by foetuses and it allows them to have certain rights (Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 76), 
and some duties, according to some jurists (Zahraa, "The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law”, 247).  
No such a distinction is found regarding dhimmah (In mentioning this idea, see Mdkwr, Mḥmd Slām. 
Al-Jnyn w al-Āḥkām al-Mtʿlqh bh fy al-Fqh al-Āslāmy. 2 ed. Cairo: Mktbh 
ʿbd Allāh Whbh, 1969. 274).  Therefore, when the subject lacks the ability to have certain rights 
or duties, imperfection cannot be attributed to his/her dhimmah.  It should; rather, be attributed to his/her 
ahliyyat al-wujub.  
The foundation upon which this distinction can be established, which has not been specified by the last 
mentioned jurists, is that since dhimmah is based on an inherited quality of humanity that admits no degree: 
either all-or-nothing,   Dhimmah, likewise, cannot be divided into complete and incomplete.  Nevertheless, 
deeming the capacity for acquisition or ahliyyat al-wujub to be divisible while basing it on dhimmah that is 
indivisible cannot be reconciled.  How can a differentiation be made between subjects with regard to the 
degree of their capacity for acquisition while they equally share the basis upon which that capacity is 
enjoyed?  To put it another way, when two humans by virtue of being so acquire dhimmah, there is no basis 
for attributing different types of dhimmah to them.  None is more human than the other, and likewise none 
can have more dhimmah than the other.  Both qualities are inseparable.  The same will be the case regarding 
the capacity for acquisition or ahliyyat al-wujub if we base it on dhimmah.  There is no ground on which 
different capacities for acquisition can be assigned.  Also, considering as perfect or full the capacity for 
acquisition held by born humans, contradicts the fact that many humans in many cases lack this capacity 
regarding certain rights or duties.  This is evident in that when a woman is deprived of the right to divorce 
or that to be a judge, in some schools of thought, she certainly lacks the capacity for acquiring these rights 
(These examples are cited by Nyazee (Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 76, 77., though he, like many 
writers, has indicated the distinction between the full and restricted types of ahliyyat al-wujub that is being 
criticised above).  Her capacity for acquisition or ahliyyat al-wujub cannot be attributed to fullness.  The 
same can be said regarding foreigners when being prevented from owning real-estate rights (ʿbwdh, al-
Kwny ʿly.  Āsāsyāt al-Qānwn al-Wḍʿy al-Lyby, al-Mdkhl al-ā ʿlm al-Qānwn, 
al-Hq. Tripoli: al-Mrkz al-Qwmy ll-Bḥwth w al-Drāsāt al-ʿlmyt, 1998.  
133). The only way out of this dilemma is to adopt the distinction between the two capacities as detailed 
in the main text above.   
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Another related concept that has also been associated with dhimmah is ahliyyat āl-
ādā.  Ahliyyat āl-ādā in Shari’a refers to the ability for executing or exercising rights and 
duties, and as such, is linked to the faculty of reasoning.  Full capacity for execution is 
assigned to those who reach the age of maturity or discretion unaffected by any 
deficiency hindering them from being fully mentally developed.  Imperfect or deficient 
capacity, on the other hand, is assigned to those possessing some discretion such as 
children above the age of seven years.  None is attributed when the subject has no 
discretion at all, like children aged less than seven or the insane.228   
Ahliyyat āl-ādā, then, has nothing to do with the acquisition of rights and duties.229  
One may completely lack ahliyyat āl-ādā and still be able to gain rights and assume 
duties.  Exercising them can be done through the guardian or the testamentary guardian.230  
This result is particularly important with regard to the legal status of the foetus as it 
allows it to be attributed with personality, hence rights, despite its apparent lack of the 
ability to execute those rights.231  Ahliyyat āl-ādā, therefore, should not be confused with 
dhimmah which revolves around the capacity for acquisition.232 
                                                 
228 Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 75, 96.  Zahraa, "The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law”, 247. 
229 Suliman M.K Ibrahim, "Ālṭbyʿh al-Qānwnyh ll-Jnyn." Benghazi: Garyounis 
University, 2001. (Unpublished LL.M dissertation), 18, 19.  
230 Zahraa, "The Legal Capacity of Women in Islamic Law”, 248. 
231 See page 206 below.   
232 However, this has not always been the case.  After defining dhimmah as the capacity for acquisition Al-
Qrāfy (Al-Qrāfy, Aḥmd bn Adrys bn ʿbd al-Raḥmān al-Snhājy.  Al-Frwq. 1 ed. 
Vol. 3.  al-Cairo: Dār Aḥyāʾ al-Ktb al-ʿrbyt, 1346 A.H. 230, 231) has 
claimed that this capacity is subject to special conditions such as reaching the age of maturity, discretion 
and that no interdiction is being laid down (Al-Qrāfy,  Al-Frwq, 231).  Building on that, he has 
concluded that a bankrupt will lose his/her dhimmah if an interdict preventing him/her from executing 
his/her transaction rights is issued (———, Al-Frwq, 231).  This statement, however, contradicts the 
distinction established by Moslem scholars between dhimmah, as the capacity for acquisition, and ahliyyat 
āl-ādā as that for execution.  As Mustāfā āl-Zārqā has rightly commented, Al-Qārāfi’s statement is far away 
from the meaning of dhimmah and might be due to a special use of the term dhimmah in the school that that 
jurist belongs to, i.e. the Māliqi School (Al-Zarqā, Mṣṭfā Aḥmd.  Al-Fqh al-Āslāmy fy 
Thwbh al-Jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Ānẓryh al-Āltzām al-ʿāmh fy al-Fqh al-Āslāmy.  
vol. 2, 3 ed. Damascus: the Syrian University, 1958.  214). 
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In addition, besides being used to denote the meaning of the capacity for 
acquisition, the term dhimmah is also used to refer to the supposed or imaginary 
repository that includes one’s rights and duties.233  Dhimmah in the second meaning is the 
consequence of the acquisition of dhimmah in the first meaning, that is to say, when one 
is assigned the capacity for having rights and duties, the assignment of a presumed 
container to include these rights and duties follows.234  Notwithstanding this connection, 
the two meanings of dhimmah are distinct from one another in the same way capacity is 
distinct from repository.   
 Confusing the two meanings of dhimmah is noted in the writings of many jurists.  
For example, while defining dhimmah, Mahdi Zahraa has quoted two different definitions 
without making any distinction between them.  In the first definition, dhimmah is defined 
as a repository, that is, “… as a juristic container presumed in a person in order to 
encompass all its debts and obligations that are related to it.”235  In the second one, in 
which the meaning of capacity is indicated, dhimmah is defined as a “… juristic (shar’ie) 
description that is presumed by the legislator to exist in a human being and according 
with which [the person] becomes able to oblige and be obliged.”236  Similar confusion can 
be noted in other writings.237  After mentioning and criticising this confusion, Al-Zārqā 
has chosen to limit the use of the term dhimmah to the meaning of repository and utilise 
                                                 
233 Zahraa, M. "Legal Personality in Islamic Law.”  Arab Law Quarterly 10 (1995): 193-206, 203.  Wzārh 
al-Āwqāf w al-Shʾwn al-Āslāmyt, al-Mwswʿh al-Fqhyt. vol. 39 Kuwait.  Al-
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234 Zahraa, "Legal Personality in Islamic Law”, 203.  
235 This definition is given by Al-Zarqā, Ahmad M., Al-Madkhal Al-Fighi Al’am.  6th edn (1959), vol. 2, 
738.  As cited by Zahraa, "Legal Personality in Islamic Law”, 203. 
236 Al-Sabouni, Abd Al-Rahman, Al-Madkhal Lidirasat Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, Al-Matba’ah Al-Jadidah, 
Damascus, 4th edn, 1978, vol. 2, p. 20.  As cited by Ibid., 203.  (The emphasis is mine). 
237 See for example, Al-Bkhāry, ʿbd al-ʿzyz bn Aḥmd bn Mḥmd. Kshf al-Āsrār 
ʿn Aṣwl- Fkhr al-Āslām al-Bzdwy.  Vol. 4: Dār al-Ktāb al-Āslāmy, (n.p.), 
238.  
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the term personality to refer to the capacity for acquisition.238  He considers dhimmah, as 
well as the two types of ahliyyat, as effects of personality.239  Mahdi Zahraa has followed 
him in considering dhimmah as an effect of personality.  In his words: “… the concept of 
dhimma represents that aspect of legal personality which is supposed to contain an 
account of all the person’s rights and obligations whether they are religious or financial in 
nature”.240  Though I agree on the distinction made between the two meanings of 
dhimmah, I have, as will be expanded on later in this thesis,241 some reservations about 
the use of the term personality to denote the meaning of the capacity for acquisition. 
The third result of the covenant is the accountability of human beings to God.  
They have to obey God.  If they should break this covenant, they would be held 
accountable.  This accountability reflects the Islamic perception of life as a test.  The 
Qur’an reads: “[b]lessed is He in Whose hand is the sovereignty, and, He is able to do all 
things.  Who hath created life and death that He may try you which of you is best in 
conduct; and He is the Mighty, the Forgiving”.242  Whether human beings will be 
rewarded or punished in the hereafter depends on the choices they make in the mundane 
world.  The Qur’an reads:    
On that Day [Day of Judgement] will men proceed in companies sorted out, to be 
shown the deeds that they (had done).  Then shall anyone who has done an atom's 
weight of good, see it! And anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see 
it.243   
                                                 
238 Al-Zarqā, Al-Fqh al-Āslāmy fy Thwbh al-Jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Ānẓryh al-
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As will be explained, the accountability of human beings to God is significant in deciding 
on moral agency as the criterion of personality, hence determining the status of the 
foetus.244 
Being God’s vicegerent entitles human beings to a special position in the universe.  
The entire cosmos is seen to be the theatre or field in which they live and struggle to fulfil 
their responsibilities as vicegerents, “… to prove oneself ethically worthy.”245  Other 
creatures have therefore been subordinated to them.  The Qur'an reads: “…it is He Who 
hath created for you all things that are on earth”,246 and, “We have honoured the sons of 
Adam; provided them with transport on land and sea; given them for sustenance things 
good and pure; and conferred on them special favours, above a great part of our 
creation”.247  The freedom human beings have been given entitles them to a position 
higher than that of the angels who never disobey God.  This freedom makes their 
obedience a product of moral struggle rather than mere instinctive nature.248      
However, the vicegerency or trusteeship works also to place limitations on the 
authority of human beings in the universe.  Simply put, they are vicegerents while the real 
owner of everything is God.  In the words of the Qur'an: “… praised, therefore, is Allah, 
in Whose hands is dominion over all things”,249 and “… to Him will you all return.  Say, O 
Allah, King of all dominion, Owner of all things”.250  As such, all that human beings have 
                                                 
244 See Section  4.2.2.2 The justification of the selection of moral agency as the criterion of moral 
personality. 
245 Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 57. 
246 02: 29.   
247 17: 70.   
248 Badawi, "Humanity and Creation, an Islamic Perspective,” Al-Shāfʿy, Hsn. "Krāmh al-
Ānsān w Mkānth fy al-Kwn.”  In Rʾyh Asl-āmyh lbʿḍ al-Mshklāt al-Tbyh al-
Mʿāṣrt.  Casablanca: al-Mnẓmh al-Āslāmyh llʿlwm al-Tbyt, 1999.  210, 
211. 
249 36: 83. 
250 3: 26. 
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is a right to usufruct251 that should be used in conformity with the real Owner’s 
stipulations.252  For example, they are not allowed to misuse their own bodies or commit 
suicide, as these acts are seen to be in contradiction of God's commandments and so are 
considered amoral.253  This is the essence of the vicegerency on which they are being 
tested.   
Then, human beings have been created as free-willed entities and chosen, as such, 
to bring the imperatives that constitute the ethical arm of God’s will into actuality.  
However, the question posed is how these imperatives can be known.  Shari’a is the 
answer. 
3.2 The concept of Shari’a 
Shari’a in this thesis forms the basis upon which the analysis and assessment of 
ideas and arguments are conducted, hence it is necessary to provide an explanation of 
its definition, nature, and sources.  This explanation is, as outlined earlier, closely 
connected to the rationale behind the creation of human beings.  The previous section 
explains that, messengers were sent to remind them about the covenant and to show 
them how to live according to the Creator’s will, and so prove themselves morally 
worthy.  According to Islamic doctrine, Mohammad is the seal of those messengers, 
and Islam is the message that he brought with him.  Islam means submission to the 
ethical arm of the divine will, and trying to implement it into one’s life.  As Fazlur 
Rahman puts it, Islam means “… surrender to the Will of God; i.e. the determination to 
                                                 
251 The right to usufruct is a Roman law term that means “the right to enjoy the use of another's property 
short of the destruction or waste of its substance”.  See "usufruct n."  The Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary, Eleventh edition revised.  Ed.  Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson.  Oxford University 
Press, 2006.  Oxford Reference Online.  Oxford University Press.  .  .  .  Lancaster University.  .  .  .  9 July 
2008  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t23.e62651> 
252 Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 57. 
253 Badawi, "Humanity and Creation, an Islamic Perspective," 7, 8 
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implement, in the physical texture of the world, the command of God or the Moral 
Imperative.  This implementation is ‘service to God (ibada).”254  
 
The aim of Shari’a can be clarified through its link with Islam.  It is the 
functional face of Islam255 and so, its main objective, as such, is to guide human beings 
through their voluntary surrender to God, which is the essence of their vicegerency.  In 
the words of the prominent Moslem jurist al-Shātibī: “[t]he primary goal of Shari’ah 
… is to free Man from the grip of his own whims and fancy, so that he may be the 
servant of Allāh by choice, just as he is one without it.”256  In this statement, the 
distinction is clear between involuntary obedience, which is laid down by the 
metaphysical will and shared by all creatures, and voluntary obedience, which is laid 
down by the ethical will and peculiar to human beings, their vicegerency.257  Shari’a is 
the guideline to the latter.  Its definition, nature, and sources are intimately connected 
to this role.   
3.2.1 The definition of Shari’a     
The definition of Shari’a, which is significant in understanding the analytical 
basis of this thesis, shows an intimate connection with the vicegerency of human beings.  
Linguistically speaking, it is defined as the way or path.258  This meaning is apparent in its 
                                                 
 
254 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (New York: Doubleday, 1968), 315.  In a similar meaning, see S. G. Vesey-
FitzGerald, Muhammadan Law: An Abridgement According to Its Various Schools (London Oxford 
University Press Humphrey Milford, 1931), 1, 2.  All creatures are believed to be in total surrender to God’s 
metaphysical Will and so are Moslems in this sense.  The Qur’an reads, “seek they other than the religion of 
Allah, when unto Him submitteth whosoever is in the heavens and the earth, willingly or unwillingly, and 
unto Him they will be returned.” [3:83].  However, Islam meant here is surrender to the ethical Divine Will 
that is subject to the human being’s free will.  Therefore, Islam in this sense applies only to humans who 
choose to live in obedience to God commandments.  See  3.1.2 The human beings’ raison d’être above. 
255 Rahman, Islam, 117. 
256 Al-Shātibī, ii, 168, as cited by Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 235.   
257 See  3.1.2 The human beings’ raison d’être. 
258 Rahman, Islam, 117.  Hathout, "Human Genetic and Reproductive Technologies: Comparing Religious 
and Secular Perspectives, an Islamic Perspective," 6.  Jonathan E. Brockopp, "Taking Life and Saving Life, 
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technical definition wherein it is said to be the way ordained in concrete terms by God, to 
guide His worshippers in their life of obedience,259 “… the highway of good life,” as 
expressed by some writers.260  Shari’a in this sense is the revelation embodied in the 
Qur'an and Prophetic teachings or traditions.261  Shari’a, then, is a synonym for 
revelation; yet, human reasoning plays an important role in understanding and applying 
this revelation through a process of inquiry called fiqh, which is translated into English, 
quite misleadingly, as jurisprudence262 and sometimes as Islamic law.263       
The definition of figh shows its role in grasping imperatives embodied in the 
revelation and applying them in everyday life.  In Arabic, the term fiqh means 
understanding or discerning.264  The same is the case regarding technical usages as the 
term fiqh is used to denote the process of reflecting on revelational statements in order to 
find answers to questions of everyday life.265  This process is subject to highly formulated 
stipulations outlined in the Science of the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence266 or the 
Roots of Law,267 ūsūl al-fiqh as it is called in Arabic.268   
The distinction between Shari’a and fiqh is, then, apparent.  While the former is 
the revelation embodied in the Qur’an and the Sunnah,269 the latter is the human reason-
                                                                                                                                                  
the Islamic Context” in Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia, ed. Jonathan E Brockopp 
(Columbia, South Carolina University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 10. 
259 Rahman, Islam, 117.  Hathout, "Human Genetic and Reproductive Technologies: Comparing Religious 
and Secular Perspectives, an Islamic Perspective," 6. 
260 Rahman, Islam, 117.   
261 See  3.2.3 The sources of Shari’a.  
262 Brockopp, "Taking Life and Saving Life, the Islamic Context ", 10.   
263 A. Kevin Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, Journal of Religious Ethics 11, no. 2 (1983): 186-
203, 187. 
264 Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 20.  Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 187. 
265 Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 189. 
266 M Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research.”  Arab Law Quarterly 18, no. 3 (2003): 215-249, 223. 
267 Rahman, Islam, 75. 
268 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 216. 
269 For a definition of Sunnah and an explanation of its importance as a revelational source, see 74 below. 
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based inquiry into that revelation, to extract and formulate detailed rulings governing 
daily life.  In other words, Shari’a is the way revealed by God to His worshippers to bring 
them closer to Him, while fiqh is those worshippers’ structured efforts to understand and 
apply in their daily life imperatives laid down in revelation.  God is the subject of Shari’a 
while man is the subject of fiqh.  In fact, since fiqh is a highly formulated science, it 
demands special requirements of those practising it and so it is not open to everybody.270   
However, the terms Sharĩ’a and fiqh are frequently synonymously used.  Many 
writers use both terms to refer to the sum total of rulings extracted from revelation via 
reason,271 which is figh in the exact meaning of the term.  Thus, there are two uses of the 
term Sharĩ’a.  Firstly, the use of the term sharĩ’a to refer to the way ordained by God and 
communicated to humans through His Prophet.  Shari’a here is distinct from fiqh, which 
is the process by which Shari’a rulings can be extracted and formulated, in the same way 
the end is distinct from its means.  The other use of the term Sharĩ’a refers to the sum 
total of rulings grasped through fiqh.   
Nevertheless, the difference between the two uses, as I see it, is largely formal.  
As will be explained in more detail below, rulings grasped by human reason via fiqh 
procedure must be based directly or indirectly on the revelational sources, i.e. the Qur’an 
                                                 
270 This is apparent from the stipulations set for understanding and applying revelational imperatives.  See 
 3.2.3.3 The principles of understanding and applying revelational statements. 
271 See for example (Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and 
Social Science Research Methods for Islamic Research," 217) in which Shari'a (termed Islamic law) is 
defined as “the body of norms, principles, rules and rulings that are extracted from the primary Islamic 
sources (the Qur’ān, Sunnah and Ijmā’ (juristic consensus)) and elaborated on by the individual reasoning 
of Muslim jurists in the form of Islamic jurisprudence.”  This is apparent also from the two following 
definitions in which Fiqh and Shari’a are given similar meaning, i.e. the one cited above.  According to al-
Zarqa, Fiqh is “the total sum of practical rulings islamically legitimate”.  (Al-Zarqa’, Mustafa Ahmad, Al-
Fiqh Al-Islamĩ fi Thawbihi Al-Jadĩd, Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhĩ Al-‘ Aam, Dar Al-Fikr Liltibacah, Damascus, 
1067, Vol.  1, paras.  1 & 2.  As cited by (Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of 
Modern Legal and Social Science Research Methods for Islamic Research,” 217), while Sharĩ’a as to al-
Khallaf is “… the total sum of legitimate … practical rulings which are benefited from detailed evidences.”  
(Al-Khallāf, Abd Al-Wahhāb, ‘Ilm Usūl Al-Fiqh, Al-Nāshir Liltiba’ah wa Al-Nashr waAl-Tawzĩ’, 2nd edn, 
Cairo, n.d.  [page number is not mentioned) as cited by (Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the 
Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 217).   
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and the Sunnah.  These rulings, therefore, can always be attributed to Shari’a.  In fact, 
this is a prerequisite for them to be islamically recognised.  As such, it makes no real 
difference to term their sum total Shari’a or fiqh so long as this meaning is borne in mind. 
3.2.2 The nature of Shari’a 
The study of the nature of Shari’a is important in clarifying it as the analysis and 
evaluation basis in this thesis.  In addition, it is significant in deciding on some issues 
directly related to the status of the foetus, namely, the definition of legal personality and 
its establishment on moral personality.272  This nature is, like the Shari’a definition, 
closely connected to the vicegerency of human beings.  Existing to guide human beings to 
fulfil their vicegerency through living in accordance with the divine will in all aspects of 
life, Shari’a has its character as a trans-religious, moral, and legal system.  Religion 
comprises the basis upon which the whole system is built.  As mentioned earlier, Shari’a 
is functional Islam,273 which is simply a religion.  This is, also, apparent from the fact of 
the subject and aim of Shari’a.  As such, basic doctrine and devotions occupy an essential 
part of Shari’a, and legal sanctions are normally associated with religious penalties.274 
Shari’a also has the features of an ethical system.  Indeed, detailing the ethical 
imperatives human beings have been created to observe is the sole aim of Shari’a.  This is 
also apparent in the statement of the Prophet Mohammad in which he described the 
                                                 
272 See  4.2.1 Basing legal personality on moral personality. 
273 Rahman, Islam, 117. 
274 Ibid., 95.  He mentions, as an indication on this fact, that every book about Shari'a starts by addressing 
religious duties. 
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message he was sent to convey, Islam or, functionally, Shari’a, as bringing ethics or 
moral standards to their completion.275  
Many examples can be cited to support this conclusion but due to space 
limitations, only a few will be mentioned.  Firstly, all humans, as earlier mentioned,276 are 
believed to be born in a state of fitrah whereby they are naturally inclined to know their 
Creator and act in accord with His commands, that is, to act ethically.  All Shari’a 
determinations are believed to be in agreement with this fitrah and to translate it into 
ethical acts.277  Indeed, a consensus on this meaning between the scholars of the Science 
of the Roots of Islamic Law has been reported.278  As such, the aim of each Shari’a 
determination is to encourage the performance of an act that brings into actuality what is 
inherited in every human being’s fitrah.   
Intent is another indication of the ethicality of Shari’a.  When performing an act, 
intent should be formed purely for the sake of pleasing God.  As indicated before, besides 
sticking to the limits set out by God, this is enough to transform any act including 
permissive ones into an act of worship,279 which is the essence of human beings’ 
vicegerency.280  As extremely important as intent is, Moslem scholars deem that one must 
have a valid will to perform it in order for one to be addressed by Shari’a, that is, one 
                                                 
275 Ahmad Rajai El-Gendy, ed., the International Islamic Code for Medical and Health Ethics. (Kuwait: 
The Islamic Organization for Medical Science, 2005), 29.  ʿbdāl Raḥmān, Taha. Tjdyd al-Mnhj 
fy Tqwym al-Trāth. 2 ed. Casablanca: al-Mrkz al-Thqāfy al-ʿrby, 2005, 
113.  
276 See page 57 above. 
277 Taha ʿbdāl Raḥmān. Tjdyd al-Mnhj fy Tqwym al-Trāth. 2 ed. Casablanca: 
al-Mrkz al-Thqāfy al-ʿrby, 2005.  100.  
278 Ibid, 103.  
279 For the classification of acts into Shari’a, see page 71 below. 
280 See  3.1.2 The human beings’ raison d’être. 
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becomes a valid recipient of the communicative act of Shari’a’, or khitāb al-tāklĩf as it is 
known in Arabic.281  
More importantly, there are five principal ethical values called the intents of 
Shari’a, or māqāsid al-Shari’a in Arabic, whose preservation is believed to be the 
ultimate end of Shari’a, viz.  religion, self, reason, reproduction, and property.282  The 
assumption is that every Qur’anic or Prophetic statement aims explicitly or implicitly 
towards the realisation of one or more of these values.283  Many examples of the Qur’anic 
and Prophetic statements in which the ordainment of their judgements is explicitly 
justified as being a means for the accomplishment of one of these ethical values can be 
cited.  Lack of space prevents the discussion of them all so only two will be considered 
here.  The Qur’an reads: “[r]ecite that which hath been inspired in thee of the Scripture, 
and establish worship.  Lo! worship preserveth from lewdness and iniquity.”284  Also: “… 
take alms of their wealth, wherewith thou mayst purify them and mayst make them grow, 
and pray for them.  Lo! thy prayer is an assuagement for them.  Allah is Hearer, 
                                                 
281 ʿbdāl Raḥmān, Tjdyd al-Mnhj fy Tqwym al-Trāth, 101.  
282 Aḥmd bn Mḥmd abu Hamed Al-Ghazali, al-Mstṣfā fy ʿlm al-Swl, vol. 1 
(Beirut: Dār al-Ktb al-ʿlmyt, 1413), 173.  Ibid., 111.  The reason can be seen in the 
close connection these values have with man’s mission on earth.  Each one of them leads in some way or 
another to observing that mission.   
283 The objectives aiming towards preserving the five values vary in degree in accordance with their 
importance in saving those values.  Essential objectives lie at the top and constitute the aim of all 
determinations directed towards saving the five values from destruction.  Complementary objectives are 
those comprising the aim of determinations ordained to remove any hardships caused to one or more of the 
five values.  Following that, come the amelioratory objectives that form the end of any determinations 
outlined to enhance and better the preservation of one or more of the five values.  The amelioratory 
objectives are related to the aesthetic sense of humans in realizing these values.  In explaining these values 
and their supplementary objectives see Abd al Majid al Najjar, The Vicegerency of Man, between 
Revelation and Reason : A Critique of the Dialectic of the Text, Reason, and Reality, trans. Aref T. Atari, 
vol. 2, Islamic Methodology (Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1999), 71.  Nyazee, 
Theories of Islamic Law, 214.  ʿbdāl Raḥmān, Tjdyd al-Mnhj fy Tqwym al-Trāth, 111, 
114.  It is worth mentioning that the five principle values are normally placed within the first category of 
necessary objectives; however, as some writers have rightly pointed out, this classification may not be 
accurate and it would be more plausible to regard these values as the principles whose preservation 
constitutes the aim of all other objectives whether they are necessary, complementary or amelioratory (——
—, ʿbdāl Raḥmān, Tjdyd al-Mnhj fy Tqwym al-Trāth, 111, 114).  
284 29:45. 
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Knower.”285  Even if the ethical value sought is not explicitly mentioned when a 
determination is being ordained, the assumption is that there must be one or more.  
Grasping it or them is the role of reason.286  As will be demonstrated with regard to the 
issue of abortion, considering these ethical values has great impact on decision making in 
the moral and legal dilemmas surrounding the foetus.287  
 In addition, the way Shari’a classifies actions is another indication of its 
ethicality.  It does not only classify them into required and prohibited actions, it also adds 
other categories of recommended, permissible, and reprehensible.288  Besides showing the 
comprehensiveness of Shari’a, for they cover all possible judgements of human deeds, 
these categories represent its moral character.  That is to say, when dealing with these 
categories, especially the last three, the applier is subjected to the ruling of ‘resoluteness 
and relaxation’ by which s/he can, according to moral considerations, regard the same 
action as permissive in some circumstances and non-permissive in others.289   
Shari’a also has the characteristics of a legal system.  Indeed, the widespread 
concept of Shari’a as such is reflected in translating it as ‘Islamic law’.  One of the 
examples of these characteristics is the adherence to legal methodology known as the 
Science of Roots of Law, Ūsūl al-Fiqh, in understanding, authenticating the authority and 
soundness of Shari’a sources, and deriving imperatives from primary sources.290  Another 
                                                 
285 Ibid., 9: 103.   
286 See  3.2.3.3 The principles of understanding and applying revelational statements.  
287 See page 219 below.   
288  Brockopp, "Taking Life and Saving Life, the Islamic Context ", 11.  Rahman, Islam, 95.  
289 Rahman, Islam, 95. 
290 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 216. 
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example is that of forming imperatives extracted into legal enactment,291 as well as, 
prescribing strictly legal sanctions when rulings are broken.292  
However, Shari’a cannot be deemed a legal system in the conventional sense of 
the term, that is, as a code of fixed rulings enforced by the sanctions of a state.293  In 
addition to the examples cited above to show the ethical features of Shari’a, the following 
example shows the embodiment of ethics into legally formed imperatives, and the 
superiority they have over law.  Each determination in Shari’a has two arms: legal and 
ethical.  The legal arm aims towards the exterior part of the determination.  It is 
associated with a mundane sanction, and conditioned by a coextensive occasion.  The 
ethical arm, on the other hand, concentrates on the interior part of the determination.  It is 
associated with a self-imposed internal punishment, and justified by an ethical end.  The 
ethical arm has superiority over the legal one.  This is evident in that the ethical end 
guides the coextensive occasion.  The performance of the act is subject to whether that 
end can be achieved, and if not, the act should not be performed even if its coextensive 
occasion is observed.294 
Therefore, Shari’a cannot be considered law in the conventional meaning.  Its 
widespread translation into English as Islamic law is, as many writers have rightly 
pointed out, quite misleading.295  In this thesis, the term Shari’a will be used in a wider 
sense, i.e. as the sum total of rulings extracted from revelation, primary sources, through 
human-reason-based instruments, secondary sources. 
                                                 
291 Rahman, Islam, 95. 
292 Ibid.   
293 Vesey-FitzGerald, Muhammadan Law: An Abridgement According to Its Various Schools, 1. Brockopp, 
"Taking Life and Saving Life, the Islamic Context ", 10. 
294 ʿbdāl Raḥmān, Tjdyd al-Mnhj fy Tqwym al-Trāth, 106, 108         
295 Vesey-FitzGerald, Muhammadan Law: An Abridgement According to Its Various Schools, 1. Brockopp, 
"Taking Life and Saving Life, the Islamic Context ", 10.  Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 187. 
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3.2.3 The sources of Shari’a  
Its source is the translation of the Arabic term āsl that means root296 and is 
technically used in the plural form to refer to the roots from which Shari’a rulings can be 
derived.297  The discussion of these sources is important in clarifying the position of 
Shari’a as the analysis and evaluation basis of this thesis.  In addition, this discussion 
shows the possibility of relying on human reasoning to know the ethical imperatives laid 
down by God.  Consequently, if interpreted as expressions of this reasoning, arguments 
and ideas found in Western morals and legal literature on the status of the foetus can be 
accepted from an Islamic perspective.   
Stating the sources of Shari’a, their relation to one another, and the weight of 
each, are subjects of the Roots of the Science of Law, or Ūsūl al-Fiqh.  These aim to 
define the rules and methodology by which “… practical rulings of Shari’a are extracted 
from their detailed evidence”,298 that is, how they can be moved from the roots to detailed 
determinations.299  According to this discipline, the sources of Shari’a are divided into 
two main categories: revelational or primary sources, and instrumental or secondary 
sources.  Each will be briefly explained, followed by an explanation of the principles used 
to extract and apply Shari’a rulings.   
 
                                                 
296 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 230. 
297 Salqĩm, Ibrāhĩm, Ũsūl Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmĩ, Matba‘at Al-Insha’, Damascus, 1981, p.41.  As cited by Ibid.  
298 Khallāf, Abd Al-Wahhāb, ‘Ilm Usūl Al-Fiqh, Al-Nāshir Liltiba’ah wa Al-Nashr waAl-Tawzĩ’, 2nd edn, 
Cairo, n.d, p.12 and Salqĩm, Ibrāhĩm, Ũsūl Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmĩ, Matba‘at Al-Insha’, Damascus, 1981, pp 4-
10, as cited by Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social 
Science Research Methods for Islamic Research," 230.  
299 Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 189. 
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3.2.3.1 Revelational Sources 
The revelational sources are the Qur'an and the Sunnah.  They are also called the 
primary sources.300  The Qur’an is the record of the very Word of God revealed in Arabic 
through the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Mohammad.301  It is the most authoritative 
source and the first to be consulted when any determination is sought.302  It is, as 
described by Burton: 
 [A]n unparalleled window into the moral universe.  It is a source of knowledge in 
the way that the entire corpus of legal precedent is for the common law traditions: 
not so much as an index of possible rulings as a quarry in which the astute inquirer 
can hope to find the building blocks for a morally valid, and therefore true, system 
of ethics.303   
However, not all general principles governing religious and worldly affairs are set out in 
the Qur'an with the same clarity and detail, and so there is a need for another source to 
work as clarifier and detailer of the Qur'an.304 
This explicator is the Sunnah.  It is the second revelational or primary source, and 
defined as the record of the Prophet Mohammad’s sayings, acts, and tacit approvals.305  
The authority of the Prophetic teaching stems from the continuous combination the 
Qur'an makes between the obedience of God, and that of the Prophet.306  This authority is 
                                                 
300 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 230. 
301 Khallāf, Abd Al-Wahhāb, ,‘Ilm Usūl Al-Fiqh, Al-Nāshir Liltiba’ah wa Al-Nashr waAl-Tawzĩ’, 2nd edn, 
Cairo, n.d, p.23 and Salqĩm, Ibrāhĩm, Ũsūl Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmĩ, Matba‘at Al-Insha’, Damascus, 1981, pp 46-
47, as cited by Ibid., 231.  Rahman, Islam, 25.   
302 Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 189.  
303 Ibid. he refers to John Burton, 1977, the collection of the Quran.  London: Cambridge University Press, 
4, 111. 
304 Abul Fadl Mohsin Ebrahim, "Islamic Ethics and the Implications of Modern Biomedical Technology: 
An Analysis of Some Issues Pertaining to Reproductive Control, Biotechnical Parenting and Abortion" 
(Temple University, 1986), 3.      
305 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 233.  Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 190. 
306 Rahman, Islam, 51, 52.  
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understood by Moslems to be a reference to his oral and performative conduct,307 the 
record of which represents an example of a human being who lived in accordance with 
Qur’anic teachings and so provides a model through which it can be known how these 
teachings can be implemented in daily life.308   
Both, the Qur'an and the Sunnah are considered to be collections of indicators, i.e. 
material sources, from which scholars can, directly and indirectly, extract and formulate 
rulings governing all possible actions.309  They form Shari’a as a doctrine revealed by 
God throughout which His divine will is embodied.  Understanding and implementing 
imperatives outlined in them is the role of human intelligence or reason.  To that end, 
procedural or instrumental sources and principles have been established.   
3.2.3.2 Instrumental Sources  
 
The Qur’an and the Sunnah, as stated above, comprise the sources of Shari’a.  
However, not all rulings are outlined in them with equal clearness and detail.  Thus, 
instrumental sources have been designed to help extract these rulings from the primary 
sources, which are considered to be material ones.310  The two main ones, the qiyās and 
ijmā, will be discussed here.   
The first secondary or instrumental source is qiyās.  It means analogy in Arabic, 
and is technically defined as giving the determination of a case outlined in the Qur’an or 
Sunnah, to a case that has no explicit determination in either of them because of the 
                                                 
307 Ibid.  The Suunah is considered to be of divine origin like the Qur’an.  However, while the wording and 
meaning of the latter are believed to be those of God Himself, only the meaning of the former is attributed 
to Him.  The wording is that of the Prophet.  The Qur’an reads, “nor does he [the Prophet] say [aught] of 
[his] own desire.  It is no less than inspiration sent down to him (53: 34).”  Najjar, the Vicegerency of Man, 
between Revelation and Reason: A Critique of the Dialectic of the Text, Reason, and Reality, 28. 
308 In a slightly different meaning, see Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 190.    
309 Ibid.  
310 Ibid.    
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 This dependency is noted also with regard to the ijmā’.  In Arabic it means 
consensus and is technically defined as the agreement held by an authoritative body on 
the assessment of an act or practice.313  Ijmā is conditional upon recourse to an indicator 
from one of the primary sources directly or indirectly, i.e. via qiyās, and as such, is 
clearly of an instrumental nature.314   
Besides qiyās and ijmā there are other instrumental sources such as istihsān or 
Islamic equity, al-masālih al-mursalah or public interest, and urf or custom.315  The use of 
the instrumental sources in extracting rulings set out in the revelational sources and 
applying them, is subject to the principles that will be explained presently. 
3.2.3.3 The principles of understanding and applying revelational statements 
The principles governing the use of the instrumental sources can be divided into 
those related to understanding revelational sources and those related to implementing 
them.   
 
                                                 
311 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 236.  Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 191.    
312  Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 191.    
313 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 234.  Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics”, 190.    
314 Wzārh al-Āwqāf w al-Shʾwn al-Āslāmyt, al-Mwswʿh al-Fqhyt. “Ijmā”.  
315 Zahraa, "Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research”, 238, 244. 
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3.2.3.3.1 The principles of understanding revelational statements  
Understanding revelational imperatives seeks to identify the divine intent behind 
them.  For this end, it is subject to stipulations that are designed to keep it objective.  
These principles are linguistic, circumstantial, intentional and rational.  Firstly, 
revelational statements should be linguistically analyzed.  Secondly, circumstances 
surrounding revealing Qur’anic or Prophetic statements should be considered.  The intent 
or the principal ethical values behind Shari’a determinations should also be taken into 
account.  The assumption is that every Qur’anic or Prophetic statement aims towards the 
realisation of one of these intents or values in their different degrees.  Another guideline 
is that the statement at hand should be understood in the light of other statements, that is, 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah should be taken as a whole.  It might be the case that a 
particular statement is rescinded, expanded on, or restricted by other statements.  These 
guidelines work to help grasp the divine intent behind revelational statements, however, 
these statements do not denote the same level of certainty.316   
Revealed statements are divided into conclusive and inconclusive.  The former 
refer to those statements that are definite in narration and denotation, meaning that they 
are attributed beyond doubt to God, with respect to the Qur'an, and to the Prophet, with 
respect to the Sunnah.  As such, all Qur’anic verses and a great number of Prophetic 
traditions are definite.  Being definite in denotation means that the statement concerned is 
clear in showing the divine intent, and there is only one possible meaning.  If this is the 
case, and it is so with regard to statements that regulate doctrine, ritual acts, prescribed 
                                                 
316 Najjar, the Vicegerency of Man, between Revelation and Reason: A Critique of the Dialectic of the Text, 
Reason, and Reality, 45, 52.  
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penalties, prescribed penances and inheritance, the role exercised by reason is restricted to 
understanding this apparent meaning.  Deviating from this meaning is not acceptable.317   
If, on the other hand, the statement concerned is inconclusive in either narration or 
denotation or both, the role of reason expands to a greater extent.  If the statement is 
inconclusive in narration, it is necessary to work out whether it is a revealed one, guided 
while doing so by stipulations outlined in the Science of Prophetic Traditions.  If it is 
inconclusive in denotation, and it becomes so when more than one meaning is 
conceivable, reason is required to choose the most plausible meaning, in light of the rules 
of understanding explained above.318   
An important result follows; understanding reached in the case of conclusive 
statements cannot be changed across time or space, while that concerning inconclusive 
ones can be changed according to the variations between those who exercise reasoning in 
understanding and applying the linguistic, circumstantial, intentional and rational bases.319  
Grasping the divine intent marks the end of the phase of understanding revelation.  The 
second phase should follow.   
3.2.3.3.2 Applying revelational statements  
When the ruling embodied in the revelational statement concerned is understood, 
that is, the divine intent has been revealed, it is time to apply it.  This is also a reason-
based task.  The application of revelational rulings means embodying them into the 
human being’s everyday life; that is, subjecting his or her deeds to them.320  This requires 
classifying human deeds under the different categories of revelational rules, which is not 
                                                 
317 Ibid.   
318 Ibid., 54. 
319Ibid., 55, 58.    
320 Ibid., 69.    
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an easy task, as these rules tend to take general forms in order to cover boundless human 
deeds.  Thus, the comprehensive understanding of the revelational rule and the human 
deed concerned is essential.321  The former has been explained above.  Understanding the 
human deed concerned, or the actualities of life as it is also termed,322 requires examining 
it from all aspects: its nature, causes and motives, and short and long-term effects.  
Relevant disciplines such as psychology, physiology, medicine, or economics should be 
consulted, depending on the nature of the deed concerned.  Failure in classifying human 
deeds under the right category of revelational rules, just like misunderstanding the divine 
will behind these rules, results in failure to observe the divine will.323  Nevertheless, 
sticking to the instrumental sources and principles explained earlier should help 
understand and implement the stance of Shari’a on daily life issues.   
The previous discussion of the use of the instrumental sources focuses on the role 
of human reason within Shari’a, i.e. in understanding and applying it.  However, an 
important question in terms of the current thesis arises about the role of reason beyond 
Shari’a in knowing autonomously the divine will. 
3.2.3.3.3 The role of human reasoning in knowing the ethical arm of the divine will 
The question that arises with regard to human reasoning is whether it can be 
accepted as a means of knowing the divine will when revelation is silent.  It has already 
been shown that revelational statements can be inconclusive in denotion or narrations.  
There is also a possibility that there are not any revelational statements at all concerning a 
particular issue.  One clear example is the issue of ascertaining the end of human life.  As 
Yasin puts it:  
                                                 
321 Ibid., 69, 70.    
322 Ibid., 73.    
323 Ibid., 73, 75. 
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Undoubtedly the attempt to determine the moment at which man’s life on earth 
comes to an end in a way that is considered precise from the point of view of 
Islamic law is … difficult …[because] there is no statement, either in the Quran or 
Sunnah, which can be taken as a starting point.324   
Whilst another highly relevant example is the issue of determining the beginning of 
human life.325 
This question is similar to that posed in connection with the version of natural law 
theory based upon the belief in God as the lawgiver.326  The assumption in this theory is 
that not all God’s laws have been revealed.  Only those that cannot be reached without the 
help of revelation have been revealed while others are embodied by God in nature where 
they are awaiting human discovery.  These unrevealed laws are the only ones available 
for non-believers.327  They can also be reached by believers prior to receiving 
revelation.328   
This issue has been hotly debated among Moslem scholars.  The starting-point 
was the question of whether the determinations of goodness and badness are inherently 
embodied in acts, and so can be known by reason, or whether they are ordainments laid 
down by God, and so can be known by no means other than revelation.  Those who 
adopted the first perspective believed accordingly that God’s laws can be known by 
human reason prior to revelation, and so humans are bound by them even if no reference 
to them is found in revelation.  That is to say, if an act is discovered to be bad or good via 
reason, there is an obligation to act upon this discovery even if the revelation is absent.  It 
                                                 
324 Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
375. 
325 See for more details, pages 194-197 below.    
326 Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 44, 45. 
327 Austin, John, Lectures on Jurisprudence (London, 1911) I, 104.  As cited by Ibid. 
328 Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, 44. 
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follows that laws can be grasped and formulated for acts regarding which no revelational 
statement has been found.329   
However, the majority of Moslem scholars hold the opposite perspective, that is, 
no determination can be known except through revelation.  Scripture then, is the only 
source from which God’s laws can be identified, and the only role reason can play is to 
discover and implement them.330  Nevertheless, all scholars, it is claimed, agree that after 
revelation no source other than revelation can be used.331  
From my perspective, both revelation and reason can be used to know the ethical 
arm of the divine will.  As Al-Faruqi succinctly makes the point: 
To know the divine will, man was given revelation, a direct and immediate 
disclosure of what God wants him to realize on earth.  …  Equally, man is endowed 
with senses, reason and understanding, intuition, all the perfection necessary to 
enable him to discover the divine will unaided.  For that will is embodied not only 
in causal nature, but equally in human feelings and relations.  Whereas the former 
half takes another exercise of the discipline called natural science to discover it, the 
second half takes the exercise of the moral sense and the discipline of ethics.332 
However, the knowledge derived from reason is not as reliable as that derived 
from revelation; as Al-Faruqi says: 
The discoveries and conclusions [through reason] are not certain.  They are always 
subject to trial and error, to further experimentation, further analysis and to 
correction by deeper insight.  But, all this notwithstanding, the search is possible, 
and reason cannot despair of re-examining and correcting its own previous findings 
                                                 
329 Ibid., 46. 
330 Ibid., 46, 47. 
331 Al-Ghryāny, al-Sādq ʿbdāl Raḥmān.  Al-Hkm al-Shrʿy byn al-Nql w al-
ʿql. 2 ed. Tripoli: Dār al-Hkmt, 1996.  9, 10.  
332 Al-Faruqi, Al Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life, 6. 
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without failing into scepticism and cynicism.  Thus, knowledge of the divine will is 
possible by reason, certain by revelation.333    
Therefore, the knowledge derived from revelation should be given priority over 
that stemming from reason in cases of conflict.  However, this is obviously not the case if 
uncertain knowledge is found in revelation.  In this case, recourse to reason to determine 
the uncertain ethical imperative is inevitable.  As mentioned previously, rational bases are 
amongst those used to determine the denotion of revelation.  The role of reason is greater 
when no knowledge is found in revelation because in such a case, it is the only recourse 
for establishing the ethical imperatives of the case.  This result is of special importance 
for the present thesis as will presently be explained.   
The previous explanation of the definition, nature, and sources of Shari’a has been 
provided in order to demonstrate what is meant by undertaking this research from a 
Shari’a-based perspective.  It should have made clear that the standing of Shari’a on any 
issue should be sought through consulting the revelational sources by means of the 
procedure and principles of understanding and application explained earlier.  However, as 
will be detailed later in this thesis, there is no revelational conclusive statement on the 
legal and moral status of the foetus.334  Consequently, both revelation, as embodied in 
Shari’a, and reason will be used to ascertain the status of the foetus.  Regarding the 
former, the relevant inconclusive revelational statements will be analysed to grasp what 
should be the position of revelation on the issue, guided by the appropriate instrumental 
sources and means.   
                                                 
333 Ibid. 
334 See for more details, pages 194-197 below.  Mohammed Na'im Yasin, "The Inception of Human Life in 
Light of Statements of the Quran and Sunnah and the Opinions of Muslim Scholars " in Human Life - Its 
Inception and End as viewed by Islam ed. Ali Al-saif Khaled Al-Mazkur, Ahmad Raja'ii Al-Gindi, Abd Al-
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Reason, on the other hand, will be utilised to ascertain what should be the stance 
of Shari’a on the status of the foetus.  For example, scientific knowledge concerning 
foetal development and the brain’s structure and function will be utilised to comprehend 
the divine will outlined in revelation.  In addition, non-Islamic theories, ideas and 
hypotheses will be used to indentify which meaning is more reliable in case more than 
one is possible, and to determine the ethical imperative in case no definitive one can be 
derived from revelation.  However, this is conditional on not contradicting the spirit of 
Shari’a, or any of its general principles.  Furthermore, though Shari’a may have a clear 
position on the issue discussed, an attempt will be made to contrast and compare this 
position with that of the relevant Western theories.  Assuming that the position of Shari’a 
will be adopted in the current research, the comparison and contrast with the position of 
other theories should make the stance clearer. 
4. Defining Legal Personality 
4 Defining Legal Personality 
As previously explained, ascertaining whether the foetus is a legal person is the 
first step towards assessing its legal status.  In order for this possibility to be examined, 
the definitions of legal personality and the criterion/criteria they set out should be 
ascertained.  This chapter looks firstly at the current definitions, as this allows for an 
examination of the current legal status of the foetus: whether it meets the criterion/criteria 
set out, and so is a legal person.  However, personifying or non-personifying the foetus in 
accordance with whether it meets or fails to meet the currently required criterion/criteria, 
is not necessarily the right assessment of its status.  That is to say, the legal status of the 
foetus in the positive law sense will need to be changed, if the current definition/s of legal 
personality is/are discovered to be muddled.  As this will be shown to be the case, this 
chapter moves on to suggest another definition, proposing it to be free from the 
limitations of the current ones.   
4.1 The current definitions of legal personality 
The study of the current definitions of legal personality, is the first step towards 
ascertaining whether the foetus is a legal person.  These definitions can be classified in 
two parts.  The first definition treats legal personality as a purely legal concept, and 
disregards any extra-legal factors when conferring or withdrawing it.  The second bases it 
on a particular meta-legal consideration, namely, the quality of humanity, or being 
human.  Stating this distinction, and describing how courts have found it difficult to 
differentiate between the two types of definition, a Harvard Law Review editorial says:  
Courts have not been able to distinguish cleanly between these two points of view, 
alternately treating the issue of personality as a commonsense determination of 
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what is human or as a formal legal fiction unrelated to biological conceptions of 
humanity.  Furthermore, the expressive dynamic through which law communicates 
norms and values to society renders impossible a clear divide between the legal 
definition of “person” and the colloquial understanding of the term.335      
This chapter examines the two definitions.  Starting with an examination of the 
positivist definition, it then moves on to assess the humanity-based one, and argues that 
both are implausible generally and from an Islamic perspective. 
4.1.1 Defining legal personality as a purely legal concept  
The first of the current definitions of legal personality is the positivist definition 
that defines it as a purely legal concept.  This section focuses on this definition, and 
develops an argument that shows that it is implausible.  In the following, the meaning of 
the positivist definition, its supporting points, and implications, especially for the status of 
the foetus, will be examined, as well as its limitations.  
4.1.1.1 The meaning of the positivist definition of legal personality 
The positivist definition considers legal personality a purely legal capacity to have 
rights and duties, and participate in legal relations that the lawmaker confers to fulfil 
certain purposes.336  This definition refers to the main dimensions of legal personality as 
conceived by positivists.  It is a purely legal concept in that no extra-legal factors of any 
kind are considered when it is conferred or withdrawn.337  According to Ngaire Naffine, 
positivist legal personality: 
                                                 
335 Editorial. "Notes: What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal 
Fiction," Harvard Law Review 114, no. 6 (2001): 1745-1768, 1745.    
336 Davies and Naffine, Are Persons Property?  52.  
337 Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 350, 351.  
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[H]as neither biological nor psychological predicates; nor does it refer back to any  
particular social or moral idea of a person and it is to be completely distinguished 
from those philosophical conceptions of the person which emphasise the 
importance of reason.338 
In addition, legal personality is seen as no more than the representation of rights 
and obligations one has, or the totality of these rights and obligations.339  As Bryant Smith 
argues, if you strip a person of their rights and duties, you will find nothing left: 
To regard legal personality as a thing apart from the legal relations, is to commit an 
error of the same sort as that of distinguishing title from the rights, powers, 
privileges and immunities for which it is only a compendious name.  Without the 
relations, in either case, there is no more left than the smile of the Cheshire Cat after 
the cat had disappeared.340   
Further, legal personality is a device utilised to fit particular purposes: “… 
simplifying legal calculations”.341  Representing the positivist concept of the role of legal 
personality Derham claims that: 
Just as the concept ‘‘one’’ in arithmetic is essential to the logical system developed 
and yet is not one something (eg apple or orange, etc), so a legal system (or any 
system perhaps) must be provided with a basic unit before legal relationships can be 
devised.  The legal person is the unit or entity adopted.  For the logic of the system 
it is just as much a pure ‘‘concept’’ as ‘‘one’’ in arithmetic.  It is just as 
independent from a human being as one is from an ‘‘apple’’.342  
                                                 
338 Ibid., 351.  
339 H. Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law, Max Knight (Trans.)”, (Berkley: University of California Press. 
1970), 172, 173. 
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The other dimension of the positivist definition of legal personality is that it 
disregards any intrinsic qualities the entity concerned may have.  The Consideration of 
such qualities leads to the accusation of bringing external elements into the world of law.  
The following example may make this point clearer.  Defining the way according to 
which legal personality should be determined, Michoud argues that, “[f]or legal science, 
the notion of person is and should remain a purely juridical notion.  The word signifies 
simply a subject of rights-duties, [sujet de droit] a being capable of having the subjective 
rights properly belonging to him.”343  In this passage, he clearly adopts a purely legal 
definition of personality; however, he then proceeds to pronounce what strips his 
definition of such a label: 
To know if certain beings correspond to this definition, it is not necessary to ask if 
these beings constitute persons in the philosophical sense of the word.  It is enough 
to ask if they are of such a nature that subjective rights may be attributed to them.344  
According to John Dewy, considering the nature of the entity personified casts doubt over 
the purity of legal personality, because extraneous factors are being considered “… under 
the guise of the necessity of inquiring into the nature of the subjects”.345  In the positivist 
understanding then, the legal personality should be founded on no extra-legal factors.  
The bases of this definition will be explained as follows:  
4.1.1.2 The bases of the positivist definition of legal personality  
The positivist definition of legal personality is based on three considerations.  The 
first is a distinction made between the world of fact and the world of law.  Each is thought 
                                                 
343 Michoud, La Notion.  de Pcrsonnalité Morale (1899) 11 Revue Du Droit Public, 1, at 8.  As cited by J. 
Marie Dewey, "The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality”, The Yale law journal 35, no. 6 
(1926): 655-673, 659.  Emphasis in original.   
344 Ibid. 
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of as a complete and independent world, and while the existence in the former is physical, 
it is abstract in the latter.  Indeed, a thing or an entity may exist in both worlds, but the 
two existences are different and distinct.  In terms of legal personality, it belongs to the 
world of law, and is different from human personality that resides in the world of fact and 
hence should not be confused with it.346  
Applying the separation between the two worlds eases the work of lawmakers.  
Indeed, their work is being hindered rather than facilitated, if they consider physical 
things while forming legal concepts.  The reason for this is the fact that they do not have 
complete control over physical things, as they do with regard to abstract ones.  
Accordingly, no assurance can be given about the way the former may work.  Thus, it is 
much better to restrict their work to abstract things.  In terms of legal personality, 
lawmakers should avoid considering human characteristics when conferring it, even when 
dealing with humans.  In this case, they should think of them as types.347   
However, in the beginning, the imitation of physical things while inventing their 
abstract counterparts is not only conceivable, but also desirable.  This is because the 
familiarity with physical things makes it easier for people to comprehend the invented 
disembodied ones.  Still, this imitation should shrink in accordance with the advancement 
in legal creativity.  In terms of legal personality, emulating human characteristics while 
forming it, is desirable at the beginning.  Yet, a more abstract legal personality should 
gradually be adopted until we reach a stage at which it can be attributed to anything, 
regardless of whether or not it has any similarity to humans.348  
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The second consideration behind the exclusion of non-legal factors is their 
instability.  Such an attribute may lead to instability and incoherence in the legal concepts 
built on them.  To illustrate this, John Dewey cites the example of the philosophical 
concepts of the nature of inherent and necessary qualities that are claimed to make an 
entity a person.  History shows, according to him, that these theories have undergone a 
continuous change that has led to instability in the legal concepts based on them.  To 
make matters worse, the emergence of new philosophical concepts has not been 
accompanied by the disappearance of old ones.  Rather, they have stayed together in a 
way that has introduced confusion and conflict into legal concepts.349 
The other consideration that is claimed to support the understanding of legal 
personality as a purely legal concept, is the history of law.  Historically, legal personality 
has been conferred on, and withdrawn from, variable entities regardless of any alleged 
intrinsic qualities, namely, human qualities.  Furthermore, it was the family, not the 
individual, that was first regarded as a legal person.  Even when legal personality was 
eventually conferred on individuals, not all of them were honoured.  Children, women, 
and slaves are examples of those denied legal personality throughout history.  As phrased 
by Christopher D.  Stone:   
We have been making persons of children although they were not, in law, always 
so.  And we have done the same, albeit imperfectly some would say, with prisoners, 
aliens, women (especially of the married variety), the insane, Blacks, embryos, and 
Indians.350  
On the other hand, because of the continuous evolution of law, non-human entities such 
as corporations were assigned legal personality.  Clearly, corporations can hardly be said 
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to have any intrinsic qualities, let alone human ones.  Their worth is derived from the 
value that others such as shareholders and customers confer on them.351  This seems to 
prove that no intrinsic qualities have been required for legal personality to be conferred 
on an entity.352 
 Such an understanding yields important results concerning the conferral and 
withdrawal of legal personality.  Stating these results with particular emphasis on their 
effect on the legal personification of the foetus is the theme of the following discussion.   
4.1.1.3 The results of the positivist definition of legal personality 
The adoption of the positivist definition of legal personality entails several results 
that are closely connected to the status of the foetus.  First, the conferral and withdrawal 
of legal personality become subject to the lawmaker’s decision regardless of any extra-
legal considerations such as the intrinsic qualities of the entity concerned.  In the words of 
Nékám: 
Everything … can become a subject - a potential center - of rights, whether a plant 
or an animal, a human being or an imagined spirit; and nothing … [if the lawmaker 
decides so] will become a subject of rights, whether human being or anything 
else.353 
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Accordingly, the foetus will be on the same footing as any other entity or thing in terms 
of the chance of being attributed legal personality.  All is contingent on the lawmaker’s 
edict. 
Practically speaking, many courts, as will be presently exemplified, have treated 
legal personality as a purely legal matter that should be solved with no recourse 
whatsoever to non-legal factors.354  In the US, the standing of some courts on the issue of 
whether slaves were legal persons provides a clear example.  The courts deemed slaves 
non-legal persons, since they failed to meet the conditions set out for this standing in law.  
Their humanity was considered irrelevant to the legal argument.  As stated by the Court 
of Appeals of Kentucky in Jarman v Patterson:   
Slaves, although they are human beings, are by our laws placed on the same footing 
with living property of the brute creation.  However deeply it may be regretted, and 
whether it be politic or impolitic, a slave by our code, is not treated as a person, but 
(negotium), a thing, as he stood in the civil code of the Roman Empire.355   
In terms of the foetus, this result means that no recourse to extra-legal 
considerations, or non-legal literature, can be made when its legal status is being 
determined.  The decision of the Queen's Bench Division in Paton v British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service Trustees and Another356 is a clear example of that.  In this case, a man 
unsuccessfully sought an injunction to prevent his partner from having an abortion.  
Finding itself required to take a decision on whether the foetus has any rights of its own, 
                                                 
354 Seeing legal personality as a purely legal concept is considered by Adrian Whitfield to be one of the 
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the Court concluded that, after reviewing the relevant laws, it has none.357  Extra-legal 
considerations were considered irrelevant:    
In the discussion of human affairs and especially of abortion, controversy can rage 
over the moral rights, duties, interests, standards and religious views of the parties.  
Moral values are in issue.  I am, in fact, concerned with none of these matters.  I am 
concerned, and concerned only, with the law of England as it applies to this claim.  
My task is to apply the law free of emotion or predilection.358 
Similarly, when called upon to decide on whether frozen foetuses can inherit in 
the case of In Re the Estate of K, 359 the Tasmanian Supreme Court made it clear that its 
decision would be built on no extra-legal considerations for they are, in the Court’s logic, 
irrelevant: 
 The Court is not concerned with any philosophical or biological question of what is 
life since the question relates solely to the status recognised by law and not to any 
moral, scientific or theological issue.360  
Though the Court ended by granting frozen foetuses the right to inheritance, it did so by 
analogy with foetuses that have that right through a mere legal fiction.  That is to say, the 
foetuses were deemed alive at the death of the intestate and so entitled to inherit from 
them, but not because of any metaphysical or biological attributes but via legal 
assumption.  The conferral of the same right on frozen foetuses by analogy with foetuses 
is, therefore, another legal fiction.361   
                                                 
357 Ibid., 279. 
358 Per Judge Sir George Baker P for the court, Ibid., 278. 
359 In Re the Estate of K, (1996) 5 Tas R 365. 
360 Ibid., 378.  
361 Ibid., 381.  
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A similar position has been taken by the New York Court of Appeals in Byrn v 
New York City Health and Hospitals.362  While discussing the issue of the status of the 
foetus, the Court said:  
What is a legal person is for the law, including, of course, the Constitution, to say, 
which simply means that upon according legal personality to a thing the law affords 
it the rights and privileges of a legal person363… The process is, indeed, circular, 
because it is definitional.  Whether the law should accord legal personality is a 
policy question which in most instances devolves on the Legislature, subject of 
course to the Constitution as it has been ‘legally’ rendered… The point is that it is a 
policy determination whether legal personality should attach and not a question of 
biological or ‘natural’ correspondence.364 
Summing up, the Court said: 
There are, then, real issues in this litigation, but they are not legal or justiciable.  
They are issues outside the law unless the Legislature should provide otherwise.365     
The other result of the positivist definition of legal personality is that no 
difference between legal persons can be claimed, since they are all completely law-made.  
The classification of legal persons into real and artificial, according to whether or not they 
are human, becomes implausible.  As expressed by Bryant Smith:    
The legal personality of a corporation is just as real and no more real than the legal 
personality of a normal human being.  In either case it is an abstraction, one of the 
major abstractions of legal science, like title, possession, right and duty.366  
                                                 
362 Byrn v New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., (1972) 286 N.E.2d 887. 
363 Here the Court cited some references including Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State, which is an 
indication on the understanding of legal personality adopted by the Court, i.e. positivism-based 
understanding.  
364 Per Breitel J for the Court Ibid., 889. 
365 Per Breitel J for the Court Ibid., 890. 
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In addition, regarding legal personality as a mere device makes it possible, even 
desirable, for lawmakers to vary in attributing it to, or withdrawing it from, a particular 
entity in accordance with the situation concerned.367  This result is of particular 
significance for the current thesis because it justifies the inconsistency of treatment 
received by the foetus.  It becomes possible to grant it legal personality and its associated 
rights and protection in one law, and deprive it of these in another.  A useful example of 
this perspective, is that of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s position regarding the 
protection of foetuses in criminal and civil contexts.  In DiDonato v Wortman, the Court 
interpreted the term person used in the state wrongful death statute to allow recovery for 
the death of a foetus.368  However, later in State v Beale, the Court refused to interpret the 
state murder statute to extend criminal responsibility to the killing of a foetus.369  
Another related result is that variation between legal persons becomes acceptable 
with no need to attribute it to the variation in legal relations.370  This result follows from 
considering legal personality as a mere device that can be used to fit different purposes.  
Fitting these purposes may require attributing different types of legal personality.  
However, as has just been mentioned, the variation becomes unacceptable if it based on 
intrinsic qualities in the entities concerned, such as the variation between the real legal 
personality that is attributed to human beings, and the artificial legal personality that is 
ascribed to other entities.  
                                                                                                                                                  
366 Smith, "Legal Personality”, 293.  He cites Wiloughby (the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law, 1924, 
34) making a similar statement that “[t]he legal personality of the so-called natural person is as artificial as 
is that of the thing or group which is personified.  In both cases the character or attribute of personality is 
but a creation of the jurist’s mind a mere conception which he finds it useful to employ in order to give 
logical coherence to his thought.” 
367  Smith, "Legal Personality”, 298, 299. 
368 358 S.E.  2d 489, 493 (N.C.  1987).   
369 376 S.E.  2d 1, 2 n.3 at 4 (N.C.  1989). 
370 Lawson, "The Creative Use of Legal Concepts”, 914.  
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The adoption of the positivist definition of legal personality entails the acceptance 
of these results when assessing the legal status of the foetus.  However, this definition is 
implausible as will presently be shown.   
4.1.1.4 The limitations of the positivist definition of legal personality 
The positivist definition of legal personality has not been immune from criticism, 
in particular the criticism that it is practically unattainable.  The separation between legal 
and non-legal relations is virtually impossible in practice, and Wesley Hohfeld admits 
that.  Despite his emphasis on “… the importance of differentiating purely legal relations 
from the physical and mental facts that call such relations into being”, he indicates that 
there is “… ample evidence of the inveterate and unfortunate tendency to confuse and 
blend the legal and the non-legal quantities in a given problem.”371  He cites two reasons 
for that.  The first is the intimate relationship that the law has with other disciplines, and 
the second is the looseness and ambiguity of legal terminology.  Such looseness and 
ambiguity are the result of borrowing terminology from the physical world, wherein they 
are used to denote physical things, and bringing them to the world of law where they are 
used metaphorically to designate legal things.372  
In addition, Naffine specifies two further reasons for the practical unattainability 
of the positivist definition of legal personality.  First, by describing legal personality as 
the capability to bear rights and duties, this definition invokes the idea of a particular 
entity naturally endowed with that ‘capability’ rather than being given it by an external 
                                                 
371 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning " 
in Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning ed. Walter Wheeler Cook (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), 27. 
372 Ibid., 27, 30. 
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factor, i.e. a mere dictate of a lawmaker.  This is exactly against the understanding of 
legal personality as a pure abstract that has no link with any pre-law existence.373  
The second reason concerns intelligibility.  The positivist definition of legal 
personality cannot be thought of without being given an empirical content, but each time 
it has been applied, it has lost part of its allegedly abstract and artificial nature.  
Accordingly, legal personality has been modelled on a particular understanding 
influenced by extra-legal considerations of who should count as a legal person.  In this 
particular understanding, legal personality, was withheld from slaves because of 
historical, social, and political considerations.  According to Ngaire Naffine, animals have 
similarly been denied legal personality though there is nothing preventing them from 
obtaining one.  Women too, in her opinion, are deprived of legal personality, because 
their interests, while pregnant, are waived in favour of those of their foetuses.  Therefore, 
although it might be theoretically plausible, the positivist definition of legal personality 
does not stand up in practice.  Every time it is applied, it is affected by extra-legal 
considerations resulting in making it no longer an empty slot that can be filled and refilled 
with anything.  It becomes something that is already filled with a particular content 
influenced by non-legal factors.374  
In addition, even theoretically, the positivist-based definition of legal personality 
is problematic.  The commentators quoted earlier stressing that legal personality must be 
formed on purely legal bases, are, in fact, among those basing it on non-legal 
considerations.  According to Nékám, for example, the decision of the lawmaker to confer 
or withdraw legal personality is not arbitrary.  It reflects the social importance of that 
                                                 
373 Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 355. 
374 Ibid., 355, 356. 
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being, as seen by society.375  In other words, the lawmaker is bound to confer legal 
personality on each being the society considers socially important, and so, worthy of legal 
protection.  No other requirements are necessary, not even existing experimentally since 
society may believe in the importance of imaginary beings: 
[T]he only circumstance which makes of something a subject of rights is the fact 
that it is, in the opinion of the community, an entity having certain interests, real or 
merely imagined by the community, but always considered socially important 
enough to need and deserve social protection.  As the socially important interests of 
the entity are conceived, so rights are adapted to it; and so far the entity as it has 
such rights acknowledged to it does the entity become a legal phenomenon, a 
subject of rights.376   
Obviously, social factors are per se exterior to the legal realm, and therefore, when built 
on them, legal personality is built on non-legal considerations; it cannot be deemed a 
purely judicial concept.   
Furthermore, introducing social evaluation into the conferral of legal personality 
opens the door to the influence of other non-legal factors, and so, calls the purity of this 
concept into question.  Social evaluation is subject to the influence of other exterior 
factors embodied in society such as moral, metaphysical, political, and other 
considerations.  Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that in a particular society a 
certain religion has strong influence, and that this religion happens to give, as is the case 
of Islam, special importance to human beings as the crown of all creation.377  It would be 
more than likely that human beings are considered socially important and so given legal 
personality.  In this case, religious belief forms the basis of legal personality, even 
                                                 
375 Nékám, the Personality Conception of the Legal Entity, 37. 
376 Ibid. 
377 See  3.1 The Islamic concept of human being.  
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indirectly.  The same could be said about other factors whenever they play the same role 
in shaping society’s opinions about whom it should count as important for the purpose of 
the conferral of legal personality.   
Inspired by this fact, Jane Nosworthy, a proponent of animal-rights, has suggested 
that, in order to succeed in granting animals legal personality, effort must be made to 
influence society’s opinions about them.  Their similarities with humans should be 
emphasised to make society believe that the protection offered to the latter via being legal 
persons should be, by the same virtue, extended to animals: 
[I]t seems that we must play upon human emotions in order to obtain the 
community's support for the legislative conferral of legal personality on animals.  
The general disapproval of anthropomorphism expressed by many of those engaged 
in philosophical discussion of animal rights may need to be tempered by 
pragmatism in order to maximise community support for the extension of 
personality to animals.  Human weakness for animals who exhibit 'human-like' 
behaviour, such as the use of language by apes, can be used to animal advantage by 
arousing empathy in human observers.378   
Furthermore, the claim that legal positivists put forward for disregarding extra-
legal factors from the conferral and withdrawal of legal personality has been called into 
question.  According to Anthony J Connolly, who is himself a positivist, no legal 
positivist can be held to have such a belief.  All legal positivists admit the connection that 
law has with non-legal factors, and so consider them while forming legal concepts in 
general, and that of legal personality in particular.379  This is clearly the case with 
positivists such as Hart who hold a sociological or naturalistic form of legal positivism:380 
                                                 
378 Jane Nosworthy, "The Koko Dilemma: A Challenge to Legal Personality”. 
379 Anthony J Connolly, "Legal Positivism and Personality”, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 28 
(2003): 192-198, 193. 
380 Ibid., 196. 
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“[f]or Hart, all legal concepts are constructions of (and therefore, necessarily connected 
to) some or other set of social facts”, Connolly argues.381  
The same is true of other positivists.  For example, though they may not be held to 
have the same mode of thinking about legal positivism, Kelsen and his adherents 
recognise the linkage between legal personality and extra-legal factors.  According to 
Connolly, they think of legal personality as a cluster of rights and duties whose content, 
those rights and duties, consists of human behaviour, which is an extra-legal fact.382  
Kelsen is quoted as stating that, “…human behaviour is the content of legal obligations 
and rights.”383  Then, even if legal personality were considered a purely legal concept, 
building on the concepts of rights and duties that are based on extra-legal facts would lead 
to building, even indirectly, legal personality on such facts.384  
Moreover, Kelsenian positivists, Connolly claims, do not deny the connection law 
has with other disciplines in the wider world.  Their call to keep legal concepts pure is 
just an attempt to eliminate any obscurity that might be caused to law by interaction with 
methodologically different disciplines.385  Kelsen describes the subjects of psychology, 
sociology, ethics, and political theory as being “…closely connected with law”.386  He also 
says that,  
The Pure Theory of Law undertakes to delimit the cognition of law against these 
disciplines, not because it ignores or denies the connect, but because it wishes to 
                                                 
381 Ibid., 194.  He refers to Hart’s discussion of legal concepts in Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence 
(1954) 70 Law Quarterly Review 37 and The Concept of Law (1961). 
382 Ibid., 195. 
383 Ibid.  Connolly’s emphasis.   
384 Ibid. 
385 Ibid.  
386 Kelsen, Hans, Pure Theory of Law (1967), p1 in Ibid., (Connolly’s emphasis).   
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avoid the uncritical mixture of methodologically different disciplines which 
obscures the essence of the science of law….387  
Then, according to Connolly, there are no positivists who deny that legal personality has 
any connection with social facts.388  However, there are indeed positivists who deny that 
legal personality has a necessary connection with a particular set of social facts:  
[I]t is quite consistent with the Kelsenian view that legal personality is necessarily 
connected with some or other set of social facts, that it is not necessarily connected 
with a particular set of such facts.  On the Kelsenian view, legal personality may 
attach to any set of human behaviour.  It is not limited to some particular set.  For 
Tur and Fitzgerald also, legal personality can attach to anything that can have rights 
and duties, to any being capable of rights or duties.  And if, per Kelsen, any set of 
human behaviour can bear rights and duties then any set of behavioural or social 
facts may bear legal personality.  Legal personality may be informed by such 
facts.389 
Nevertheless, legal personality is semantically independent from any particular set of 
those facts:  
The … historical account of the various sets of social facts to which the concept of 
legal personality has been applied within Western law illustrates the semantic 
independence of that concept from any particular set of those facts.  … [I]n practice 
and over given periods of history the concept has taken up specific social content.  
However, this is a contingent incorporation of such content and not a necessary 
linking of the concept and that content.  …  If it was, [we] … would not and could 
not be talking about the same concept over time but would rather be talking about 
different concepts at different times.390 
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However, in terms of the discussion of the accuracy of the claim that legal 
personality is a purely legal concept, it does not matter whether legal positivists are really 
in denial of any role played by non-legal factors.  What matters is that they, at least in 
practice, do consider such factors.  This is indeed a clear indication of the impossibility of 
the separation claimed between law and other disciplines in general, and legal personality 
and extra-legal considerations in particular.  In terms of this discussion, the argument that 
legal positivists make a distinction between building legal personality on any set of extra-
legal considerations, and building it on a particular one, and approve only of the former is 
not important.  In either case, they admit that legal personality should be built on non-
legal factors, and that is enough to refute the definition that aims to exclude such factors, 
regardless of whether or not this definition can be called positivist.   
Furthermore, the current practice of law does not favour legal positivism.  
According to Michael Moore, basing legal concepts in general, and the concept of legal 
personality in particular, on non-legal factors, namely, moral ones, is the position law has 
already held.391  He cites several examples to support this claim:        
It takes considerable attention to the details of contract law, for example, to show 
that its doctrines are built upon the moral practices of promise making; or that tort 
law is built either upon some utilitarian notions of efficient resource allocation or 
upon some corrective justice views, or upon some accommodations between these 
competing moral theories; or that property law assigns rights on the basis of either 
utilitarian or natural (moral) rights theories; or that criminal law doctrines are 
                                                 
391 M. S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship.  Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 48, 49.  Shari’a’s stance on the issue is that no distinction 
between law and other disciplines should be held, and so, legal personality should be based on non-legal 
considerations.  See  3.2.2 The nature of Shari’a. 
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simply legal restatements of some moral theory of responsibility, either utilitarian 
or retributive.392  
The concept of legal personality is no exception:  
Because the law is built upon morality in this way it is plausible to suppose that the 
law’s crucial concepts, such as that of personality, action, and intention, are also 
built upon corresponding moral concept.  In this view, an entity is legally a person 
only if it is morally a person.393  
Furthermore, according to the Editor of the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, in 
practice, the theory that separates morality from law, legal positivism, has not been 
followed, and when the law is ambiguous, lawyers and judges rely on moral 
considerations to support their positions on what the law really is.394  Another indication 
on the impossibility of separating law from non-legal factors in general, and moral factors 
in particular, is the legal permissibility of abortion.  According to John Harris, this 
permissibility is based on the law’s recognition of moral considerations granting the 
foetus no moral personality.  In his words: 
The law of course recognises a distinction between human persons and human non-
persons.  Embryos and foetuses are human beings but not full persons and 
permitting abortion would not be coherent unless the law also recognised that moral 
status of the embryo and foetus is not identical with that of the normal adult 
human.395 
 In addition, the intimate linkage between morality and law may be evidenced by 
the tendency to build legislation on recommendations worked-out by committees 
                                                 
392 Ibid., 48. 
393 Ibid.   
394 Ted Honderich, ed., the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 505, 
506. 
395 John Harris, "Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgement in Re 
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consisting of legal and non-legal experts.  The recommendations, therefore, are inevitably 
built, beside the legal considerations, on moral, philosophical, and/or religious ones.  A 
clear example of this is the Warnock Committee whose 1984 Report framed the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990.396  Accordingly, the legal status of the 
foetus, as embodied in this legislation, is heavily influenced by the concept that the 
Committee’s members had concerning its moral status.  Indeed, the Committee’s 
following statement precludes any other interpretation: 
Although the questions of when life or personhood begin appear to be questions of 
fact susceptible of straightforward answers, we hold that the answers to such 
questions in fact are complex amalgams of moral and factual judgments.  Instead of 
trying to answer these questions directly, we have therefore gone straight to the 
question of how it is right to treate the human embryo.  We have considered what 
status ought to be accorded to the human embryo, and the answer we give must 
necessarily be in terms of ethical or moral principles.397   
What could be concluded from the previous discussions is that it would be impossible to 
ignore extra-legal considerations while conferring legal personality.  The question still 
arises about which factor(s) is/are relevant. 
4.1.2 Defining legal personality as a humanity-based concept   
Unlike the positivist definition of legal personality, the definition discussed in this 
section transcends the borders of the legal realm, and bases legal personality on a non-
legal factor, i.e. humanity or the quality of being human.  Though this thesis identifies 
humanity with moral and legal personality, the meaning it gives to this quality and the 
                                                 
396 See fn. 807. 
397 Mary Warnock (Chairman). "Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
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criterion for acquiring it are different from those adopted in the definition examined in 
this section.398  This definition is, I will argue, unsatisfactory.  In the following 
paragraphs, I will discuss its meaning and results, especially those which concern 
defining humanity, before moving on to examine its plausibility.   
4.1.2.1 The meaning of the humanity-based definition  
The humanity-based definition of legal personality is adopted by natural law 
theorists399 such as John Finnis.400  It is a view that regards legal personality as no more 
than a legal expression of characteristics that attach to human beings simply by virtue of 
their status as human beings.401  Accordingly, human beings have rights and duties 
because of who and what they are.402  Human beings are “…the paradigmatic subject of 
rights”,403 while others such as corporations can be deemed artificial subjects of rights or 
persons only by analogy with them.  Unlike others, no fiction is embodied in the conferral 
of legal personality on them.404  
Considering humanity as the basis for having rights is apparent in human rights 
literature.  To many human rights lawyers, this is almost a self-evident thing.405  Rights 
are “[i]nherent in the natural condition of being human”, some of them say.406  Or, as in 
the opening statement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the “…recognition 
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
                                                 
398 See  4.2 Suggesting a new definition of legal personality. 
399 Davies and Naffine, Are Persons Property? , 55. 
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human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace”.407  Also, Article 1 of the 
Declaration asserts that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal and in dignity”.  
Dignity here is inherent in the state of being human, as Ngaire Naffine observes.408  
4.1.2.2 The results of the humanity-based definition  
The humanity-based definition entails significant results concerning legal 
personification in general and that of the foetus in particular.  First of all, it becomes 
necessary, in order to determine whether an entity is a legal person, to determine whether 
it is a human being.  This, in turn, necessitates exploring the meaning of humanity and the 
conditions of acquiring it.  In practice, the beginning and the end of human life then 
become the markers of the beginning and the end of legal personality.  Accordingly, legal 
personality cannot be deemed a purely legal concept.  That is, the exploration into the 
meaning of humanity and its related issues demands transcending the borders of the legal 
realm, and going deep into other disciplines that have interest in such issues, e.g.  
philosophy, ethics, religion, and science.409  
For this thesis, this means that if a humanity-based definition is adopted, 
discussing whether the foetus is a human being will be essential for deciding whether it is 
a legal person.  It means also that non-legal literature on the issue such as that concerning 
the meaning of humanity and its beginning will have to be consulted before a definitive 
conclusion can be obtained.   
                                                 
407 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec 1948 and reprinted in 43 Am J International 
Law Supp 127 (1949).  Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 
358. 
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 105
4. Defining Legal Personality 
Another consequence is that the terms ‘human’ and ‘person’ can be used 
interchangeably or synonymously.410  Indeed, deeming humanity the basis of legal 
personality inevitably means that all humans must be persons and all persons, in the real 
sense, must be humans; personality and humanity become the two sides of the same coin.  
This result is apparent in the writing of proponents of humanity-based definitions such as 
John Finnis411 who moves, as Ngaire Naffine rightly points out, “… between the terms 
‘person’, ‘human person’, ‘human animal’ and human being’ without any clear endeavour 
to distinguish these terms.”412 
Furthermore, a distinction between ‘real’ and ‘artificial’ legal persons naturally 
follows from this understanding.  The former are human beings who gain legal 
personality because of the traits inherent in them, while the latter are those that lack such 
qualities and are attributed legal personality only by analogy with human beings.413  This 
is clearly shown in the case of corporations.  Three theories have been established 
regarding the legal personality of corporations, viz.  fiction or creature, group, and person 
or reality theories.414  According to the fiction or creature theory, corporations are deemed 
legal persons only through analogy with real persons, i.e. human beings, and as they lack 
the intrinsic qualities entitled humans to be real legal persons, their personality must be 
considered artificial.  Consequently, their rights are limited to those stated in the charter 
by which they are created.415  In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:  
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411 Finnis, "The Priority of Persons”.  
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A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence.416 
The group theory starts from the same assumption, that is, since human beings are 
the natural holders of rights, they can create corporations, upon their right to work 
together under the same name.  Yet, there is no entity existing separately from the 
members who comprise it, and the rights attributed to a corporation are actually those of 
its members.  The corporation works here merely as a useful label for that collective 
work.417  As phrased by Morawetz, “[a]lthough a corporation is frequently spoken of as a 
person or unit … the existence of a corporation independently of its shareholders is a 
fiction; and … the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights 
and duties of the persons who compose it, and not an imaginary being”.418    
The reality theory seems different from the previous two theories, but it is also 
formed in a way that clearly shows the effect of the humanity-based definition of legal 
personality.  While it insists that corporations have legal personality and that their 
personality is as real as the personality of human beings, 419 it assumes that humanity is 
the natural basis for legal personality, and in order to grant corporations legal personality, 
it attributes to them what is thought of as the essence of being human.  For the proponents 
of the theory who believe that ‘organism’ is what comprises the human essence, 
corporations have this, and their members are like the organs of the human body.  Those 
who believe that having a will is that essence, claim that corporations have a common 
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will.420  As Nékám rightly points out, though the fiction and the reality theories look 
different, in fact they have lots in common: 
They both regard expressly or impliedly the human personality as a natural 
foundation of legal predicates; and the only point in which they really differ is 
asking whether this personality, or something substantially the same, really exists in 
the outside world in the case of groups and associations, or on the contrary, whether 
in these latter cases such a personality is a mere creation and artificial elaboration of 
the law.421  
The other result is that when built on humanity, legal personality must be kept 
consistent throughout the law.  No variation according to each law’s aims, principles, and 
context is acceptable since legal personality is built on an intrinsic trait that does not vary 
from one law to another.422  Accordingly, if the foetus is discovered to be a legal person 
on account of being human, its personality will have to be kept consistent throughout the 
law no matter which relationships it is involved in, or with whom.   
As regards the first result, humanity has been given a biological definition, 
embodied in a dictum known as ‘the born alive rule’.   
4.1.2.3 The born alive rule  
As previously established, deeming humanity the basis of legal personality 
necessitates defining it.  This definition has been given a biological meaning represented 
by the born alive rule.  The discussion of this rule is of great importance since it is the one 
according to which the current legal status of the foetus is determined in many laws, 
English and Libyan laws included.  I maintain that the biological definition in general, 
                                                 
420 Nékám, the Personality Conception of the Legal Entity, 55. 
421 Ibid., 53. 
422 In a similar meaning see Editorial, "Notes: What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The 
Language of a Legal Fiction," 1758.   
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and the born alive rule in particular are inadequate.  In the following section, I will 
explain (1) the meaning of this rule and its adoption in law in general with particular 
emphasis on Libyan, English laws, and Islamic jurisprudence; (2) its implications for the 
legal status of the foetus; (3) justification, and (4) limitations. 
4.1.2.3.1 The meaning and the legal adoption of the born alive rule 
The born alive rule is the legal translation of a biological definition of a human 
being.  According to this definition, a human being is any human organism that is capable 
of independent integrated functioning.423  Other non-biological attributes such as 
intelligence or sentience are irrelevant.424  This understanding is reflected in the born alive 
rule; “…live birth [is regarded] as the simplest bright-line rule for determining whether 
independent integrated organismic functioning was present”.425  
The born alive rule has been widely adopted so that according to the International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, “'[p]eople everywhere acquire general legal 
personality at birth … all laws establish the self-evident prerequisite that a child must 
come into the world alive in order to attain legal personality’”.426  Libyan law is no 
exception.  According to the Civil Code (Article 29), a human being’s legal personality 
starts when s/he is completely delivered alive.427  This requires, according to the 
commentators, that the newborn be completely separated from the pregnant woman; 
                                                 
423 C. M. Charles M. Kester, "Is There a Person in That Body?: An Argument for the Priority of Persons and 
the Need for a New Legal Paradigm," The Georgetown law journal 82, no. 4 (1994): 1643-1687, 1644 & 
1646. 
424  Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 361. 
425 Kester, "Is There a Person in That Body?: An Argument for the Priority of Persons and the Need for a 
New Legal Paradigm," 1644 & 1650. 
426 A. Heldrich and A.F.  Steiner, ‘Legal Personality’ in M.A.  Glendon (chief ed), International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol 4: Persons and Family (Tubingen: JCB Mohr, 1995) 3, 4.  As cited 
by Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 357. 
427Al-Qāānwn al-Mdny al-Lyby, al-Jrydh al-Rsmyh 20/11/1954 nqlā ʿn Mwswʿh 
al-Tshryʿ al-Lyby, al-Qānwn al-Mdny, Dār al-Mʿārf bmṣr, 1965. 
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partial separateness, regardless of how big the separated part is, is not sufficient for the 
initiation of legal personality.428  Several commentators have interpreted the conferral of 
legal personality upon live birth as an indication that human life starts at that time too.429 
The position of Libyan Criminal law is slightly different.  While it links the 
beginning of the protection it offers to persons with the occurrence of birth, it does not 
require the procedure of birth to be completed.  Rather, the protection starts at the 
beginning of the birth process.  This is evident in Article 373 of the Penal Code that 
equates the killing of a foetus during labour with the killing of a recently born child.430 
Another example of the systems adopting the born alive rule can be found in 
Islamic jurisprudence.  The basis of this stance is the Prophetic saying that subjects the 
right to inheritance to live birth.  However, jurists have differed over the meaning of live 
birth.  While Hanafi jurists have argued that the child is born alive when most of its body 
is expelled from the pregnant woman’s body, Maliki, Shafi’a, and Hanbli jurists have 
asked for a complete delivery.431  
The other relevant example is that of English law.  In Paton v British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service Trustees and Another, the court confirmed that: “[t]he foetus cannot, in 
English law … have a right of its own at least until it is born and has a separate existence 
                                                 
428 Al-Sdh, ʿbd al-Mnʿm Frj. Aswl al-Qānwn. Birute: Dār al-Nhḍh al-ʿrbyt, 
1972.  389. However, the severance of the umbilical cord is not necessary.  See (ʿbwdh, 
Āsāsyāt al-Qānwn al-Wḍʿy al-Lyby, al-Mdkhl al-ā ʿlm al-Qānwn, al-Hq, 
98.) 
429 Bkr, ʿbd al-Mhymn.  Al-Qsm al-Khāṣ fy Qānwn al-ʿqwbāt.  Cairo: Dār al-
Nhḍh al-ʿrbyt, 1977.  544. Zhrt, Mḥmd al-Mrsy.  "Ālṭbyʿh al-Qānwnyh ll-
Jnyn.”  Al-Mḥāmy (Kuwait), no.  April-June (1990), 92. 
430 Bārt, Mḥmd Rmḍān. Qānwn al-ʿqwbāt al-Lyby, al-Qsm al-Khāṣ, al-Jzʾ al-
Āwl, Jrāʾm al-āʿtdāʾ ʿlā al-Āshkhāṣ. Misurata (Libya): al-Dār al-
Jmāhyryh ll-Nshr w al-Twzyʿ w al-Āʿlān, 1993. 20, 21. 
431 Jmʿh, Fkry ʿbd al-ʿzyz Mḥmd. Al-Hmāyh al-Mdnyh l-Nfs al-Sghyr.  Cairo: 
Dār al-Nhḍh al-ʿrbyt, 1998.  46, 47. 
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from its mother”.432  Similarly, in R v Tait, the President of the Family Division said that, 
“…[t]here can be no doubt, in my view, that in England and Wales the foetus has no right 
of action, no right at all, until birth”.433  Live birth occurs, it is held, when the process of 
birth has been fully completed.  As Littledale J directed a jury in R v Poulton,434 “…with 
respect to birth, the being born alive must mean that the whole body is brought into the 
world; it is not sufficient that the child respires in the progress of birth.”  As such, 
destroying the life of a foetus before the process of birth has been entirely completed is 
not murder.  However, if such an act is committed against a foetus capable of being born 
alive with intent to destroy its life, this act is punishable with life imprisonment under the 
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.435     
This applies also to common law in general.  The Ontario High Court decision in 
Dehler v Ottawa Civic Hospital436 is a clear example.  In this case, an injunction was 
sought to prevent a hospital from performing an abortion.  After enquiring about the legal 
position of the foetus, the Court concluded that, since it was unborn, it had no full legal 
personality and so no rights of its own.437  In their words:  
 [T]he law does not regard an unborn child as an independent legal entity prior to 
birth … A fetus, whatever its stage of development, is recognized as a person in the 
full sense only after birth.  …  In short, the law has set birth as the line of 
demarcation at which personhood is realized, at which full and independent legal 
                                                 
432 Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees and Another (1979) 1 QB 276, 279.  
433 R v Tait, (1989) 3 All ER 682.  
434 R v Poulton, (1832) 5 C & P 329.   
435 For a discussion of the purpose behind this Act and its function in the light of the Abortion Act (1967), 
see John Kenyon Mason, Medico–Legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood, 2nd ed. (Ashgate; 
Aldershot, Hants, England: Dartmouth, 1998).  D. Morgan and R. G. Lee, Blackstone's Guide to the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990: Abortion and Embryo Research, the New Law (London: 
Blackstone Press 1991). 
436 Dehler v Ottawa Civic Hospital, (1979) 101 D.L.R (3d) 686. 
437 Ibid., 695. 
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rights attach, and until a child en ventre sa mère sees the light of day it does not 
have the rights of those already born.438 
The Supreme Court of Canada approved this ruling in Tremblay v Daigle.439   
 The other issue regarding which the born alive rule has been applied, is that of the 
possibility of applying laws prohibiting delivering or supplying drugs to women who use 
illegal drugs during their pregnancy.  The courts in the US have, in general, founded their 
refusal to apply such laws on the basis that the prohibited drug supply is that to another 
‘person,’ while the foetus is not a ‘person’.440  As Mason states, “…fundamentally, the 
common law sees no personality in the unborn foetus: any personal rights as do exist can 
mature only at birth.”441  
4.1.2.3.2 The implication of the born alive rule for the legal status of the foetus 
The legal status of the foetus in the light of the born alive rule is not as clear and 
definite as might appear.  The apparent meaning of the rule is that the foetus has no 
humanity, hence no personality or rights whatsoever.  However, the legal systems that 
adopt the rule normally do attribute limited rights to the foetus.  Such an attribution has 
provoked debate about whether it means conferring personality on the foetus in one way 
or another, since no rights can be attributed without personality. 
In Libyan law, after stating the general rule that natural legal personality starts 
when the child is completely delivered alive, Article 29 of the Civil Code adds that the 
foetus has rights that the law determines.  Commentators understand this addition in 
different ways.  On the one hand, some commentators stick to the apparent meaning of 
                                                 
438 Ibid.  
439 Tremblay C. Daigle, (1989) 62 D.L.R (4th) 634. 
440 Seymour, Childbirth and the Law, 143. 
441 Mason, Medico–Legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood, 143.  Emphasis his.  
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the born alive rule, as embodied in Article 29, and argue that the foetus has no humanity 
or personality.  They argue that legal personality cannot be attributed except to an entity 
that has some self-subsistence and independence, while the in utero foetus is a part of the 
pregnant woman depending on her for sustaining its life.442 
On the other hand, other commentators interpret the additional statement that the 
foetus can have rights as conferring personality on it, but, they differ over the nature of 
this personality.  Some of them claim that it is exceptional.  Accordingly, it first entitles 
the foetus to have rights but no obligations, and second, entitles it to have only those 
rights that the law confers on it.443  
To other commentators, however, the personality of the foetus cannot be deemed 
exceptional.  A situation can be considered to be exceptional only when it can be applied 
to one case or a few cases differently from a general rule that applies to all other cases.  If 
the situation applies to all cases, it cannot obviously be regarded as an exception.  This is 
the case of the personality of the foetus since every born human being was once a foetus, 
and as such, acquired the personality the law attributes to foetuses.  This personality is the 
same personality this human being currently enjoys, and the ruling of his or her live birth 
just affirmed it, since it was uncertain during foetal life.  There are no human beings 
whose personality has started at live birth, and others whose personality has started during 
                                                 
442 Nʿmān, Jmʿh Mḥmd Khlyl. Drws fy al-Mdkhl llʿlwm al-Qānwnyt.  Cairo: 
Dār al-Nhḍh al-ʿrbyt, 1977.  402.  
443 Ghmyḍ, Sālm ʿbd al-Raḥmān. Al-Mdkhl al-ā ʿlm al-Qānwn. (Gharyan 
(Libya): The university of al-Jbl al-Ghrby, 1991), 297.  Frj, Twfyq Hsn. 
Al-Mdkhl llʿlwm al-Qānwnyt.  (Alexandria: al-Mktb al-Mṣry al-Hdyth, 
1971), 297.  Zky, Mḥmwd Jmāl al-Dyn.  Drws fy Mqdmh al-Drāsāt al-
Qānwnyt.  Cairo: al-Hyʾh al-ʿāmh l-Shʾwn al-Mṭābʿ al-Āmyryt, 1969, 401, 
409.  Shhāb, ʿbd al-Qādr Mḥmd. Asāsyāt al-Qānwn w al-Hq fy al-Qānwn al-
ʿrby al-Lyby. 1 ed. (Benghazi: Garyounis University Press, 1990), 198. 
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their foetal life.  All have acquired personality when they were foetuses and so the 
personality of the foetus cannot be considered exceptional.444  
What is more, the nature of legal personality implies the understanding of the 
foetus’s personality as being non-exceptional.  It is a mere vehicle for acquiring rights 
rather than an actual acquisition of those rights.  Thus, it is enough for one to obtain 
personality that one has the capacity to have rights, any rights, regardless of their quantity 
or type.  An individual’s personality will be equal to that of any other person even if they 
differ in the rights acquired.  In terms of the foetus, there is no doubt that it has the 
capacity to have rights, succession rights at least, and as such, it has personality.  This 
personality is equivalent to that of any born person despite the fact that the foetus has 
limited rights.445  Similarly, some commentators argue that personality in Islamic 
jurisprudence begins at the moment when the foetus is created, not from the moment 
when it is born alive.  The role of live birth, according to them, is only to affirm 
personality after the phase when it was uncertain.446  
From my perspective, however, the opinion that the born alive rule deprives the 
foetus of personality is more satisfactory.  The rule as embodied in the Libyan Civil Code 
states clearly that the natural personality of human beings begins when they are born 
completely alive.  The apparent meaning is that there is no personality prior to the 
complete live birth.  Admittedly, the same Code adds that the foetus can have rights 
determined by law, but this addition means no more than a mere legal assumption to solve 
certain practical problems.  For example, succession rights are attributed to the foetus 
                                                 
444 Mnṣwr Mṣṭfā Mnṣwr, al-Mdkhl llʿlwm al-Qānwnyh.  As cited by Nʿmān, 
Drws fy al-Mdkhl llʿlwm al-Qānwnyt, 401. 
445 Ibid. Al-Sdh, Swl al-Qānwn, 391.  Kyrh, Hsn. Al-Mdkhl al-ā al-ʿlwm al-
Qānwnyt.  Alexandria: Mnshʾh al-Mʿārf, 1971.  526. 
446 Al-Zarqā, al-Fqh al-Āslāmy fy Thwbh al-Jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Ānẓryh al-
Āltzām al-ʿāmh fy al-Fqh al-Āslāmy, 227. 
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from the moment of the death of an intestate rather than from the moment when it is born 
alive, to cover the period between the two events.  This attribution is just a mere legal 
hypothesis, or "fictional construction".447  In fact, naming rights attributed to the rights of 
the foetus cannot be true except metaphorically, due to the absence of an essential 
condition for the existence of any right, i.e. a right-holder.  These rights can only be 
described, as some commentators plausibly point out, as “legal ghosts”.448  
However, depriving the foetus of personality because of the born alive rule has 
been rightly criticised since this rule is built on implausible grounds.  The justification 
given for the adoption of the rule will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of the 
criticism levelled at it.             
4.1.2.3.3 The justification of the born alive rule 
The born alive rule has been justified on two different grounds.  On the one hand, 
live birth is said to derive its significance from being the time when the foetus physically 
separates from the pregnant woman; on the other, it is claimed that its importance lies in 
being the time when the foetus becomes capable of existing independently from the 
pregnant woman.449  
The second justification seems more central.  This is evident in several cases 
indicating that it is not enough for the foetus to separate from the pregnant woman’s 
body, as this can happen at any time during gestation; rather, it must be capable of 
                                                 
447 Elliot v Lord Joicey, (1935) A.C. 209 233.  Although in English law, this expression denotes exactly the 
meaning intended in Libyan law. 
448 Hjāzy, ʿbd al-Hy.  Al-Mdkhl l-Drāsh al-ʿlwm al-Qānwnyt, al-Hq. Kuwait: 
the University of Kuwait, 1970.  374. 
449 P. A. King, "The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn," Michigan 
Law Review 77, no. 7 (1979): 1647-1687, 1657. 
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autonomous survival at the time of separation.450  This is exemplified in the American 
case Marsellis v Thalhimer451 in which the court, after stating the general rule that upon 
live birth the child becomes eligible for an inheritance, despite being just a foetus at the 
death of the testator, indicated that the child must be capable of independent existence in 
order for such a qualification to take place.452  It their words: 
Although by the civil law of successions, a posthumous child was entitled to the 
same rights as those who were born in the life time of the decedent, it was only on 
the condition that they were born alive, and under such circumstances that the law 
presumed they would survive.  …  Children in the mother's womb are considered, 
in whatever relates to themselves, as if already born; but children born dead, or in 
such an early state of pregnancy as to be incapable of living, although they be not 
actually dead at the time of their birth, are considered as if they had never been born 
or conceived.453 
Another example is State v Winthrop.454  In this case, the issue was whether the 
killing of a full-term foetus before being completely separated from the pregnant woman 
constituted the killing of a person or homicide.  The trial court concluded that the child 
was totally separated from the pregnant woman, though the umbilical cord was not yet 
cut, hence it had independent life and was a human being.455  Instructing the jury, it said: 
If the child is fully delivered from the body of the mother, while the after birth is 
not, and the two are connected by the umbilical cord, and the child has independent 
life, no matter whether it has breathed or not, or an independent circulation has 
been established or not, it is a human being …456 
                                                 
450 Ibid., 1658. 
451 2 Paige Ch.24 (N.Y.1830). 
452 Marsellis v Thalhimer, 40, 41. 
453 Marsellis v Thalhimer, 40, 41. 
454 43 Iowa 519 (1876). 
455 State v Winthrop, 519. 
456 Ibid. (Emphasis in the original) 
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However, the Supreme Court of Iowa did not agree with this conclusion.  It held that 
mere physical separation is not indicative of the newborn’s independent life.  It must also 
be proven that the newborn had autonomous circulation, breathed on its own, and that the 
umbilical cord was cut.457  Therefore, as King rightly argues, the capability of the 
newborn for existing independently seems to be the central rationale behind the born alive 
rule.458  However, being based on such rationales has rightly caused the born alive rule to 
be subject to heavy criticism. 
4.1.2.3.4 The evaluation of the born alive rule 
The born alive rule is correctly said to be ill-founded.  In the first place, new 
technologies have rendered the rationale behind it invalid because, if it is the separateness 
from the pregnant woman that makes live birth significant, it has been proven that the 
foetus is genetically separate at, or near, conception.459  If, however, it is the capability for 
independent existence, as is likely to be the case, it has already become possible for pre-
term foetuses to survive apart from the pregnant women if they have reached the age of 
viability,460 which is currently around twenty six weeks.461  This means that the foetus is 
                                                 
457 Ibid., 521, 522. 
458 King, "The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn," 1661. 
459 Ibid., 1660. 
460 Ibid. 
461 C. Cameron and R. Williamson, "In the World of Dolly, When Does a Human Embryo Acquire 
Respect?”  Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 4 (2005): 215-220, 218.  The stage at which viability is 
confirmed is somewhat contentious, but the scientific consensus locates it around 26 weeks.  The British 
Association of Perinatal Medicine considers that “[i]nfants born 22 - < 28 weeks gestation (approx. 
equivalent to 500-1000g.)  have been termed as having “threshold viability”, though in developed countries 
this term is more often used in reference to infants of < 26 weeks.”  The British Association of Perinatal 
Medicine (BAPM), "Memorandum: Fetuses and Newborn Infants at the Threshold of Viability a 
Framework for Practice,” (2000), retrieved from 
http://www.bapm.org/documents/publications/threshold.pdf at 20/07/2008. For a discussion of 
the effect of scientific development on decreasing the age of viability, see Lee, "The Abortion Debate 
Today”, 239, 240. 
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capable of existing independently of the pregnant woman long before normal birth, which 
usually occurs at around thirty-eight weeks of gestational age.462 463  
This has caused courts to question the validity of the born alive rule.  The 
American case of People v Chavez is a clear illustration of this.464  When having to decide 
whether a woman was guilty of the manslaughter of her newborn child, the court 
expressed doubts about whether such a conviction required proving that the child had 
been born alive, in the following long but essential quote:   
Beyond question, it is a difficult thing to draw a line and lay down a fixed general 
rule as to the precise time at which an unborn infant, or one in the process of being 
born, becomes a human being in the technical sense.  There is no much change in 
the child itself between a moment before and a moment after its expulsion from the 
body of its mother, and normally, while still dependent on its mother, the child, for 
some time before it is born, has not only the possibility but a strong probability of 
an ability to live an independent life.  It is well known that a baby may live and 
grow when removed from the body of its dead mother by a Caesarian [sic] 
operation.  The mere removal of the baby in such a case or its birth in a normal case 
does not, of itself and alone, create a human being.  While before birth or removal it 
is in a sense dependent upon its mother for life, there is another sense in which it 
has started an independent existence after it has reached a state of development 
where it is capable of living and where it will, in the normal course of nature and 
with ordinary care, continue to live and grow as a separate being.  …  There is no 
sound reason why an infant should not be considered a human being when born or 
removed from the body of its mother, when it has reached that stage of development 
where it is capable of living an independent life as a separate being, and where in 
the natural course of events it will so live if given normal and reasonable care.  It 
should equally be held that a viable child in the process of being born is a human 
                                                 
462 "Pregnancy n."  Concise Medical Dictionary.  Oxford University Press, 2007.  Oxford Reference Online.  
Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  28 April 
2008  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t60.e8141> 
463 About the different methods of calculating the foetus age see fn. 666 below.  
464 People v Chavez, (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 621. 
 118
4. Defining Legal Personality 
being within the meaning of the homicide statues, whether or not the process has 
been fully completed.  It should at least be considered a human being where it is a 
living baby and where in the natural course of events a birth which is already started 
would naturally be successfully completed.465          
Indeed, the futuristic possible application of ectogenesis has made this point 
clearer.  Ectogenesis is “…the development of artificial wombs that can sustain foetuses 
to term without the need for women’s bodies.”466  It has made possible, theoretically at 
least, for a foetus to survive outside the pregnant woman’s body, regardless of its age.  
Therefore, live birth, as an indication of the capability of living independently from the 
pregnant woman, is no longer significant. 
However, it may well be argued that the foetus placed in an artificial womb is still 
incapable of independent existence.  It still cannot sustain its own life without a womb, 
albeit an artificial womb this time.  Such an objection is unsound since the importance of 
the ectogenesis argument lies in the fact that it proves that foetal life can be sustained 
outside natural wombs.  This means that traditional birth is no longer inevitable, hence the 
born alive rule would no longer be applicable in all cases.  However, this objection invites 
a discussion of the necessity of independent existence for legal personality. 
                                                 
465 Ibid., 625, 626. 
466 A. Smajdor, "The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16, no. 
03 (2007): 336-345, 337.  Artificial wombs are already in use at both edges of gestation.  Six-month-old 
foetuses on the one hand are kept alive in incubators and artificially fertilised eggs on the other are also kept 
alive in vitro for three and four days before implanting them into a womb.  What is needed is just filling the 
gap via the use of artificial wombs capable of sustaining foetuses to term regardless of their age.  Jeremy 
Rifkin, "The End of Pregnancy: Within a Generation There Will Be Probably Be Mass Use of Artificial 
Wombs to Grow Babies," The Guardian Thursday January 17, 2002.  This, according to the most important 
researchers working on ectogenesis, as Robin Mckie wrote in The Observer, “will become reality in a few 
years.”  ((Robin McKie, "Men Redundant?  Now We Don't Need Women Either," The Observer Sunday 
February 10, 2002.)  Yosinori Kuwabara, the Japanese scientist who managed to keep goat foetuses alive in 
an artificial womb for ten days, predicted that that would happen in less than six years.  Others, though did 
not share the same optimism, see as probable the mass use of artificial wombs after quite a longer time.  
(McKie, "Men Redundant?  Now We Don't Need Women Either.")  This has led Jeremy Rifkin to state that 
“[t]he artificial womb seems the next logical step in a process that has increasingly removed reproduction 
from traditional maternity and made of it a laboratory process.”  (———, "Men Redundant?  Now We 
Don't Need Women Either.")  For more details, see S. Gelfand, Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology 
and the Future of Human Reproduction (Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2006). 
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Independent existence, which is the central rationale behind the born alive rule, is 
in my view, an unsatisfactory criterion for legally defined humanity, and subsequent 
personality.  Independence is unattainable for many people, yet this has not led to 
weakening their humanity and so their personality.  Similarly, the dependence of the 
foetus, in itself, should not be used to deprive it of any legal standing.  As Stanton and 
Harris ironically point out:  
[T]here is a sense in which none of us are capable of [independence] … and 
certainly in complex modern societies, most people require assistance and are in 
some sense dependent.  Is the person attached to a heart/lung machine or dialysis 
machine independent or not?  Why is independence of the mother so important?467  
Similarly, Goldenring sees no reason why an eighty year old patient who, despite 
being kept alive in an intensive care unit by an external mechanical respirator, is 
considered alive, as long as s/he has a functioning brain, while an eight weeks old foetus 
is not, despite the fact that it is “…inside the most advanced intensive care unit ever 
designed – the uterus … [and] is being maintained by the most complex extracorporeal 
respirator known – the placenta”, and has a functioning brain.468  Making the same point, 
Catharine MacKinnon argues:  
Foetal dependence upon the pregnant woman does not make the foetus a part of her 
any more than fully dependent adults are parts of those on whom they are 
                                                 
467 Catherine Stanton and John Harris, "The Moral Status of the Embryo Post-Dolly”, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 31, no. 4 (2005): 221-225, 222.  
468 John M Goldenring, "The Brain-Life Theory: Towards a Consistent Biological Definition of 
Humanness," British Medical Journal 11, no. 4 (1985): 198-204, 199.  It is worth mentioning that this 
thesis adopts a different perspective about when the brain starts functioning.  See Section  5.1 Determining 
the timing of the ensoulment event.         
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dependent.  The foetus is a unique kind of whole that, after a certain point, can live 
or die without the mother.469 
Besides that, being a biologically based criterion, the born alive rule is subject to 
the same criticism levelled at basing legal personality on biological criteria.  In the 
following quote, with which I partially agree, Naffine states what she considers to be the 
limitations of the biologically based definition of a legal person:            
The reliance of this definition of the person, at least in part, on a biological 
paradigm of human being means that it is exposed to controversies between 
biologists, which are in turn influenced by the new medical technologies.  It is 
therefore also vulnerable to biological arguments that human life starts earlier than 
birth and that death is a process not an event and therefore its timing is 
indeterminate.  It is also vulnerable to social or cultural considerations because the 
meaning of biology is always socially determined.  What counts as a legal 
biological human is therefore not just subject to medical (which of course are also 
cultural) determinations about the beginnings and ends of a human being.  What it 
means to be a biological legal human is also influenced by cultural ideas of what it 
is to be a whole and proper metaphysical person.470  
While agreeing on the first point, I see no reason for the other two.  Indeed, the 
reliance on biology is implausible because of its changeability.  Stability in determining 
who the subjects of law are is certainly needed.471  However, criticising biological 
definitions because they suggest that human life may well begin before birth is not 
reasonable.  Such a suggestion will be an important proposition to examine, if humanity is 
considered the basis for legal personality.  In addition the fact that biological definitions 
are subject to cultural and social considerations of what it means to be human is not a 
                                                 
469 C. A. MacKinnon, "Reflections on Sex Equality under Law”, The Yale law journal 100, no. 5 (1991): 
1281-1328, 1314. 
470 Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 359, 360.   
471 Hjāzy, Al-Mdkhl l-Drāsh al-ʿlwm al-Qānwnyt, al-Hq, 387. 
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limitation.  Actually, it reduces the pure biology of these definitions, and makes them 
more non-biological.  Therefore, seeing the reliance on cultural and social considerations 
as a shortcoming, is a reminder of the implausible positivist definition of legal 
personality, wherein non-legal considerations are excluded.472  Furthermore, biological 
factors cannot be completely disregarded.  Whilst they should not be the final word on 
who counts as a legal person, they can, and should, as will be explained later in this 
thesis, be used to apply the criterion of legal personality.473  
 The other limitation of the definition of humanity as a biologically based concept 
is its arbitrariness.  As previously indicated, according to this definition, it is sufficient, in 
order to be a human and so qualify as a legal person, to meet the biological paradigm, 
regardless of having any intelligence or sentience.474  Non-human entities are considered 
non-persons, despite the fact that some of them are more intelligent or sentient than some 
humans, such as babies and cognitively impaired adults who are nonetheless deemed to 
be legal persons.475  
This is what some writers call speciesism.  It is the preference given to the 
members of one species, namely, the human species, over members of other species, just 
because of membership.476  As Hursthouse indicates, speciesism in this sense is as 
indefensible as sexism, i.e. preference based on membership of a sex, or racism, i.e. 
preference based on membership of a race:  
                                                 
472 Indeed, Naffine advocates the formal positivist definition of legal personality, that is, as an empty slot 
that can be filled with any thing.  As such, it, personality, can be conferred on anyone or anything 
regardless of their sex, age, or species; the positivist definition, in such a case, will provide “…the basis of a 
law for everyone.”  Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 366, 
367.   
473 See  5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event.  
474 Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 361.   
475 Ibid.  
476 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 1995), 6.  
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Speciesism is just like racism and sexism built on irrelevant moral differences 
between the preferable entity and others.  Like sexists and racists, speciesists 
consider their category –fellows their equal while excluding others even if those 
fellows do not meet the requirements claimed to distinguish that category from 
others.  Retarded humans are considered morally important in the same way normal 
human beings are though they lack the rationality claimed to distinguish humans 
from animals.  They are “the kind of thing” that deserves to be distinguishable as 
racists and sexists were defending the inclusion of retarded white men while 
excluding women and non-white men.477         
For these reasons, it seems fair to conclude that the humanity-based definition of 
legal personality is problematic.  However, this does not mean that humanity should be 
wholly abandoned as a mechanism for deciding the issue of legal personality.  As will be 
explained presently, the most satisfactory definition of legal personality is one that is 
based on a moral criterion that is exclusively human, i.e. cannot be fulfilled by entities 
other than humans. 
 
477 Rosalind Hursthouse, Ethics, Humans and Other Animals: An Introduction with Readings (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 122, 123. 
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4.2 Suggesting a new definition of legal personality  
Since the current definitions of legal personality are unsatisfactory, a new 
definition free from their limitations is suggested.  The criterion suggested in this 
definition will then be applied to the foetus to determine whether it is a person.  The first 
feature of the new definition, as argued in this chapter, is to base legal personality on 
moral personality.  The second one is to base moral personality on a criterion that cannot 
be met except by human beings, i.e. moral agency.  As a result, the concepts of legal 
personality, moral personality, and humanity become identical to one another.478    
To justify this definition, four points need to be proven.  The first is that legal 
personality should be based on extra-legal factors in general.  The second is that legal 
personality should be established on moral personality amongst non-legal factors.  The 
third point is that moral agency should be selected as the criterion of moral personality.  
Lastly, that moral agency is a human-specific criterion, that is, one that cannot be met by 
non-humans.  Since it has already been proven, through the theoretical and practical 
failure of the positivist definition, that legal personality cannot but be based on extra-legal 
factors,479 the following discussions will focus on the other three points respectively. 
4.2.1 Basing legal personality on moral personality  
This section is about the relationship between legal personality and moral 
personality.  It contains the proposition that the former should be based on the latter 
                                                 
478 Margaret Brazier argues that “the belief in the unique nature of humanity … can never be established by 
tangible objective criteria”.  See "Embryo' "Rights": Abortion and Research " in Medicine, Ethics and the 
Law, ed. M. D. A. Freeman (London Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1988), 14.  However, I argue in this chapter that 
human beings are unique because they are the only entities known to have moral agency, which is a morally 
and legally relevant criterion.  So, the belief in their uniqueness can be founded on a tangible objective 
criterion. 
479 See  4.1.1.4  The limitations of the positivist definition of legal personality.  
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because this is the position supported by the concept of personality in Shari’a, the 
yardstick against which the ideas and theories discussed in this thesis are evaluated.  
There is also a strong argument that this position is the one adopted by law.  As this last 
point has already been shown in this thesis,480 the following discussion will focus on the 
first point. 
It is clear that the concept of personality in Shari’a advocates basing legal 
personality on moral personality.  This can be shown through recalling the relationship 
that personality or dhimmah has with vicegerency.  As previously detailed, human beings 
have been created to be God’s vicegerents on earth.  The essence of this vicegerency is 
bringing the ethical imperatives constituting the ethical arm of the divine will, into 
actuality.  The main explicator of these imperatives is Shari’a,481 whose message is to 
bring ethics or moral standards to their completion.482  As such, the imperatives detailed 
in Shari’a are ethical in essence, though they might be clothed in legal forms and 
enactments; the latter are used as a means to the former.  In this way, the nature of 
dhimmah, which is the Shari’a equivalent of personality, is determined.  It has been 
conferred on human beings to enable them to assume and bear their mission as 
vicegerents.483  As such, it is a capacity for acquiring rights and obligations that are 
ethical in essence.  In other words, since Shari’a has the nature of a multidimensional 
system wherein law is based on ethics, dhimmah, as the capacity of acquisition in this 
system, has that nature too.   
                                                 
480 See page 101 below.   
481 The other being human reason.  See  3.2.3.3.3 The role of human reasoning in knowing the ethical arm of 
the divine will.  
482 El-Gendy, ed., the International Islamic Code for Medical and Health Ethics, 29.  Taha.  Tjdyd 
al-Mnhj fy Tqwym al-Trāth, 113. 
483 See page 57 above.  
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As a result, it seems implausible to equate dhimmah with legal personality as it 
stands in law.  This implausible position has been held by some commentators who have 
assumed that, since the two concepts have similar definitions,  484they are two terms for 
the same concept.485  Accordingly, they have used the term legal personality instead of the 
term dhimmah to refer to the ability to acquire rights and duties in Shari’a.486  Others, 
nevertheless, have objected to the identification of legal personality and dhimmah and 
claimed that they differ in two ways.487  The first difference concerns their source: while 
the giver of dhimmah is God, it is the state that assigns legal personality.  The second 
objection concerns their ability to encompass rights and duties: while dhimmah expands 
to embrace matters related to the hereafter, legal personality is limited to those connected 
to this world.  In addition, some commentators have refused the use of the term legal 
personality in Shari’a because, they claim, it is unknown to it.488 
However, the denial of the term legal personality because it is unknown to Shari’a 
is not convincing.  The worth of any term is contingent upon its ability to convey the 
meaning intended, the term has no significance per se.  Thus, choosing the term dhimmah 
                                                 
484 See for example, Al-Tftāzāny, Shrḥ al-Tlwyḥ ʿlā al-Twḍyḥ, 323.  Hsyn, Al-
Mlkyh w Nẓryh al-ʿqd, 225.  Bdrān, abw al-ʿynyn.  Al-Shryʿh al-Āslāmyt.  
Alexandria: Mʾssh Shbāb al-Jāmʿt, (n.d.), 428.  Khlāf, ʿlm Swl al-Fqh, 
136.  Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business Organization Corporations.  Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, 91.  
In Nyazee’s words dhimmah is “…an attribute by which a human being becomes capable of acquiring 
rights and obligations.”  ———, Islamic Law of Business Organization Corporations.  Islamic Law and 
Jurisprudence, 91. 
485 Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business Organization Corporations.  Islamic 
Law and Jurisprudence, 87.  Mdkwr, Al-Jnyn w al-Āḥkām al-Mtʿlqh bh fy 
al-Fqh al-Āslāmy, 274.  Mrqs, Slymān. Al-Mdkhl llʿlwm al-Qānwnyt.  4 ed. 
(Cairo: Dār al-Nshr ll-Jāmʿāt al-Mṣryt, 1961), 553.  ʿbdāl Raḥmān, Fāḍl. 
Aṣwl- al-Fqh. 2 ed. (Amman: Dār al-Msyrt, 1998), 57. 
486 Al-Zarqā, Al-Fqh al-Āslāmy fy Thwbh al-Jdyd, al-Mdkhl al-Ānẓryh al-
Āltzām al-ʿāmh fy al-Fqh al-Āslāmy, 276.  Abrāhym, "Ālṭbyʿh al-Qānwnyh 
ll-Jnyn", 23, 26.  Mṣṭfā Abrāhym al-Zlmy and ʿly Aḥmd Al-Mhdāwy. Aṣwl- 
al-Fqh fy Nsyjh al-Jdyd.  (Amman: al-Mrkz al-Qwmy, 1999), 250. Al-Zḥyly, 
Whbt. Al-Fqh al-Āslāmy w Adl-th, vol. 4. 4th edition, (Damascus: Dār al-
Fkr. 1997), 2961. 
487 Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business Organization Corporations. Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, 106.   
488 Al-Hmydāwy, Hsām ʿbd al-Wāḥd Kāẓm. "āl-Mwt w Āthārh al-Qānwnyt." 
(Baghdad: Baghdad University Law School, 1999). (Unpublished Ph.D thesis), 202. 
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or legal personality should be built on this criterion, not on being known or unknown to 
one system or another.  As will shortly be explained, the term dhimmah is more able to 
express the meaning of the capacity for acquisition in Shari’a than the term legal 
personality. 
With regard to the two claimed differences between dhimmah and legal 
personality, while I believe that the first one is implausible, the second has some merit.  
The claim that legal personality is assigned by the state dismisses the opinion that 
personality is a quality inherited in humans, and so when observing it, the lawmaker or 
the state does no more than recognise what already exists.489  The real assigner, then, 
cannot be the state.  It is either God or Nature, according to one’s belief.  The second 
claim that dhimmah is wider than legal personality is indeed plausible.  Being the 
capacity for acquisition in Shari’a, the trans-ethical, religious, and legal system, has led to 
dhimmah being wider than legal personality.  It embraces rights and obligations related to 
this world and the hereafter, on the one hand, and rights and obligations of different 
nature, i.e. ethical, religious, and legal, on the other.   
Therefore, it seems reasonable to claim that the term dhimmah instead of legal 
personality should be used to refer to one’s ability to have rights and duties in Shari’a.  
Associating the term ‘personality’ with the adjective ‘legal’ inaccurately gives the 
impression that only ‘legal’ rights and duties can be gained through this ability.  
Furthermore, this objection can still hold true, in my opinion, even if dhimmah is 
understood as an ability to have ‘legal’ rights and duties, since legal enactments and 
procedures are used in Shari’a as a means to actualising imperatives of an ethical nature.  
That is to say, legal rights and duties here are no more than ethical ones clothed in legal 
                                                 
489 See  4.1.2.1 The meaning of the humanity-based definition.   
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wording.490  It might be said that the objection is no longer needed if the term 
‘personality’ is used without being associated with the adjective ‘legal’.  I would agree on 
that except there is another reason for the preference given to the term dhimmah.   
The second reason for the preference given to the term dhimmah, when talking 
about the capacity for acquiring rights in Shari’a, is that, unlike the term personality, it 
evokes the concept’s special origin.491  In other words, when the term dhimmah is utilised, 
it evokes the idea of being endowed by God, and so it seems more appropriate to use it 
when talking about the capacity for acquiring rights in Shari’a, the way ordained by God.  
Hence, in this thesis, the term dhimmah will be used when talking about that capacity in 
Shari’a; elsewhere, the term personality will be used. 
In summary, it seems reasonable to conclude that legal personality should be 
based on moral personality.  The question then arises of the basis on which the latter 
should be founded. 
4.2.2 Basing moral personality on moral agency  
Basing legal personality on moral personality is not the end of the inquiry as it is 
still necessary to determine on which criterion the latter, and indirectly the former, should 
be based.  I hold that the most plausible criterion is moral agency.  I will, therefore, define 
moral agency before going on to give my justification for selecting it as the sole criterion 
upon which moral personality should be based.  Following that, I will address the main 
criticism levelled at using moral agency as the basis of moral personality. 
                                                 
490 See  3.2.2  The nature of Shari’a.   
491 See page 57 above  
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4.2.2.1 The definition of moral agency  
Though I have found no explicit definition of moral agency, I think one can be 
formulated by studying the different philosophical writings about the capacity.  In these 
writings, the capacity for moral agency is seen generally as being composed of two 
components: cognition and autonomy.  Though these components are differently 
expressed in these writings, the core meaning is quite similar.   
The two constituents of moral agency can be found in the writing of Kant.  
According to him, the autonomy element, or the capacity to will, means operating in 
compliance with the concepts of law instead of being inertly subjected to nature’s 
forces.492  Acting in such a manner necessitates that one “…be free to follow logic rather 
than the random fluctuations of brain chemistry, free to make sense.”493  Following logic 
or reasoning leads to establishing purely reason-based universalised moral imperatives.494  
Will and reason, therefore, are equated with one another; “…will is nothing but practical 
reason”,495 in Kant’s words.   
In Alan Gewirth’s writing, the two elements of agency are referred to as 
purposiveness and voluntariness.496  The former embraces the quality of cognition and 
requires the agents to act for self-related good ends, as they see them.497  The 
                                                 
492 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals 40 (Thomas K.  Abbott B.  D.  
trans., 1987) As cited by L. R. Meyer, "Unruly Rights," Cardozo Law Review,  22, no. 1 (2000), 5. 
493 Ibid. 
494 "Autonomy/heteronomy"  the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy.  Simon Blackburn.  Oxford University 
Press, 1996.  Oxford Reference Online.  Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  8 June 
2007  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e217> 
495 See supra fn. 492.  
496 Alan Gewirth, 1978, Reason and Morality, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 27.  As cited by 
Mahowald, "Person", 1938.  
497 Ibid.  In a similar meaning, Michael Moore says, “…an entity is a person in moral theory or legal 
doctrine only if it is rational and autonomous … viz., only if it is a practical reasoner.”  (Moore, Law and 
Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 49).  To him, “[a] person is a rational being, a being who acts for 
intelligible ends in light of rational beliefs.”  ———, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 66.   
 129
4. Defining Legal Personality 
voluntariness element requires the agents to perform acts willingly in the light of 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding them.498  Voluntariness is linked to 
rationality in a way that rules out the likelihood that acts performed impetuously can be 
considered purely voluntary.499  
In a similar analysis, Charles Taylor defines the moral agent as “…a being who 
encompasses purposes, who can be said to go after, and sometimes attain goals.”500  
Likewise, a person for Michael Moore is “…a rational being, a being who acts for 
intelligible ends in light of rational beliefs.”501   
John Locke’s definition of a person is another source through the analysis of 
which the elements of moral agency can be identified.  This is so since being a moral 
agent is, as Warren rightly concludes, a prerequisite for being a person in this 
definition.502  For Locke, “…person stands for … a thinking intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different 
times and places.”503  To be a person, according to this definition, one has to have 
“…intelligence, and … [the capacities] for thought, reason, reflection, and self-
awareness.”504  In such a definition, one can be a person without being a moral agent.505  
However, Locke proceeds to say that a person “…is a forensic term, appropriating actions 
                                                 
498 Alan Gewirth, 1978, Reason and Morality, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 27.  As cited by 
Mahowald, "Person", 1939. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Charles Taylor, "The Person”, in the Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, ed. M. 
Carrithers, S. Lukes, and S. Collins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 258.   
501 Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 66.   
502 Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, 95.  She considers this 
definition maximalist, that is, a definition that bases moral personality on the acquisition of full moral 
agency.  
503 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.D. Woozley (London: Fontana library, 
1964), 211.  (Emphasis in original)       
504 Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, 95. 
505 Ibid. 
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and their merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law.”506  As such, to 
be a person, one has to have the capacity for evaluating acts and choosing from them.  As 
a result, individuals can be held accountable, and so be credited or blamed for their 
actions.507  So, once again, the two elements of cognition and autonomy are designated as 
central to the definition of moral agency. 
In addition, cognition and autonomy play important roles in Harry Frankfurt’s 
concept of will, which, he claims, can distinguish persons from non-persons.  According 
to him, desires that motivate one to act or refrain from acting can be classified into first 
and second order desires.  The first order desires are those that motivate one to do or 
abstain from doing a particular act.  The second order desires are those to have one 
particular desire as that which motivates, will, or would motivate someone to perform an 
act.  While having desires and an ability to choose between them is essential for being a 
person, it is, however, insufficient in Harry Frankfurt’s concept of will.  In order to be a 
person, one must be able to form second-order desires, that is, be able to evaluate 
different first order desires and choose one, or more of them, to be the motive for 
performing or abstaining from performing an act, and to become someone’s will.508    
The rationality element of moral agency can be identified here since the 
evaluation of different desires and the choice that follows, requires one to be rational.  In 
Frankfurt’s words:  
                                                 
506 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 220.       
507 Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, 95.  In a similar meaning, see 
Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 362. 
508 H. G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, the Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 
(1971): 5-20, 6, 7.   
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[I]t is only in virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of becoming 
critically aware of his own will and of forming volitions of the second order.  The 
structure of a person’s will presupposes, accordingly, that he is a rational being.509   
The autonomy element is also essential in Frankfurt’s theory.  Indeed, his theory 
is entitled “the freedom of will”.510  He differentiates between two types of freedom: that 
of action and that of will.  While the former pertains to the first order-desires and means 
the freedom to perform whatever actions one wants to perform, the latter relates to 
second-order desire volitions and refers to the agent’s freedom to will what s/he wants to 
will.  This distinction makes it possible to distinguish between persons and non-persons.  
Although non-persons share with persons the freedom of action because they can be 
shown to have the ability to do one act instead of another, only the latter (persons) can 
have the ability to freely form second order desires.511 
From these writings, it can be argued that moral agency has two elements, 
cognition and volition, and can be defined in the light of them as the capability to freely 
make moral judgments.  This involves evaluating the different choices faced, and 
selecting, out of free will, one or more of them to implement.  As such, moral agency is 
also associated with accountability.  That is to say, the exercise of the capacity for moral 
agency is associated with being morally accountable.  When one voluntarily and 
consciously decides to perform or refrain from performing a particular act while other 
options are equally possible, s/he should be accountable for his or her choices.512  This is 
apparent in the Islamic conception of vicegerency, as outlined earlier,513 and in the 
                                                 
509 Ibid., 11, 12.   
510 Ibid., 1. 
511 Ibid., 14, 17. 
512 In a similar meaning, see Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible 
Subjects”, 362.  C. Cohen, "Do Animals Have Rights?”  Ethics & Behavior 7, no. 2 (1997): 91-102, 96, 98.   
513 See  3.1.2 The human beings’ raison d’être.  
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philosophy of Kant who believed that “…moral accountability presupposes freedom and 
the ability to follow the moral law.”514  
The intimate connection between accountability and moral agency is evident in 
that accountability has been associated with personality, and understood as a moral 
agency-based concept throughout history.  It has been believed that in order to hold an 
entity accountable for its actions, it must be a person, and to be so, it must be a moral 
agent.  This has been the case even with regard to animals and inanimate things: all were 
personified before being held accountable for actions caused by them.  Similarly, 
corporate accountability is said to be contingent upon whether companies can be deemed 
moral agents and persons.515  
In this regard, moral agency is also comparable with the legal principle of mens 
rea.  According to this principle, to hold someone responsible for committing a criminal 
act, they must generally be proven to have committed it deliberately while being aware of 
its illegal nature.  As Cohen puts it, “…in law, an act can be criminal only when the guilty 
deed, the actus reus, is done with a guilty mind, mens rea.”516  The cognition and 
autonomy elements of moral agency are apparent here.  As suggested by Brown and 
colleagues, “[t]raditional criminal legal doctrine constructs a free-willed, intentional, 
rational, choosing, responsible, individual subject: a subject morally suitable for 
punishment.”517  In a similar vein, Waller and Williams say that, “…almost the whole of 
our system of substantive criminal law is based upon the view that a human being is a 
                                                 
514 G. K. Becker, "The Moral Status of Persons: Introduction " in the Moral Status of Persons: Perspectives 
on Bioethics, ed. G. K. Becker (Amsterdam-Atlanta Rodopi, 2000), 3. 
515 Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 62, 64.   
516 Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, New England Journal of 
Medicine 315, no. 14 (1986): 865-870, 867.   
517 D.  Brown, D.  Farrier, S.  Egger and L.  McNamara, Criminal Laws (Sydney: Federation Press, 3rd ed, 
2001) 24.  As cited by Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 
364. 
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rational creature, free to choose how to act, and deserving of punishment if she or he 
chooses to act immorally or wickedly.”518  
A clearer indication of the similarity between the accountability associated with 
moral agency and the legal concept of criminal responsibility can be found in what Lacey 
calls the “capacity theory of responsibility” in which: 
 [I]ndividuals’ criminal responsibility is at root based upon their capacities and 
opportunities: capacities of cognition or understanding: it is only fair to punish 
someone who has the capacity to understand what they are doing; and capacities of 
volition or will: it is only justifiable to punish someone who has the capacity or, in 
some versions, the fair opportunity to act otherwise than they did.519  
Similarly, Michal Moore argues that:   
[W]e hold people retrospectively responsible in law and morals only if they are 
accountable agents who negligently or intentionally, and without justification or 
excuse, perform actions that cause some state of affairs they were obligated not to 
bring about.520  
 Since accountability is, as should be clear from the previous discussion, of great 
importance for moral agency, the definition of the latter should mention it.  This 
definition, therefore, should be formed as follows: moral agency is the capability to freely 
make moral judgments and be accountable for them. 
It is clear from the previous discussions that moral agency is a highly demanding 
criterion.  It demands that one be a rational and free-willed agent in order to be a person.  
                                                 
518 L.  Waller and C.R.  Williams, Criminal Law Text and Cases (Chatswood, NSW: Butterworths, 9th ed, 
2001) 258.  As cited by Naffine, "Who Are Law's Persons?  From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects”, 
364. 
519 N. Lacey, "In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social Sciences in Criminal 
Law Theory," Modern Law Review 64, no. 3 (2001): 350-371, 353. 
520 Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 51, 52. 
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Hence, choosing it in this thesis as the sole criterion of personality raises a legitimate 
question about what justification can be offered for that.  This point will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
4.2.2.2 The justification of the selection of moral agency as the criterion of moral 
personality 
  The following discussion concerns the justification for selecting moral agency as 
the sole criterion upon which moral personality should be based.  I contend that this 
justification can be found in the concept of vicegerency.  I also examine another 
justification based on the concept of a general secular moral community, but I start with 
my own justification. 
 Selecting moral agency as the criterion of moral personality in this thesis is 
justified by the concept of vicegerency.  As detailed earlier,521 being God’s vicegerent on 
earth requires that one be a rational and free-willed agent, i.e. a moral agent.  Put another 
way, being a moral agent is a prerequisite for being a vicegerent.  In turn, being a person 
is linked to being a vicegerent since dhimmah or personality522 has been conferred on 
human beings to enable them to assume their position as vicegerents and bear any rights 
and obligations arising out of that.  It follows that being a person is connected to being a 
moral agent.  In other words, since (1) moral agency is the criterion of vicegerency and 
(2) vicegerency is the criterion of dhimmah, then moral agency is the criterion of 
dhimmah.  Therefore, in research adopting a Shari’a-based perspective, it seems 
necessary to base personality on moral agency.  Using the same perspective, the other 
justification will now be evaluated.   
                                                 
521 See  3.1.2 The human beings’ raison d’être.  
522 As explained above (page 57), dhimmah is the Shari’a equivalent of personality.   
 135
4. Defining Legal Personality 
 Tristram Engelhardt’s project of establishing a general secular moral community 
provides another justification.  According to him, there exist variable moral communities 
within which binding content-full morality can be found.  Each of these communities is 
based on a common convention that can be religious, such as Christianity, or non-
religious, such as capitalism.  The belief in this common convention constitutes a 
precondition for membership of the community concerned.  It also makes of the believers 
“moral friends” to whom the binding content-full morality that exists within that 
community applies.  However, the enforceability of such morality is limited to the 
members of that particular community, and the outsiders, or “moral strangers”, cannot be 
bound by that particular morality unless they believe in it and cease, therefore, to be 
strangers.523  
Encompassing those moral strangers cannot be achieved, according to Engelhardt, 
except in a general secular moral community that transcends the boundaries of different 
common conventions, which will then be private.524  In the general moral community, no 
content-full morality is conceivable and its members cannot be bound by an authority 
derived either from God or from reason, except if they freely agree to it.525  Therefore, as 
Engelhardt argues, the existence of such a community assumes the existence of moral 
agents who are interested in establishing it: 
The very notion of a general secular moral community presumes a community of 
entities who are self-conscious, rational, free to choose, and in possession of a sense 
of moral concern.  It is only when such entities are interested in understanding when 
                                                 
523 H. T. Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), viii 
& x. 
524 Ibid., viii. 
525 Ibid., x.   
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they or others are acting in a blameworthy or praiseworthy fashion that moral 
discourse is possible.526   
Having the ability to conduct moral discourse in this way is, therefore, a prerequisite for 
being a member of the general secular moral community, that is, being a moral agent is a 
prerequisite for being a person.  In the words of Engelhardt:    
The principle of permission and elaboration in the secular morality of mutual 
respect … concerns only persons, which notion (i.e., being a person) is defined in 
terms of the ability to enter into this practice of resolving moral controversies 
through agreement.  The morality of autonomy is the morality of persons.527 
 However, this justification cannot be wholly accepted from an Islamic 
perspective.  The Islamic community is, obviously, a convention-based community, built 
on a belief in Islam.  All of its members are, therefore, moral friends, to use Engelhardt’s 
words.  In this community, as in all other convention-based communities, there exists a 
content-full morality, namely Shari’a, that is binding on all members.  Indeed, no-one can 
be a member of that community until they decide freely to be so, by either converting to 
Islam or consenting to an Islamic state’s authority.528  Both ways presuppose 
contemplation and free will, hence moral agency.  However, after joining the community 
one must adhere to the authority of Shari’a.  One can remain a member even after 
disobeying Shari’a, but denying its authority cannot be tolerated and losing membership 
                                                 
526 Ibid., 136.   
527 Ibid., 139.   
528 Non-Moslems can join the Moslem community without accepting Islam as a religion.  This can be done 
though the dhimmah contract, as it is known in Arabic.  According to this contract, a non-Moslem agrees to 
live in an Islamic state and enjoy the protection it offers while keeping his/her own belief.  Further, s/he, 
according to this contract, is exempt from implementing Islamic imperatives when they differ from those 
determined by his/her own religion.  For example, eating pork and drinking alcohol are legitimate for non-
Moslems living in an Islamic state.  See Al-ʿwā, Mḥmd Slym.  "Nẓām Hl al-Dhmh. Rʾyh 
Slāmyh Mʿāṣrt.”  Asl-ām Awn L-āyn, retrieved from 
http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/contemporary/2005/07/article01a.shtml, at 25/06/2008. 
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is the immediate consequence of that.  Therefore, requiring the individual’s consent to be 
bound by every moral imperative is not plausible from an Islamic perspective.   
 To sum up, the adoption of moral agency as the criterion of moral personality can 
be justified by the concept of vicegerency.  However, such a viewpoint has been heavily 
criticised.  In the following, I will discuss this criticism and some responses given to it. 
4.2.2.3 The criticism levelled at selecting moral agency as the criterion of moral 
personality  
 The selection of moral agency as the sole criterion of moral personality has been 
heavily criticised, as will now be shown.  The main criticism has been made by animals-
rights proponents, in the argument known as the argument from marginal humans.  The 
responses have been variable but, as I see them, unsatisfactory.  In the following section, I 
will present the main criticism before moving on to address and discuss the responses. 
 Animals-rights proponents have been strong critics of the selection of moral 
agency as the sole criterion for moral personality.  For them, the exclusion of animals 
from the class of persons is unjustified since animals meet all morally relevant criteria, 
such as language and purposeful communication, intelligence, creativity, tool-using, 
autonomy,529 and self-consciousness.530  The argument of animals-rights proponents is 
that:    
                                                 
529 See for example, E. B. Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: the Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman 
Animals (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 46, 47.  The belief that the acquisition of the capacities 
for reason and self-awareness is sufficient for having moral personality makes it reasonable to conclude that 
many non-human animals may be persons.  Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living 
Things, 95.     
530 Tom L. Beauchamp, "The Failure of Theories of Personhood”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal 9, no. 
4 (1999): 309-324, 313. 
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Capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans from the other animals.  
Animals also care passionately for their young; animals also exhibit desires and 
preferences.  Features of moral relevance-rationality, interdependence, and love are 
not exhibited uniquely by human beings.  Therefore, there can be no solid moral 
distinction between humans and other animals.531   
 Furthermore, they are held to have some moral agency.  Like the other qualities 
that have just been listed, moral agency is claimed to be a degree-admitted quality or an 
evolutional ability, and so can be acquired in its lower degrees by some animals.532  
Questioning the belief that moral agency is human-specific, Evelyn Pluhar says:    
Is it really so clear … that the capacity for moral agency has no moral precedent in 
any other species?  Certain other capacities are required for moral agency, including 
the capacity for emotion, memory, and goal-directed behavior.  …  [T]here is ample 
evidence for the presence of these capacities, if to a limited degree, in some 
nonhumans.  …  Not surprisingly, then, evidence has been gathered that indicates 
that nonhumans are capable if what we call “moral” or “virtuous” behavior.533  
 However, when taken as an autonomous moral agency, as is the case in this 
thesis,534 no animal is then claimed to meet the criterion.  Admitting this fact, Evelyn 
Pluhar says:    
[O]nly humans are capable of having the mental development sufficient for 
autonomous moral agency.  Nonhumans may have lesser degrees of the relevant 
                                                 
531 Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, 866.  He refers to the following 
sources, Rollin, BE.  Animal rights and human morality.  New York: Prometheus Books, 1981.  Hoff C.  
Immoral and moral uses of animals.  N Engl J Med 1980; 302/; 115-8.  Jamieson D.  Killing persons and 
other beings.  In: Miller HB, Williams WH, eds.  Ethics and animals.  Clifton, N.J.: Humana Press, 1983: 
135-46.  (no page number(s) specified )       
532 Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals, 4 & 57.   
533 Ibid., 55.   
534 See  4.2.2.1 The definition of moral agency. 
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characteristics, but, so far as we know, none can match the capacities of the mature, 
normal human being.535  
 In addition, the admission that some animals can, to a lesser degree, have the 
capacity for moral agency but not autonomous moral agency can be found in Frankfurt’s 
concept of free will where it is asserted that:       
Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices.  
They share these things with the members of certain other species, some of whom 
even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior 
thought.  It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are 
able to form … “second-order desires”.536   
In another place, he re-emphasises that: 
Many animals appear to have the capacity for … “first-order desires” … which are 
simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another.  No animal other than man, 
however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is 
manifested in the formation of second-order desires.537 
The capacity for autonomous moral agency is, therefore, unattainable by animals.  Thus, 
they can be justifiably excluded from being classed as persons.  This has provoked 
animal-rights proponents to criticise the basing of moral personality on moral agency.   
                                                 
535 Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals, 57.   
536 Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, 6.   
537 Ibid., 7.  In a quite similar vein, Carl Cohen asserts, “[w]hat makes human special and distinguishable 
from other animals “is not the ability to communicate or to reason, or dependence on one another or care for 
the young, or the exhibition of preferences, or any such behavior that marks the critical divide.”  Animals 
do exhibit such attribute but that does not make them member of the community of moral agents.  
“Membership in a community of moral agents nevertheless remains impossible for them.  Actors subject to 
moral judgement must be capable of grasping the generality of an ethical premise in a particular syllogism.  
Humans act immorally often enough, but only they-never wolves or monkeys-can discern, by applying 
some moral rule to the facts of a case, that a given act ought or ought not to be performed.  The moral 
restraints imposed by humans on themselves are thus highly abstract and are often in conflict with the self-
interest of the agent.  Communal behavior among animals, even when most intelligent and most endearing, 
does not approach autonomous morality in this fundamental sense.”  Cohen, "The Case for the Use of 
Animals in Biomedical Research”, 867.    
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 The main criticism that animal-rights proponents provide is that known as “the 
argument from marginal cases” or “marginal humans”.538  It aims to show the absurdity of 
basing moral personality on moral agency, and allows for the possibility that some 
animals be personified.  The argument is expressed by Tom Regan as follows: 
(1) certain animals have certain rights because these [marginal] humans have these 
rights or that (2) if these [marginal] humans have certain rights, then certain 
animals have these rights also.  The former alternative represents what might be 
termed the stronger argument for animal rights; the latter, the weaker.539 
As is apparent, the argument depends on the potentially horrific effect the 
establishment of moral personality on moral agency has on the status of marginal humans.  
If such establishment is followed to its logical conclusion, the marginal humans will be 
deprived of moral personality since they lack moral agency.  The reply to the argument, 
its proponents assume, must take one of two forms.  First, the proponents of moral agency 
may prefer to continue holding moral agency as the sole basis of personality, but then 
they must deny personality to humans lacking moral agency such as infants, those with 
brain-damage, and the insane, let alone foetuses.  As Andrew Linzey argues: 
If we accord moral rights on the basis of rationality, what of the status of newly 
born children, "low grade" mental patients, "intellectual cabbages" and so on?  
Logically, accepting this criterion, they must have no, or diminished, moral 
rights.540   
 The result is so horrific that a different reply would be expected.  The proponents 
of moral agency would lower their criterion to grant marginal humans moral personality, 
                                                 
538 J. Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the Argument from Kinds and the Similarity Argument” Facta 
Universitatis Series: Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology 5, no. 1 (2006): 47-63, 47. 
539 Tom Regan, (1979) "An Examination and Defence of One Argument Concerning Animal Rights", 
Inquiry, 22, pp.  189-219, at 189.  Emphasis his.  As cited by Ibid., 51. 
540 Andrew Linzey, (1976) Animal rights: A Christian Assessment.  London.  SCM Press, at 24.  As cited 
by Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the Argument from Kinds and the Similarity Argument ", 51. 
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but in doing so, they would have to grant it to any animals that share the new less 
restrictive criterion.  As Peter Singer argues: 
[H]uman beings are not equal; and if we seek some characteristic that all of them 
possess, then this characteristic must be a kind of lowest common denominator, 
pitched so low that no human being lacks it.  The catch is that any such 
characteristic that is possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only by 
human beings.541  
 The responses of the proponents of moral agency to the arguments from marginal 
humans have varied.  Some of them such as Frey,542 Gauthier,543 McCloskey,544 
Narveson,545 and Michael Moore546 continue to hold their original claims and accept the 
deprivation of personality from marginal humans.  According to Moore:   
Very crazy human beings are not enough like us in one of our essential attributes, 
rationality, to be considered persons to whom moral and legal norms are addressed.  
Crazy people are “excused” from responsibility for the harm they cause for the 
same reason that young children, animals, stones, and perhaps corporations are 
excused: None of them has the status of being a person, the only kind of entity 
obligated by moral and legal norms.547  
Frey argues along the same lines, concluding that experimentations on marginal humans 
are legitimate.548  Similarly, Jan Narveson holds that "…the proper way to deal with them 
                                                 
541 Singer, Animal Liberation, 237. 
542 Raymond Gillespie Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering: Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 115. 
543 David Gauthier, (1977) Morals by Agreement.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, at 268, 269.  As cited by 
Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the Argument from Kinds and the Similarity Argument ", 52.   
544 H.  J McCloskey,. (1979) "Moral Rights and Animals", Inquiry, 22, pp.  23-54, at 31.  As cited by Ibid.   
545 Jan Narveson, (1983) "Animal Rights Revisited" in Miller, Harlan B.  & Williams, William H.  (eds.) 
Ethics and Animals.  Clifton, N.  J.: Humana Press, at 45.  As cited by Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the 
Argument from Kinds and the Similarity Argument ", 52.   
546  Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 65.   
547 Ibid. Emphasis in original.   
548 Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering: Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics, 115. 
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[MH]549 is simply whatever way is dictated by our interest in such things", marginal 
humans are ‘mere things’".550    
 However, others choose to respond differently.  They soften the claim that moral 
agency is a necessary condition for moral personality, and hold it instead as only a 
sufficient condition.  John Rawls is an example of these.  To him, being a moral person 
requires that entities be rational, with their own ends and a sense of justice.  However, 
since many humans lack either one or both capacities, Rawls claims that these capacities 
do not have to be perfect and equally shared by all persons.  They are degree-admitted 
and it would suffice to have them to a certain degree in order to acquire moral 
personality.551  With regard to infants and children, it is enough that they have, instead of 
the capacities required, the mere capacity for developing them: 
[T]he minimal requirements defining moral personality refer to a capacity and to 
the realization of it.  A being that has this capacity, whether or not it yet developed, 
is to receive the full protection of the principle of justice.  Since infants and children 
are thought to have basic rights (normally exercised on their behalf by parents and 
guardians), this interpretation of the requisite conditions seems necessary to match 
our considered judgements.552 
                                                 
549 An abbreviation of marginal humans, Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the Argument from Kinds and the 
Similarity Argument ", 48.   
550 See supra fn. 545.  Similarly, McCloskey has denied that marginal humans have personality upon their 
being rational entities subject to natural law.  In his words, “…that rational beings, being subject to the 
natural law, have rights, since rights are grounded on the natural law; that infants, lunatics, idiots have 
rights and are subject to natural law since they are rational beings.  Obviously, even if the theory of natural 
law could be established … infants, lunatics and idiots are not subject to it as rational agents any more than 
is an intelligent dog or ape.  The natural law is law, and is binding on men because and in so far as it is 
promulgated through reason.  It is not promulgated to infants, idiots and certain lunatics.  And, whilst it 
might be argued that it is promulgated potentially to infants, and hypothetically to idiots, potential and 
hypothetical promulgation are not promulgation, and to be a potential or a hypothetical possessor of rights 
is not to be a possessor of potential or hypothetical rights, nor of actual rights.”  H. J. McCloskey, "Rights”, 
the Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 59 (1965): 115-127, 124. 
551 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass:  Harvard University Press, 1971), 12, 508, 510.   
552 Ibid., 509. 
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 Nevertheless, this reply is problematic.  Firstly, since it relies on potentiality, it 
will result in personifying, not only infants and children, but also unfertilised eggs and 
sperm as they all have the potential to develop the required capacities.  In addition, it 
leaves unsolved the issue of those lacking actually and potentially the capacities in 
question, such as people with severe brain damage.553  Personifying them despite this lack 
is seriously indefensible and this has led John Rawls to deem moral agency as a sufficient 
but not a necessary condition for moral personality,554  which means that the latter can be 
obtained via meeting other criteria.   
The third reply of the proponents of moral agency sustains it as the sole criterion 
of personality while personifying marginal humans but not animals.  The argument of 
kind is a clear example of that.  Its theme is that the moral status of a being is determined 
by the capabilities typical of their kind, rather than their individual capabilities.  
Capabilities are typical of a kind when they are shared by some, most, or all of its 
members:  
If (1) an individual A is a member of some kind K, and (2) some, most or all of the 
other members of that kind K have some property C, and on the basis of having 
property C, they have property R, then individual A has property R as well, even 
though A lacks property C.555 
This principle is called “the ‘Getting a Property by Association Principle’”,556 or the 
“Derived Properties” principle.557  
                                                 
553 Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, 105.  However, the reliance on 
the concept of potentiality does not necessarily mean personifying gametes as there is a way to keep them 
dispersonified while conferring personality on marginal humans.  See pages 229-231 below.      
554 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 505.  506.    
555 Nathan Nobis, "Carl Cohen's 'Kind' Arguments for Animal Rights and against Human Rights”, Journal 
of Applied Philosophy 21, no. 1 (2004): 43-59, 53. 
556 Ibid. 
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 Consequently, since many humans have moral agency, it becomes the 
distinguishing feature of their kind, and so all this kind’s members, including marginal 
humans, have it.558  As Cohen argues:  
The capacity for moral judgement that distinguishes humans from animals is not a 
test to be administered to human beings one by one.  Persons who are unable, 
because of some disability, to perform the full moral functions natural to human 
beings are certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral community.  The 
issue is one of kind.  Humans are of such a kind that they may be the subject of 
experiments only with their voluntary consent.  The choices they make freely must 
be respected.  Animals are of such a kind that it is impossible for them, in principle, 
to give or withhold voluntary consent or to make a moral choice.  What humans 
retain when disabled, animals have never had.559  
Roger Scruton560 and David Schmidtz561 make the same point.   
                                                                                                                                                  
557 N. Levy, "Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis," Journal of Applied Philosophy 21, no. 2 
(2004): 213-217, 214.  
558 Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the Argument from Kinds and the Similarity Argument ", 53, 54.  
559 Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, 866. 
560 For Scruton, “[o]ur world makes sense to us because we divide it into kinds, distinguishing animals and 
plants by species and instantly recognising the individual as an example of the universal.  The recognitional 
expertise is essential to survival and especially to the survival of the hunter-gatherer.  And it is essential 
also to the moral life.  I relate to you as a human being and accord to you the privileges attached to the kind.  
It is in the nature of human beings that, in normal conditions, they become members of a moral community, 
governed by duty and protected by rights.  Abnormality in this respect does not cancel membership.  It 
merely compels us to adjust our response.  Infants and imbeciles belong to the same kind as you or me: the 
kind whose normal instances are also moral beings.  It is this that causes us to extend to them the shield that 
we consciously extend to each other and which is built collectively through our moral dialogue.”  Roger 
Scruton, Animal Rights, and Wrongs, 2nd ed. (London Demos, 1998), 43.  
561 David Schmidtz makes the following statement: “…humanity's characteristic rationality mandates 
respect for humanity, not merely for particular humans who exemplify human rationality.  Similarly, once 
we note that chimpanzees have characteristics cognitive capacities that mice lack, we do not need to 
compare individual chimpanzees and mice on a case by case basis in order to have a moral justification for 
planning to use a mouse rather than a chimpanzee in an experiment.  Of course, some chimpanzees lack the 
characteristics features in virtue of which chimpanzees command respect as a species, just as some humans 
lack the characteristics features in virtue of which humans command respect as a species.  It is equally 
obvious that some chimpanzees have cognitive capacities of some humans.  But whether every human 
being is superior to every chimpanzee is beside the point.  The point is that we can, we do, and we should 
make decisions on the basis of our recognition that mice, chimpanzees, and humans are relevantly different 
types”.  David Schmidtz, "Are All Species Equal?”  Journal of Applied Philosophy 15, no. 1 (1998): 57-67,  
61.  
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Kind membership is claimed to be morally relevant for two reasons.  The first 
reason, according to Neil Levy, is that it conforms to our intuition that all humans have 
personality and rights regardless of having the actual specified capacities.562  Kind 
membership satisfies Rawls’s criterion for normative moral theories, he proceeds to say, 
whereby: “…the correct moral theory is the one that best systematizes our intuitions.”563  
On the other hand, he claims that moral individualism leads to counterintuitive results by 
its linking of moral personality to individual or non-relational capacities.564  For example, 
many humans will fall short of qualifying for moral personality if individual non-
derivative capacities are required 
 The second reason for deeming kind membership morally relevant, is claimed to 
reside in the evolutionary history of human morality.  According to Neil Levy, proto-
morality came first as a response to our self-interested needs as humans before being 
replaced by a universalistic and altruistic system of morality.  However, selfishness is still 
present in morality.  This is evident in our intuitions to grant our fellow humans moral 
personality even when they lack the individual capacities required for that: “…our moral 
emotions, the building blocks of all moral response, are inevitably triggered by 
conspecifics”,565 as Levy puts it.  Considering these elements of morality leads to 
recognising “…the best rational systematization of morality,”566 he claims.   
 However, two criticisms have been levelled at the argument of kind.  The first 
criticism, which I think is implausible, is based on the absence of any definition of kind.  
The two possible explanations are insufficient, Julia Tanner claims.  The first one is that 
                                                 
562 Levy, "Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis," 216.   
563 Ibid., 216.  He refers to J.  Rawls (1971) A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
pp.  54ff. 
564 Ibid., 213, 214.   
565 Ibid., 216. 
566 Ibid. 
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kind means what is normal.  In effect it states that “…most humans are like this.”567  The 
problem with this explanation is that what is normal for most humans can change over 
time.  Subjecting moral personality to it can lead, therefore, to dramatic results.  Suppose 
it is claimed that moral personality is based on rationality, and that most humans lost their 
rationality.  The remaining humans would be characterised by the majority’s irrationality 
and treated accordingly.  So, all humans would be deprived of personality or rights 
including those who do have rationality.568  The same criticism can be levelled at the other 
explanation as well.   
 The second possible interpretation of what is meant by kind is also problematic.  
Kind can be identified by what is natural, so humans, as a kind, are identified by what is 
natural for most of them.569  The problem is that what is natural is changeable, and 
therefore subject to the same criticism levelled at the first possible interpretation.  
Furthermore, the problem does not end if natural is understood as the natural category to 
which humans belong, i.e. the human species or Homo sapiens.  Homo sapiens, like all 
other species, is a product of gradual evolution, and as such, it developed from other 
species.  It is difficult to determine, in such a gradual process, how a line can be drawn 
between the beginning of Homo sapiens and the end of the one from which it sprung, i.e. 
Homo erectus “…it would be arbitrary to draw a line as there was no single point at 
which all the offspring of homo erectus were homo sapiens.”570  
 In addition, a hypothesis based on the concept of evolution can show the type of 
contradiction the kind argument leads to.  Suppose, Tanner argues, that evolution had 
taken a different course, and led to our species being less rational than other species, we 
                                                 
567 Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the Argument from Kinds and the Similarity Argument ", 54.   
568 Ibid. 
569 Ibid., 55. 
570 Ibid. 
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would have attributed moral consideration to our fellow humans in spite of them being 
less rational, which is contradictory.  On the other hand, if Homo sapiens had evolved 
differently and resulted in two different species, one identical to us, as we stand, and a 
more advanced species, it would have been said that it is the other advanced species, not 
ours, that matters.  She concludes that it would be safer to detach our moral status from 
the species concept as that would secure it against evolutionary changes.571  
 Nevertheless, I think her argument is unsound.  Despite the emphasis she puts on 
the evolutionary concept, I do not think it is a real threat to the kind argument.  Assuming 
that the evolutionary theory regarding human beings is correct, the existence of the 
human species, as it is known now, must have started a very long time ago, and continued 
long enough to firmly establish a stable species.  A very long time would also have to 
pass before the human species evolved into another species.  Therefore, I think the human 
species has fairly clear boundaries.   
 However, the second criticism levelled at the argument of kind is, as I see it, the 
real challenge.  It demonstrates the argument’s inability to show the moral relevance of 
membership in a natural category.  In the absence of such a justification, it is reasonable 
to argue that there is no difference between the preference given to one’s own species and 
that given to one’s own sex or race.  All of them are types of discrimination based on a 
morally irrelevant factor, i.e. group membership.572  
 The two reasons given for considering kind membership as morally relevant are 
unsatisfactory.  The reference made to our intuitions is insufficient since they can often 
                                                 
571 Ibid. 
572 See page 122 above. 
 148
4. Defining Legal Personality 
easily mislead us, as many philosophers believe.573  Sexism and racism could be justified 
by reference to many people’s intuitions.574  However, though admitting this fact, Neil 
Levy concludes that our moral intuitions must be given some prima facie weight: 
[O]ur moral intuitions must be accorded some prima facie weight … Of course, in 
the process of reaching reflective equilibrium many intuitions will be modified and 
some will be rejected.  Intuitions are defeasible, but in the absence of defeaters they 
must be taken seriously.575 
Yet, this, I think, is also implausible since, as Julia Tanner claims, the kind 
argument contradicts our intuitions.  She claims that we have intuitions that marginal 
humans have genuine moral consideration not, as the kind arguments’ proponents say, a 
derivative one:   
We think it wrong to harm MH [marginal humans] because to do so is to wrong the 
individuals themselves not some rather vague notion of humanity.  It is not because 
MH are of the human kind that we think they deserve moral consideration; we think 
they deserve such consideration in their own right and to harm them is to wrong the 
individuals themselves.576  
The ambiguity concerning our intuitions, I believe, is a sufficient reason not to rely on 
them in the important matter of conferring and withdrawing moral personality.   
 What remains is the recourse to the claimed origin of morality.  Levy claims that 
morality finds its origin in our concern for protecting and promoting our own needs.  
Though it (morality) overcame this selfishness and became a universalistic and altruistic 
system, it might be reasonable to attribute the highest moral standing to our own species, 
                                                 
573 Levy, "Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis," 216.   
574 Ibid.   
575 Ibid. 
576 Tanner, "Marginal Humans, the Argument from Kinds and the Similarity Argument ", 57. 
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regardless of their individual capacities.  Our feelings generate our links with other 
members of our own species.577  Without discussing the accuracy of the claim of the 
origin of morality, it seems unacceptable to rely on such a concept.  In the first place, it 
results in evaluating highly our intuitions towards fellow members of our species when 
these intuitions are unreliable, as has just been explained.  If it is true that morality despite 
its dark outset, and assuming selfishness to be universally bad, has evolved to become 
what Neil Levy himself describes as, “…just the universalistic and even altruistic system 
of thought, feeling and action that moralists hope to find in it”,578 it seems implausible to 
call for a return to that origin.  For these reasons, the moral relevance of kind membership 
is unproven.  Therefore it would be difficult to rely on this argument to confer moral 
personality on any entity that fails to meet its criterion.   
 However, there is a way, I maintain that we can base moral personality on moral 
agency while attributing it to many so-called marginal humans.  This way is finding the 
seat of moral agency in humans, as the only moral agents, and subjugating the conferral 
of moral personality to having that seat, regardless of attaining actual autonomous moral 
agency.  Further explanation of this will be given in the next section. 
 
4.2.2.4 The nature of being human and the marginal humans dilemma   
 As outlined earlier, the solution for the dilemma concerning moral agency as the 
criterion of personality lies in determining the source from which it is derived.  Different 
views have been held about the trait that can be deemed as the source or seat of moral 
agency.  Examples of them are succinctly stated by Carl Cohen as follows:    
                                                 
577 Levy, "Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis," 216. 
578 Ibid. 
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[T]he inner consciousness of a free will (Saint Augustine); the grasp, by human 
reason, of the binding character of moral law (Saint Thomas); the self-conscious 
participation of human beings in an objective ethical order (Hegel); human 
membership in an organic moral community (Bradley); the development of the 
human self through the consciousness of other moral selves (Mead); … the 
unenervative, intuitive cognition of the rightness of an action (Prichard) and … the 
universal human possession of a uniquely moral will and the autonomy its use 
entails [Immanuel Kant].579  
 However, this list does not contain the seat of moral agency as I see it.  Self-
consciousness, reason, cognition, possession of free will, and autonomy are considered 
bases for moral agency.  Admittedly, these attributes are essential for the existence and 
exercise of moral agency, as they comprise its cognition and autonomy elements,580 but as 
such, they provide no explanation for why humans rather than nonhumans enjoy the 
capacity for moral agency.  It is not enough to attribute the moral agency that human 
beings have to their rationality or free will, since these capabilities are elements in the 
capacity for moral agency.  The explanation should transcend these capabilities to 
demonstrate the source from which they are derived, that is, the quality that makes 
humans rational and free willed agents.  This elucidation can be found, I believe, in the 
concept of the nature of human beings.  In the following paragraphs, the concept of the 
nature of human beings will be discussed first, followed by an explanation of how it 
works in solving the moral agency-related dilemma.   
 
 
                                                 
579 Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, 865, 866.   
580 See  4.2.2.1 The definition of moral agency. 
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4.2.2.4.1 The nature of being human   
 The concept of the nature of the human being adopted in this thesis is dualistic, 
and, as previously detailed, represents the Islamic stand on the issue.581  It is also the stand 
of Cartesianism, being one of the main dualistic theories.  Here the human being is 
perceived as a composite of two elements, namely a corporeal body, and an incorporeal 
soul or mind.582  In spite of being self-subsistent and able to exist independently from one 
another, the body and the soul or mind must unite in order for a human being, as such, to 
exist.  Upon their union, each will affect the other.583  As in Islamic teaching,584 the soul 
or mind in Cartesianism is believed to be the seat of all mental activities,585 including 
those essential for the exercise of moral agency,586 while the body is the means by which 
these activities are performed.587  
Furthermore, Thomism, the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, as another 
main dualistic theory, advocates the interaction thesis, though it differs with Islam and 
Cartesianism about the form of the dualistic nature of human beings.  It considers 
human beings to be a unit of form, i.e. soul, and matter, i.e. materiality or prime 
matter, resulting firstly in a human body.  Thomism, Donceel argues, thinks of human 
beings as individuals rather than couples, units rather than unions, that is, unions of 
soul and prime matter that result in them being one thing: 
                                                 
581 See  3.1.1 The nature of human beings. 
582 Kenneth Einar Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua 
Experiential Subject," Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 1 (2005), 48-55, 50.  Richard Swinburne, the 
Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 232.  Cartesianists use mind and soul 
interchangeably.  In criticising them for so doing see F. J. Beckwith, "Of Souls, Selves, and Cerebrums: A 
Reply to Himma," Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 1 (2005): 56-60, 56. 
583 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 50. 
584 See  3.1.1 The nature of human being in Islam.   
585  Swinburne, the Evolution of the Soul, 232.   
586 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 51. 
587 Ibid., 51, 52.    
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For Thomas, man is a real unity.  He is constituted by the complementary causality 
of his soul and prime matter.  This complementary causality makes him wholly into 
a person and wholly into a body.  I am a person and I am a body.588     
Another difference between the Islamic concept and Cartesianism on the one 
hand, and Thomism on the other, is the role of the body.  The former, as has just been 
mentioned, attributes to it an important role in constituting human beings and considering 
them ontologically self-subsistent.  However, the latter, as presented by Donceel, sees it 
as doing nothing except receiving the soul’s acts; as such, none of a human being’s 
positive features can be ascribed to it:  
The human body is not a reality in and by itself.  Its quantitative, visible features 
may be said to be rooted in it, to derive from it, only if the body is considered as 
animated by the soul.  These features are not caused by man’s material component.  
Matter, in the sense of prime matter, contributes nothing positive to man; it supplies 
only receptivity, potentiality.  It is nothing but pure potentiality.  All man’s positive 
features-not only his intellect and his will, but also his imagination and his memory, 
his senses and their organs, his character and temperament, his sex, health, and 
stature-derive totally from the soul.589        
However, despite this difference in opinion, Thomists agree with the Islamic 
concept and Cartesianism on the necessity of the body for the performance of the soul’s 
functions.  As Donceel says:   
Man’s higher, spiritual faculties have no organs of their own, since they are 
immaterial, intrinsically independent of matter.  But they need, as necessary 
conditions of their activities, the cooperation of the highest sense powers, 
imagination, memory … [which presuppose] that the brain be fully developed, that 
                                                 
588 J. Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization”, Theological Studies 31, no. 1 (1970): 
76–105, 80.   
589 Ibid., 80, 81.   
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the cortex be ready.590  Only then … matter … highly enough organized to receive 
the highest substantial form, the spiritual, human soul, created by God.591     
As will be explained in detail, perceiving the soul-body relationship in this way is 
crucial in ascertaining the timing of ensoulment and so the status of the foetus.592  
However, the task now is to explain how this concept solves the dilemma of marginal 
humans. 
4.2.2.4.2 The explanatory power of the nature of being human  
 The argument being made is that the nature of being human explains how moral 
personality can be based on moral agency and concurrently attributed to many so-called 
marginal humans.  Human beings, as detailed earlier, are seen as entities of a 
multidimensional nature: biological and intellectual, and their cognition and volition, 
which are the two pillars of moral agency, like all other intellectual capacities, find their 
source in the soul.  In this model, the soul is seen as the seat of moral agency.  Despite the 
fact that the soul is an all-or-nothing attribute,593 moral agency, being based on the soul, is 
not.  It admits degrees and undergoes primitive stages before becoming autonomous in 
the meaning intended, when it is said that moral agency is the basis for personality.   
                                                 
590 Understanding bodily readiness as the acquisition of a cortex or cortical brain, as indicated in the quote, 
is the position held in the current research, and will be explained in detail in the chapter allocated to 
applying the criterion of personality.  See  5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event.  
591 Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization”, 83.   
592 See the following chapter about Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus. 
593 In Swinburne’s words, “…having a soul is all-or nothing (a creature either has some feeling or 
awareness and so a soul, or no feeling or awareness and hence no soul); it cannot be measured.”  Richard 
Swinburne, Is There a God?  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 84.  However, some writers like 
Walter Glannon dispute that the soul is non-degreed.  For him, “…if the soul is identified with the capacity 
for consciousness, and this capacity is something that we acquire gradually on the basis of the gradual 
development of the cerebrum and cerebral cortex, then it seems to follow that having a soul is not all-or-
nothing but rather something that we possess to varying degrees, at least with respect to the margins of life 
when we begin to exist and cease to exist.”  Walter Glannon, "Tracing the Soul: Medical Decisions at the 
Margins of Life," Christian Bioethics 6, no. 1 (2000): 49-69, 57.  Personally, I see no contradiction in 
deeming as non-degreed the soul and consciousness (as an ultimate capacity) on the one hand, and 
considering the development of such a capacity as degreed when it requires the involvement of the brain.  
See below for more explanation.   
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 However, these two facts can be reconciled if seen in the light of the soul-body 
relationship.  In this relationship, the body is perceived as the machinery of the soul that 
receives and responds to its instructions regarding rational and voluntary functions.594  
Since this machinery is a developing object, the effectiveness of implementing the soul’s 
instructions depends to a great extent on the phase of development it occupies.  This 
explains why, in spite of the fact that ensoulment takes place at an early developmental 
stage,595 the exercise of moral agency in the proper sense, the sense that justifies holding 
the agent accountable for his or her deeds, occurs at a much more advanced stage.  It is 
the body, not the soul, that causes the capacity for moral agency to emerge gradually.   
 Introducing the concept of the faculties of the soul as theorised by James Porter 
Moreland should makes this clearer.  According to this concept, the soul has different 
faculties, each of which consists of related capacities ranged hierarchically.  At the top lie 
the ultimate capacities under which other capacities are arranged in different order.  The 
actualisation of ultimate capacities depends on developing lower ones.  The example is 
that when someone is able to speak English but not Russian, they have second order 
capacities towards the capacity to speak English and Russian, but only a first order 
capacity to speak English.  The inability to develop lower order capacities has no effect 
on the existence of higher order ones.596  In Moreland’s words:  
An acorn has the ultimate capacity to draw nourishment from the soil, but this can 
be actualized and unfolded only by developing the lower capacity to have a root 
system and then developing the still lower capacities of the root system and so on.  
When something has a defect … it does not lose its ultimate capacities.  Rather, it 
                                                 
594 See  4.2.2.4.1 The nature of being human . 
595 See  5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event. 
596 J. P. Moreland and S. B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2000), 203. 
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lacks some lower-order capacity it needs for the ultimate capacity to be 
developed.597 
 In terms of moral agency, a distinction can be drawn between its ultimate and 
actual existences.  As an ultimate capacity, moral agency finds its seat in the soul and so 
it first exists when ensoulment takes place.  It also continues to exist as long as there is a 
soul.  However, this ultimate capacity cannot be transformed into an actual capacity 
unless lower capacities, i.e. cognition and volition, develop enough.  Since the latter are 
dependent on bodily development, the existence of actual moral agency becomes reliant 
on this bodily development as well.  As an ultimate capacity, moral agency is not 
divisible; it is just like its seat, the soul, an all-or-nothing attribute.  Nevertheless, as an 
actual capacity dependent on bodily development, moral agency is a graduated attribute, 
that is, one that comes into degree in accordance with bodily development.   
An important result follows from this distinction.  We can distinguish between 
actual, potential, post, and non-moral agents.  Actual moral agents are those who have 
acquired, besides their ultimate capacity for moral agency, an actual autonomous moral 
agency.  They have developed the lower capacities underlining moral agency as an 
ultimate capacity.  Those are normal adult human beings.   
The other type is that of potential moral agents.  They are those who, although 
they have not yet acquired the actual autonomous moral agency due to their bodily 
development, do have souls infused into their bodies.  As such, they have the capacity, in 
an ultimate sense, along with an active potentiality for developing it into an actual one.598  
Their potentiality is immune from the weaknesses attributed to the potentiality argument, 
                                                 
597 Ibid., 203, 204.  Emphasis in original. 
598 Detailed explanation of active potentialities and passive potentialities will be provided in the following 
chapter about the application of the personality’s criterion. 
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that is, it is not open to every object that has a potential for developing into a human 
being such as unfertilised ova.599  Rather, the potentiality here is confined to those who 
have undergone the ensoulment stage and so acquired the source of moral agency.  As 
will be explained later, the ensoulment takes place long after the point when twinning is 
possible, and so another criticism levelled normally at potential arguments can be 
avoided.600 601  
The third category is that of post-moral agents.  They are those who have lost their 
autonomous moral agency, such as the insane and those with severe brain damage, but 
still can show signs, however minimal, of rational and voluntary functions.  Obviously, 
they cannot be fitted under any of the two previous categories.  However, their ability to 
show the signs concerned indicates beyond any doubt that they still have souls.  In other 
words, though their bodies’ capability to receive and execute the souls’ instructions has 
been badly damaged, it has not been completely lost.  The signs of rational and voluntary 
functions are conclusive evidence of that.  Hence, their souls still penetrate into their 
bodies providing them with the ultimate capacity for moral agency.  It may be possible 
for their bodily capability to be restored upon scientific advancement and, if so, their 
actual moral agency will be reclaimed.  Like the members of the first two categories, viz.  
actual, and potential agents, post-moral agents should always be regarded as persons.   
However, the case is different with non-moral agents.  They are those who fail 
completely and permanently to show any signs of rational and voluntary functions.  The 
example of these entities is severely brain-damaged babies, as long as the absence of the 
                                                 
599 In mentioning this criticism, see Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, 
105.  
600 For an explanation of this criticism, see Katrien Devolder and John Harris, "The Ambiguity of the 
Embryo: Ethical Inconsistency in the Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate," Metaphilosophy 38, no. 2-3 
(2007): 153-169. 
601 See  5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event. 
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signs of rational and voluntary functions is complete and irreversible.  Such absence 
indicates without any doubt that these entities have no souls infused in their bodies and so 
are not humans.  As previously explained, no entity can be considered a human without a 
soul being present in its body.602  As such, non-moral agents lack moral agency in both 
actual and ultimate senses and, accordingly, should be deemed non-persons.   
The question that may arise is over the difference between the argument based on 
the nature of being human and that of kind, because each of them attributes capacities to 
so-called marginal humans that they, in actuality, do not possess.  The real difference, for 
me, lies in the introduction of the concept of the soul.  The capacities attributed to many 
so-called marginal humans because of their souls are real and non-derivative, unlike those 
attributed by proponents of the kind argument.  It is the soul embodied in that particular 
human rather than something found in another fellow human, that justifies endowing him 
or her with ultimate capacities in the absence of actual ones.  Moral agency here is not a 
derivative attribute but rather an intrinsic and individuated one. 
Moral agency, then, can be reasonably chosen as the criterion upon which moral 
personality is based while avoiding the devastating effect on the status of many humans.  
Considering that moral personality is the basis of the definition of legal personality 
adopted in this thesis, moral agency becomes, indirectly, the criterion of the latter as well.  
Moreover, by considering that non-humans have been shown to lack autonomous moral 
agency while all humans, because of their souls, possess it in the ultimate sense, it can be 
concluded that moral agency is a human-specific criterion.  As such, it can be concluded 
that the three concepts of legal personality, moral personality, and humanity are identical.  
To model it: since (1) legal personality is based on moral personality, and (2) moral 
                                                 
602 See  3.1.1 The nature of human beings. 
 158
4. Defining Legal Personality 
 159
personality is based on moral agency and (3) moral agency resides in humanity, then (4) 
legal personality, moral personality, and humanity are identical to one another.  It follows 
that they can be used interchangeably, as will be the case in this thesis from now on.  
What remains is to apply moral agency as the criterion of personality to the foetus, to 
determine its status.  This is the task that will be tackled in the following chapter. 
 
5. Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus  
 
                                                
5 Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus  
The previous discussion demonstrates that in order for a being to possess 
personality and humanity and attract rights it must have an autonomous capacity for 
moral agency.  The discussion also shows that this capacity, along with other capacities 
distinctive of persons and humans, is acquired in an ultimate sense when a being 
possesses a human soul.  Therefore, in order to determine the status of the human foetus 
in this context, it is first necessary to ascertain the stage at which ensoulment occurs.603   
In the following two sections, I will attempt to determine the foetal stage at which 
the ensoulment event may take place.  After that, I will move on to assess the status of the 
foetus accordingly.   
5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event  
Determining the timing of the ensoulment event is a necessary step towards 
ascertaining the legal status of the foetus.604  Although deciding on this issue is difficult 
because of the incorporeality of the soul, it is not impossible.  There are philosophical and 
scientific principles that can help to achieve it.605  These principles should be combined, 
as using them separately will not lead to an accurate result.  Stating this point Donceel 
argues: 
 
603 The union of the soul and body is called ensoulment when the latter is seen as being ensouled while it is 
called embodiment when the former is viewed as being embodied.  In the present research, the terms will be 
used interchangeably.  See fn. 617 below.  
604 As the legal status is based on the moral one, they will be used interchangeably.  See  4.2.1 Basing legal 
personality on moral personality.   
605 A detailed explanation of those principles will be presently provided.  
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[I]f we ask the scientists at what time this new organism becomes a human person, 
a being endowed with a spiritual, human soul, no competent scientist will venture 
an answer.  For him, as a scientist, the question makes no sense.  The words 
“person” and “soul” never occur in his scientific system.  If we get an answer at all, 
he will let us know his philosophical views, which are worth exactly, not what his 
scientific, but what his philosophical, competence is worth.  The trouble is that the 
question can be answered neither by the scientists as such nor by the philosophers 
as such.  Both science and philosophy are needed.606 
This combination of science and philosophy takes the form of the philosophical principles 
setting the grounds on which the timing of the ensoulment event can be determined, while 
the scientific principles apply those grounds.607 
In this section it is argued that the first fruit of the combination of the relevant 
philosophical and scientific principles, is that consciousness can be used as a conclusive 
indication of the ensoulment event.  As a result, the timing of this event can be known by 
determining the beginning of consciousness.  In the following, the relevant philosophical 
and scientific principles will be explained first.  After that, the selection of consciousness 
as an indication of ensoulment will be justified.  Following that, the beginning of 
consciousness, and hence the timing of the ensoulment event, will be stated.   
5.1.1 Determining the principles 
The previous chapter explained the concept of the human being adopted here.  
Essentially, it decreed that s/he is a composite of two components, soul or mind and body.  
It demonstrated that the two components interact with one another so that the body 
constitutes the machinery of the soul.  Effectively, the body is considered the means by 
 
606 Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization”, 97. 
607 Donceel makes the same point, see Ibid.   
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which the soul performs its cognitional and volitional activities.  Two important results, 
determinative of the timing of ensoulment, follow from this understanding.  The first 
result is that the body must be fit enough to receive and execute the soul’s instructions 
before ensoulment can take place.  The second result is that, though the soul is 
incorporeal and so impossible to detect, its existence can be determined through detecting 
its functions when performed by the body.  The principle of bodily readiness will be 
discussed first, followed by a discussion of the principle of the indicatory role of the soul-
related functions 
5.1.1.1 The principle of bodily readiness    
The first principle in determining the ensoulment timing is that of bodily readiness 
or fitness, which means that the body must be fit enough to receive, and maintain, the 
soul.  The following discussion will examine the religious and philosophical bases of this 
principle, and how they can be understood in the light of science.   
There are several religious and philosophical bases for the principle of bodily 
readiness.  From an Islamic perspective, revelational statements can be cited to support it.  
For example, the Qur’an says:  
Verily We created man from a product of wet earth; Then placed him as a drop (of 
seed) in a safe lodging; Then fashioned We the drop a clot, then fashioned We the 
clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones 
with flesh, and then produced it as another creation.  So blessed be Allah, the Best 
of creators!608 
 
608 23:12-14.   
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The other creation mentioned in the verses as being preceded by bodily formation is the 
soul.609  This is because the body is the vehicle and device that the soul uses to 
accomplish what it has been created for, and so it should logically be prepared before the 
creation of its user.610  Indeed, being the means of the soul is the reason behind the 
perfection of the human body.611  
In addition, the traditions of the Prophet advocate the proposition that ensoulment 
is preceded by bodily readiness.  The Prophet says: 
(The matter of the Creation of) a human being is put together in the womb of the 
mother in forty days, and then he becomes a clot of thick blood for a similar period, 
and then a piece of flesh for a similar period.  Then Allah sends an angel who is 
ordered to write four things.  He is ordered to write down his (i.e. the new 
creature's) deeds, his livelihood, his (date of) death, and whether he will be blessed 
or wretched (in religion).  Then the soul is breathed into him …612  
The breath of the soul into the body is clearly delayed until the formation of the latter is 
completed.613  Therefore, it can be safely concluded that in Islam, ensoulment, and so 
human life, can never start in the absence of bodily readiness.   
This conclusion can also be supported by reference to the Islamic understanding 
of death as the other end of the spectrum.  In this understanding, death occurs when the 
body becomes incapable of receiving and executing the soul’s instructions.  That is to say, 
 
609 Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb 
al-ʿlmy”, 79. 
610 Ibid., 83, 84.  
611 Ibid .57. 
612 Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ismail Bukhari. Sahih Bukhari.  Translated by M. Muhsin Khan.  Vol. 4, 
Book 54, Number 430.  Retrieved from 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/054.sbt.html#004.054.430, at 
05/08/2008. 
613 For further explanation of this tradition, see page 194 below. 
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the capability of the body to receive the soul and implement its instructions is required 
throughout human life.  Any deficiency affecting this capability will affect the connection 
the soul has with the body.  However, the soul’s departure from the body and so the end 
of human life is contingent on the complete and permanent loss of the capability 
concerned.   
This understanding is present in many Moslem jurists’ writings.  For instance, Ibn 
Qaiyim al-Jawziyah defines the spirit as:        
[A]n object different in substance from its tangible body.  It is of a luminous, high, 
light, living, and moving nature.  It gets into the essence of organs and penetrates 
them the same way roses are penetrated by water, olives by oil, and coal by fire.  As 
long as these organs are fit to receive the effects on them of this delicate object, it 
remains intertwined with them and benefits them with these effects in the form of 
feeling and voluntary motion.  If these organs spoil, due to the predominance of 
dense humours and are no longer receptive to those effects, the spirit departs from 
the body and removes itself to the world of spirits.614 
Similarly, Abu Hamed Al-Ghazali explains the role the spirit plays in death as 
follows:  
The meaning of the spirit’s departure from the body is that it no longer controls the 
body, which stops obeying it.  The organs are vehicles for the spirit.  It strikes with 
hands, hears with ears, sees with eyes, and learns the truth about things by itself.  
The failure of the body with death is parallel to the chronic failure of its organs 
because one of its humours spoils, or to a crisis suffered by the nerves and 
preventing the spirit from getting to them, which makes the knowing, rational, and 
perceptive spirit available to, and in control of, some organs, and resisted by others.  
Death is when all organs resist the spirit.  All the organs are machinery used by the 
 
614 Ibn Al-Qaiyim, Al-Ruh, 241, 242.  As translated in Yasin, "The End of Human Life in 
the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 380, 381, 
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spirit.  Death means the spirit no longer controls the body, which is no longer a 
vehicle for it.  As chronic failure of the hand means it is no longer in use, death is 
the chronic failure of all organs …615  
Following the logic embodied in this understanding it is clear that ensoulment 
must be delayed until bodily fitness is acquired.  That is to say, since human life ends 
when the body becomes entirely and irreversibly incapable of receiving and executing the 
soul’s instructions, it, human life, cannot start unless the body is capable of doing so.  
Cartesianism, as a main dualistic concept, also supports the principle of bodily readiness 
or fitness.  It requires bodily readiness as a result of considering the soul- or mind-body 
relationship as intrinsically causal.  This causality requires that only when the former is 
able to implement causal influence on the latter can ensoulment occur.616  As John Foster 
puts it:  
 [A]s the dualist conceives the relation between body and mind, the very notion of 
embodiment will turn out to be, in part, implicitly causal.  An essential part of what 
makes it the case that a certain mind and a certain body belong to the same subject 
is that they are causally attached to each other in a special way—a way which 
equips the body to have direct causal interaction with the mind, and no other, and 
equips the mind to have direct causal interaction with this body, and no other.617 
However, the stance of Thomism as the other dualistic concept on the issue is 
controversial.  As presented by Donceel, it clearly advocates the notion that bodily 
 
615 Abu Hamed Al-Ghazali, Ihyay’ Ulum Al-Din, vol.  4, Beirut: Dar Al-Ma’rifah, p 494.  As cited by 
Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
381.   
616 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 51, 52. 
617 John Foster, the Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind (London; 
New York: Routledge, 1991), 165, 166.  Commenting on John Foster’s statement, Himma says, “[t]he same 
remarks, of course, apply to the notion of ensoulment since it is an extensionally equivalent notion: the 
locution ‘‘the body is ensouled’’ and the locution ‘‘the soul is embodied’’ pick out exactly the same states 
of affairs.”  Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 52. 
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readiness is essential for the ensoulment.618  Yet, according to other philosophers, while 
Thomism advocates the proposition that bodily readiness is essential for the actualisation 
of the soul’s ultimate capacities, it requires no such readiness for ensoulment.  According 
to Beckwith, as a clear example of those philosophers:   
[T]he human being is an immaterial substance that is not identical to the sum total 
of the parts of the physical body to which it is uniquely associated.  The immaterial 
substance, sometimes called the soul, is the locus of the self.  Thus, mental 
functions are powers that the soul has by nature that may only by exercised (at least 
on this side of heaven) by means of the physical entity called the brain.619   
Nevertheless, he claims that the conditionality of the performance of the soul’s activities 
on the brain does not mean subjugating ensoulment to the brain’s formation.  Human 
beings as immaterial substance, i.e. soul, come into existence prior to the formation of 
their bodily parts, including the brain, since these parts are exterior to their reality.  They 
are, and will continue to be, persons even if they lack the organs necessary for exercising 
activities peculiar to themselves as such.620  In his words:  
A human being who lacks the ability to think rationally (either because she is too 
young or she suffers from a disability) is still a human person because of her nature.  
Consequently, a human being’s lack makes sense if and only if she is an actual 
human person.621  
The different conclusions drawn by Thomists reflect, it seems to me, a 
difference in understanding Thomas Aquinas’ ideas.  For example, Donceel denies that 
 
618 See page 153 above. 
619 Beckwith, "Of Souls, Selves, and Cerebrums: A Reply to Himma," 57.  As it will be shortly explained, 
the acquisition of a brain is what is meant by bodily readiness. 
620 Ibid. 
621 Ibid.  Emphasis in original.   
 166
5. Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus  
 
                                                
Thomas’s concept of the human being is dualist,622 while Beckwith and Moreland 
describe it as ‘substance dualism’.623  Also, the soul in Donceel’s understanding of 
Thomism plays the role of the formal cause:624 “…rational soul is … the form of the 
body”, he says.625  However, in Beckwith and Moreland’s understanding, the soul is an 
efficient cause, that is, it is the originator and guider of all types of growth and 
development that human beings experience, both biological and mental.  Beckwith 
claims that “…because souls have natures (or essences) they have the teleological 
function that internally directs the growth and development of the human being.”626  
“[T]he efficient cause of the characteristics of the human body”, Moreland argues, 
“…is the soul; and various body parts, including DNA and genes, are important 
instrumental causes the soul uses to produces the traits that arise.”627 
 This belief in the soul as the efficient cause might be the reason behind 
refusing to delay ensoulment until after bodily readiness, and insisting instead, on 
timing it with conception.  It is the soul, they think, that this originates, and guides 
bodily development until readiness is accomplished.  However, though the discussion 
of whether these philosophers’ understanding represents the right interpretation of 
Thomism is clearly beyond the scope of my thesis, the discussion of their claim that 
 
622 Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization", 80.   
623 Beckwith, "Of Souls, Selves, and Cerebrums: A Reply to Himma," 56.  Moreland and Rae, Body & Soul: 
Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics, 121.   
624 According to Aristotle, there are four types of causation: material, formal, efficient and final.  Taking an 
example of a statue, the material cause is the material from which it is made while the formal cause is the 
pattern that determines its shape.  The efficient cause is the agent who makes the statue whereas the final 
one is the aim behind making it.  ("causes: material, formal, efficient, final" The Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy.  Simon Blackburn.  Oxford University Press, 1996.  Oxford Reference Online.  Oxford 
University Press.  Lancaster University.  11 October 
2007  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e378)  
625 Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization”, 84.   
626 Beckwith, "Of Souls, Selves, and Cerebrums: A Reply to Himma," 57. 
627 Moreland and Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics, 206.   
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bodily readiness is merely a condition for the soul’s function, but not a condition for 
its embodiment is not.   
The question of whether bodily readiness is essential for the soul to infuse the 
body or merely required for the already existent soul to function, can be answered by 
reference to the causal nature of the soul-body relationship.  As has already been 
explained, Cartesianists accurately argue that ensoulment is causal in nature, and so 
cannot occur until a direct causal interaction between the soul and body is possible.  
Since this direct interaction cannot happen unless the body is organised enough to 
receive and execute the soul’s instructions, ensoulment cannot happen unless bodily 
readiness is achieved.  Put another way, bodily readiness is a prerequisite for 
ensoulment.   
Furthermore, the Thomists’ belief that the soul is the organiser and guider of all 
types of growth and development of the human being, which is apparently the basis of 
their claim that bodily readiness is a condition for the functionality, rather than the 
existence, of the soul, cannot be accepted in Islam.  In Islam, a distinction is held 
between two types of life: rational or human life and biological life.  While the former 
finds its source in the human or rational soul as the originator of cognition and 
volition, the latter finds its seat in another soul called the vegetative soul, the originator 
and guider of bodily growth and development.  The rational soul cannot pertain to a 
body unless it has already, through the work of the vegetative soul, become organised 
enough to receive and respond to its effects.628  Therefore, in a thesis based on an 
 
628 See page 176 below.   
 168
5. Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus  
 
                                                
Islamic perspective, the Thomists’ claim that the human soul is the guider of growth 
and nutrition cannot be accepted. 
Requiring bodily readiness can be justified also by the ‘law of complexity-
consciousness’ as formed by Teilhard De Chardin.  According to this law, consciousness 
is proportional to centro-complexity which is “…the orderly arrangement of an immense 
number of cells in a closed whole, in which all of them work together for the same 
purpose.”629  As such, there can be no self-consciousness in the absence of a very high 
degree of centro-complexity.630  Though Teilhard talks about self-consciousness, the fact 
that such a faculty is linked to the soul makes it plausible, as Donceel rightly argues,631 to 
apply his law to ensoulment.   
Moreover, the concept of the hierarchical structure of existence as formed by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty can lend support to the conclusion being justified.  According to 
this concept, the spiritual existence of the human being lies at the top of the hierarchical 
structure of existence and lends new importance to lower levels.  Spiritual existence is 
contingent on the readiness of the lower level to bear it.  The argument as summarised by 
Donceel is that: 
[T]ere are in man three levels of existence: the physical, the vital, and the spiritual.  
Each lower level is to the next higher one as the data are to their meaning, as the 
body is to its soul.  Each higher level endows the previous ones with a new 
significance.  The vital level presupposes a certain organization of the physical one, 
 
629 As mentioned in Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization”, 103.  He does not 
reference Teilhard’s work.   
630  Ibid. 
631 Ibid. 
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and the spiritual level is possible only as rooted in a vital level which is ready to 
carry it.632   
Therefore, from an Islamic and philosophical viewpoint, ensoulment can take place only 
when bodily readiness is achieved.   
The role of science with regard to the determination of the timing of ensoulment, 
is, as outlined earlier,633 to apply the philosophical principles.  In terms of the principle of 
bodily readiness, the body can be said to be ready to receive the soul when it acquires the 
organ necessary for actualising the soul-related functions, namely, the cortical brain or 
cortex.  The cortex forms the external stratum of the cerebrum that is the biggest and most 
greatly developed division of the brain.634  It is the locus of all functions attributed to the 
soul including one’s “…personality, his conscious life, his uniqueness, his capacity for 
remembering, judging, reasoning, acting, enjoying, worrying, and so on …",635 and any 
deep and permanent damage to it normally results in a permanent coma and loss of all of 
these functions.636  The Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary states that, “[t]he cortex is the 
seat of all intelligent behaviour”.637  It also mentions that it is: 
[T]he part of the brain most directly responsible for consciousness, with essential 
roles in perception, memory, thought, mental ability, and intellect, and it is 
 
632 "Chacun de cea degrés est âme à l'égard du précédent, corps à l'égard du suivant" (La structure du 
comortement [3rd ed.; Paris, 1953] p.227).  As cited by Ibid. 
633 See page 161 above. 
634 "Cerebrum n."  Concise Medical Dictionary.  Oxford University Press, 2007.  Oxford Reference Online.  
Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  22 October 
2007  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t60.e1659 > 
635 Robert M. Veatch, Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution: Our Last Quest for Responsibility (New 
Haven Yale University Press, 1976), 39. 
636 Plum F.  Jennett B, Persistent vegetative state after brain damage: a syndrome in search of a name.  
Lancet 1972; 1:734–7.  As cited by Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept 
of Self Qua Experiential Subject," 53. 
637 "Cerebrum n."  Concise Medical Dictionary.  Oxford University Press, 2007.  Oxford Reference Online.  
Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  16 May 
2008  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t60.e1659> 
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responsible for initiating voluntary activity.  It has connections, direct or indirect, 
with all parts of the body.638   
In addition, the conclusion that the brain is indispensable for ensoulment is 
supported by the observation of its electrical activity via the electroencephalograph 
(EEG).639  While the brain’s states are indicated to be the immediate cause of the body’s 
activities, they are shown to correlate with mental states connected with volition.640  As 
Richard Swinburne puts it: 
The evidence of neurophysiology and psychology suggests most powerfully that the 
functioning of the soul depends on the operation of the brain…  When direct 
evidence shows that he is conscious, the electrical rhythm of a man's brain, his 
EEG, is found to have a certain pattern.  The EEG varies with the kind of 
consciousness—there is one kind of EEG rhythm for intense thought, another kind 
when a man is mentally inactive but awake, another kind when he is dreaming (as 
evidenced by his own testimony if woken up shortly afterwards); and there are 
different rhythms for sleep of different kinds, when the man has no recollection of 
dreaming (if woken up shortly afterwards).  EEG rhythms are thus indirect evidence 
of consciousness.641 
Therefore, the soul can be considered as the ultimate cause of any bodily activities 
while the brain is its device for putting them into effect.642  The procedure of any act can 
be modelled as follows: “(1) a volition ‘V’ to do ‘A’ occurs in the soul; (2) ‘V’ causes a 
 
638 "Cerebral cortex" Concise Medical Dictionary.  Oxford University Press, 2007.  Oxford Reference 
Online.  Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  22 October 
2007  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t60.e1649 
639 EEG is an abbreviation of the name of the machine that records the electrical activity of the brain as well 
as the name of the drawing it makes.  ("EEG abbrev" The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Eleventh 
edition revised.  Ed.  Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson.  Oxford University Press, 2006.  Oxford 
Reference Online.  Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  15 October 
2007  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t23.e17667  
640 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 52.   
641 Swinburne, the Evolution of the Soul, 174, 175.   
642 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 52. 
 171
5. Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus  
 
                                                
brain state ‘B’ that embodies that volition, and ‘B’ causes the body to perform the 
movements associated with ‘A’.”643  The brain here is held to be “…the locus of the 
causal connection between the soul and body.”644  The conclusion that can be drawn from 
this, is that having a brain is a necessary condition for ensoulment.   
Understanding bodily readiness as the acquisition of a brain is upheld in Islamic 
belief.  This is the position that Mohammed Na'im Yasin plausibly advocates: 
[T]he living human body, with the brain and other organs, is an intricate complex of 
vital apparatuses which are interwoven in a miraculous way, placed by the Great 
Creator in the service of a rational creature breathed by God into that intricate 
complex and known in Quran and Sunnah terminology as the spirit.  It … seems 
most likely that this spirit controls that living body in this life on earth through the 
brain, which, operated by it and reacting to its instruction, moves the other organs 
of the body, sending to them, or through them, the messages which the spirit wants 
to be received, which allows the spirit to go through what accumulates in the brain 
and draw conclusions and take decisions in the form of human behaviour.645      
Indeed, the justification of the adoption of brain death into Islamic jurisprudence 
revolves around the concept of the brain being the device the soul uses in performing its 
intentional and rational activities.  However, those jurists have not specified clearly, as in 
my opinion they should, that the cessation of the cortical brain not that of the entire brain 
is what should matter.646 
  The previous description shows that it is the cortical brain or cortex, rather than 
the whole brain, which is responsible for actualising soul-related functions.  Therefore, 
 
643 Ibid. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
389.  
646 See for example, Ibid., 375, 395.   
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bodily readiness should be understood as the acquisition of the cortical brain.  Yet, the 
brainstem is claimed to be extremely important for the soul’s functions and so should also 
be considered when the moment of ensoulment is being determined.  Indeed, the 
brainstem is necessary for the ordinary operation of the respiratory and cardiovascular 
systems that are indispensable for conscious life.647  In addition, since the brainstem’s role 
in transferring information between the spinal cord and the cortical brain is indispensable 
for performing all physical acts, it is said to be necessary for all independent acts.648  
Furthermore, the brainstem plays a crucial part in the capacity of consciousness per se.649  
That is to say, it regulates a series of wakefulness and sleep, and since the former is 
essential for the higher operations of conscious life, besides constituting the very state of 
being conscious, the brainstem is deemed essential for consciousness.650  This is also 
proven through the fact that going into permanent coma is the usual result of any severe 
injury caused to the area of brainstem responsible for that function.651           
However, though undeniable, the importance of the brainstem for soul-related 
functions is indirect.  As the regulator of cardiovascular operation, its importance is 
comparable to that of the heart: without the heart no biological life and so conscious life 
is possible, yet the heart does not give rise to consciousness.  The same is true of the role 
of the brainstem.  Likewise, though transmitting information between the spinal cord and 
higher brain is essential for sense perception and conscious faculties, this function of the 
 
647 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 53. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Though consciousness and soul are not the same thing, they are intimately connected for no 
consciousness is possible without soul.  See Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization,” 
103.   
650 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 53, 54. 
651 Ibid., 54. 
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brainstem causes none of these faculties.  Furthermore, the brainstem’s role in regulating 
the series of wakefulness and sleep is described as being like that of the light switch: 
despite being essential for turning the light on, it gives no rise to the light itself.  
Similarly, while the brainstem operates to switch consciousness on, it, in itself, engenders 
no consciousness.652  Thus, the brainstem’s importance for cognition and volition is not 
comparable to that of the cortical brain. 
The previous discussion shows that the cortical brain can be concluded as the 
immediate cause of cognitional and volitional functions, while the soul is their ultimate 
cause.  As such, bodily readiness for ensoulment should be understood as the acquisition 
of the cortical brain not just the brainstem.  However, despite being necessary for 
ensoulment, bodily readiness is not sufficient for it.  That is to say, bodily readiness 
means that ensoulment can happen but not necessarily that it actually will happen.  In the 
following, another principle that can help identify when ensoulment occurs will be 
explained. 
5.1.1.2 The principle of the indicatory role of the soul-related functions 
As mentioned above, the fact that the body is ready to receive the soul does not 
necessarily mean that the soul infuses it.  Thus, the ensoulment moment cannot be simply 
equated to the physical stage at which the body is ready to acquire the soul.  However, the 
solution can be found in another principle that can be formed through examining the 
previous religious and philosophical discussions of the nature of being human.  This 
principle is that since volitional and cognitional functions are the effects of the soul, they 
can be used as conclusive evidence of its existence.  In other words, these functions find 
 
652 Ibid. 
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their seat in the soul and so, when observed, they indicate the existence of the soul.  The 
reverse is also true, so that when complete and permanent, the disappearance of these 
functions indicates the non-existence of the soul.  It follows that, though physically 
undetectable, the soul can be detected through its functions.653  Accordingly, the first 
perceived volitional or cognitional activity should be regarded as a sign of the ensoulment 
moment.   
This principle is based on the clear distinction made in Shari’a between two types 
of activities the body performs.  On the one hand, there are volitional and cognitional 
activities that are attributed to the human or rational soul.  On the other, there are 
reflexive activities that are not expressions of the soul, and so have no bearing on 
determining its existence or non-existence.  It is conceivable that the body performs 
simultaneously both types of activities as in the case of normal adult human beings.  It is 
also equally conceivable that it performs only reflexive functions.  If complete and 
permanent, the absence of the non-reflexive functions is considered definite proof of the 
absence of the soul.  The human being is said to have died if the soul’s absence happened 
after it had existed in the body, while no human being can be said to have existed if the 
soul has never permeated the body.  The mere appearance of non-rational and non-
voluntary functions in this case is an expression of life stripped of the description of being 
human in the moral sense.654   
 
653 This is sufficient grounds for me to rely on the concept of ensoulment to ascertain the moral and legal 
status of the foetus despite the difficulty involved in determining how and when it takes place.  Indicating 
this difficulty, Margaret Brazier says that: “[w]e may not know (and I suspect can never now) when and 
how that soul enters the embryo.”  Brazier, "Embryo' "Rights": Abortion and Research ", 13. 
654 Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
385, 386.   
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The previous discussion suggests accurately that there can be two types of life 
existing in a human body.  Indeed, this possibility is known to Moslem scholars.  
However, only a life of cognition and volition is regarded as human in the moral sense.  
One that is stripped of cognition and volition is deemed many things except being morally 
human.655  For example, Muhammad Hasnain Makhlouf differentiates between pre- and 
post-ensoulment life.  While he admits the existence of pre-ensoulment-life in entities 
descendent from human parents, he describes it as being  merely a natural life, similar to 
that of plants, in that the entity is subject to bodily development in both quantity and 
quality.  It is only a life of growth and nourishment.  By contrast, post-ensoulment life is 
one of cognition, discernment, sensation and volition, the qualities that make it human 
life.656  
The distinction made in Shari’a between the two types of life, human and non-
human, is not merely theoretical.  Rather, it is applied with regard to what is known as 
‘joint murder in succession’,657 which occurs when a victim encounters a lethal attack 
followed by another attack, from a different person, that speeds up the victim’s death.  
The question posed concerns who is responsible for the murder and so should be 
subjected to the retaliation, the murderer’s punishment.658  Scholars have agreed that the 
murderer is the one who causes the victim to lose entirely and permanently all senses and 
 
655 Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb 
al-ʿlmyt," 74.  Vegetative, cellular, and animal are examples of descriptions given to the type of life 
mentioned above. Ibid.   
 656 Mḥmd Hsnyn Mkhlwf. Al-Mṭālb al-Qdsyh fy Aḥkām al-Rwḥ w Athārhā al-
Kwnyh (Cairo: Shrkh Mṣṭfā al-Bāby al-Hlby 1963), 2nd edition, ṭ2, page 
95.  As cited by Ibid. 
657 Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
382, 383. 
658 Retaliation, or qisas as known in Arabic, is similar to the biblical principle of an eye for an eye. In the 
case of murder, it means the right of the heirs of a murder victim to demand execution of the murderer. See 
"qisas"   Oxford Dictionary of Islam. John L. Esposito, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2003. Oxford 
Reference Online. Oxford University Press.   Lancaster University.  17 August 
2008  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t125.e1931> 
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voluntary actions.  If that one is the first attacker, then he or she must be subjected to the 
retaliation while the second one should then also be punished, but for disrespecting the 
deceased.659   
This understanding is apparent in many Moslem jurists’ writings.  For example, 
according to Badr Al-Din Al-Zarkashi:  
Stable life is when the spirit, and with it voluntary, not merely involuntary, 
movement is in the body, as the case of a human being whose intestines are spilled 
out by a criminal or a beast of prey.  No retaliation is carried out against such a 
criminal.  If a human being is stabbed by another and the victim’s death is 
confirmed within an hour or a day, retaliation in this case is the due punishment of 
the criminal, because the victim’s life is stable and he is able to move voluntarily at 
all the time of the crime ...  [this is not the case] if the intestines of the victim are 
exposed, because respiratory tract is damaged and movement is no longer 
voluntary.  As for life in the “slaughtered person’s movement” stage, it is that 
which has no eyesight, utterance, or voluntary movement …660 
Therefore, it can be concluded that volitional and cognitional functions are accepted as 
conclusive evidence of the soul’s existence, and so, when detected, they prove without 
doubt the existence of the soul.  However, it is important to clarify what is meant by 
volitional or cognitional activity.   
As previously established, the soul is the seat of all mental activities including 
those distinctive of persons, such as moral agency.  Hence, its existence can be 
determined without doubt through the detection of any of these activities, regardless of 
how rudimentary they are.  Therefore, in spite of the fact that the capacity for moral 
 
659 Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
382, 383.. 
660 Badr Al-Din Al-Zarkashi, Al-Manthur fi Al-Qaw’ed; vol.  2, First Edition (Kuwait: Ministry of 
Endowment Publications, 1402., 1982 A.D.  pp.  105 off.  As cited by Ibid., 383. 
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agency is the chosen criterion for personality, there is no need to detect the existence of 
any of its precedents even in a primitive sense at this stage.  It is sufficient for the aim of 
determining the timing of the ensoulment event to detect the first mental activity to occur, 
regardless of its relationship to the capacity for moral agency.  This leads to the need to 
discuss consciousness as a determiner of the timing of the ensoulment event.   
5.1.2 Consciousness as the indicator of the timing of the ensoulment event  
Choosing consciousness as an indication of ensoulment is a result of combining 
the previously discussed philosophical and scientific principles.  The first principle is that 
ensoulment cannot take place unless the body becomes ready to execute the soul’s 
functions.  Since these functions are of a volitional and cognitional nature, this readiness 
is achieved when the cortical brain, as the organ responsible for executing such functions, 
is formed.661  However, since the acquisition of bodily readiness is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for ensoulment, the latter cannot simply be equated with the former.  
Here the principle of the indicatory role of the soul-based functions comes to the fore.  
According to this principle, these functions indicate without any doubt the presence of the 
soul, and therefore the first to be detected can be used as an indication of ensoulment.  
This first one happens to be consciousness.662 
The fact that consciousness is the first mental activity to occur is sufficient for 
using it as the indicator of the ensoulment event.  Consciousness has been held for various 
reasons to be significant in conferring personality.  For example, some commentators 
 
661 See  5.1.1.1 The principle of bodily readiness. 
662 The type of consciousness meant here is the most basic one, i.e. consciousness as an experience of 
sensational content.  In explaining this type of consciousness and discriminating it from representational 
consciousness, the latter being more complicated and advanced, see J. A. Burgess and S. A. Tawia, "When 
Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness," Bioethics 10, no. 1 
(1996): 1-26, 4, 5.   
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have justified this by referring to consciousness as being the capacity that makes life 
meaningful and worth living, hence, it is the criterion upon which personality is based.663  
Others refer to it as being the basis upon which higher order capacities can be enjoyed.664  
For instance, Himma considers consciousness as a necessary condition for the enjoyment 
of moral agency.665  Nevertheless, I see no need to adopt such justifications.  The simple 
fact that it is, firstly, mental activity and so can be produced only by the soul, and 
secondly, that it is the first mental activity to occur, is sufficient reason for using 
consciousness as an indication of the soul’s existence.  It therefore has no bearing on the 
plausibility of the forthcoming discussion of the beginning of consciousness that it, 
consciousness, may turn out to be insignificant for the acquisition of personality or any 
higher mental capacities.   
In addition to the philosophical principles, the use of consciousness as the 
indicator of the timing of the ensoulment event is justified by scientific principles.  As 
concluded earlier in this chapter, bodily readiness means acquiring the cortical brain or 
the cortex as the organ necessary for performing soul-related functions.  Two results 
follow from this conclusion.  The first is that the structure that must develop before the 
ensoulment event can take place should be understood as that of the cortex.  The second 
result is that the activity indicative of that event must be cortical.  These results are 
significant in ascertaining the beginning of consciousness, hence the ensoulment timing, 
as will be presently explained.  
 
663 Ibid., 1, 2.  Glannon, "Tracing the Soul: Medical Decisions at the Margins of Life," 53.  In his words, 
“… personhood consists in the capacity for consciousness and mental life.” 
664 In mentioning this idea, see D. G. Jones, "Brain Birth and Personal Identity”, British Medical Journal 
15, no. 4 (1989): 173-178, 173, 174.   
665 K. Himma, "Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral Agency: What Properties Must 
an Artificial Agent Have to Be a Moral Agent?" in Seventh International Computer Ethics Conference 
(University of San Diego, USA: Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. (SSRN), 2007). Retrieved from 
http://cepe2007.sandiego.edu at 12/11/2007.   
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Then, being the first mental activity to occur, consciousness is the best candidate 
for ascertaining the timing of the ensoulment event.  The aim of the following discussion 
is to determine the beginning of consciousness as a way of determining the timing of the 
ensoulment event.   
5.1.3 Determining the beginning of consciousness  
Consciousness, as previously argued, is the first mental activity to occur and so 
the best candidate for ascertaining the time when the soul, as the ultimate seat of all 
mental activities, infuses the body.  Determining the beginning of consciousness is, 
therefore, a necessary step towards determining the timing of the ensoulment event.  I will 
propose that the beginning of consciousness, and hence, the ensoulment event, takes place 
at the twentieth week of gestational age.666  With the aim of proving this claim, I will 
discuss the different methods of determining the existence of conscious experience, and 
how the previously explained fact that the cortex is the locus of all mental activities can 
help in this regard.  Following that, I will discuss the variable suggested points for 
 
666 The age of the foetus can be articulated in different ways.  Its age taken from conception onwards is 
called the gestational age (Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the 
Beginning of Human Consciousness," 11), or the Conceptional age (W. A. William A. Engle, "A 
Recommendation for the Definition Of "Late Preterm" (near-Term) and the Birth Weight-Gestational Age 
Classification System," Seminars in perinatology 30, no. 1 (2006): 2-7, 4).  The age counted from the day 
of the last menstrual cycle is called the menstrual age (Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to 
Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness," 10, 11).  In this research, the term gestational 
age will be used to denote the age of the foetus from conception onwards while the term menstrual age will 
be used to refer to the age taken from the last menstrual period.  The conception timing and so the 
gestational age is determined through calculating the menstrual age: it is assumed that the menstrual cycle is 
twenty eight days on average and that ovulation occurs on the fourteenth day.  Since ovulation is shortly 
followed by conception, it is often taken as a proxy for the conception time.  So, the gestational age is the 
menstrual age minus two weeks.  (C. D. Lynch and J. Zhang, "The Research Implications of the Selection 
of a Gestational Age Estimation Method”, Paediatric and perinatal epidemiology 21, no.  Suppl 2 (2007): 
86-96, 86, 87.  Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of 
Human Consciousness," 11.  Engle, "A Recommendation for the Definition of "Late Preterm" (near-Term) 
and the Birth Weight-Gestational Age Classification System”, 4).  In this chapter, since the concern is about 
the development of the foetus and when certain structural and functional elements throughout this 
development occur, the age of the foetus will be taken as that from conception, i.e. the gestational age.  So, 
the twentieth week mentioned in the text above means the twentieth week after conception.   
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allocating the beginning of consciousness, and select the twentieth week of gestational 
age as the most plausible one.  Different philosophical and religious considerations will 
be used to justify this selection. 
The two methods utilised by conventional psychology to identify the existence of 
conscious experience are a little problematic in terms of ascertaining the beginning of 
consciousness.  The first method takes the form of one’s contemplation of their own 
personal experience and can be called the first person method.667  The difficulty 
associated with this method is that it gives us knowledge about our own current 
experience while past experience, which is what matters here, can be accessed only via 
memory.  Clearly, the memory cannot be fully trusted since it frequently misleads about 
recent incidents let alone those that might have occurred during prenatal life.  As a result, 
the earliest remembered conscious experience is not necessarily the very first.668        
The second method for identifying the existence of conscious experience also has 
its own inherent problems.  It takes the form of observing and interpreting others’ 
behaviour, and can be called the third person method.669  Its first difficulty is that the 
interpretation of others’ behaviour can mislead even with regard to adults, let alone 
foetuses.670  The other problem is that it is crucial when interpreting others’ behaviour that 
the interpreter be aware of what it is like to be in their position: how it feels to be an adult 
or to remember how it felt to be a child.  How can they know what it is like to be a foetus 
 
667 Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness," 6.   
668 Ibid.  Swinburne, the Evolution of the Soul, 175.   
669 Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness," 6.  Though Swinburne does not use the terms first person and third person methods, he 
adopts a similar classification.  Swinburne, the Evolution of the Soul, 174, 175.   
670 Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness," 6.   
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while the only access to that is through dubious memory?671 It is also difficult to assess 
how it might be possible to distinguish between foetal behaviour occurring because of 
spinal reflexes or brainstem activity, and that resulting from, or engaging, the cortex.672  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the foetus’s behaviour has no credibility at all as an 
indicator of consciousness.   
It is contended that foetal behaviour can be used to ascertain the beginning of 
consciousness when observed and interpreted in the light of the relationship between the 
cortex and mental activity.  This relationship is formed by the cortex as the direct locus of 
all types of mental activity, with the soul being the ultimate one, or, to put it the way 
Burgess and Tawia do, mental activity is supervenient on the cortex:  
([M]ental) facts about human consciousness are supervenient on (physical) facts 
about the human central nervous system – more specifically, they are (at least 
largely) supervenient on facts about the cerebral cortex.673 
As a result, the mental activity of consciousness is impossible without a functioning 
cortex.  Since this functionality is, in turn, impossible in the absence of the required 
physical structure, it can be concluded that consciousness is also impossible in the 
absence of that structure.  Accordingly, no foetal behaviour detected while the required 
structure is absent can be interpreted as being indicative of a conscious state. 
As for the cortex, the required structure is the formation and function of the 
thalamus.  It is the part of the brain responsible for transmitting afferent signals between 
the spinal cord and the other components of the central nervous system, the cortex 
 
671 Ibid. 
672 Ibid. 
673 Ibid., 2. 
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included.  As such, its integrative function is indispensable for sensational consciousness.  
Such a function, and in turn consciousness, is unattainable before the synapses or 
connections between the thalamus and the cortex are not only in place but also 
functioning.  Since the earliest time such functioning connections are detected is roughly 
around the twentieth week, this date could be considered as the earliest stage at which 
consciousness is possible.674  The twentieth week, then, is the threshold from which 
consciousness is possible, or, put another way, it is the point before which consciousness 
is impossible.  As a result, no foetal behaviour detected prior to that time can be 
interpreted as being indicative of a conscious state.675     
However, although it is helpful to exclude confidently any possibility that 
consciousness may start before the twentieth week, and accordingly dismiss any 
behaviour detected prior to that time, this does not help identify the date at which 
consciousness actually starts.  The existence of the physical structure per se does not 
mean that any foetal behaviour detected can be interpreted as being indicative of 
conscious states; structure, after all, is not synonymous with function.  Therefore, the 
question remains about when consciousness begins.   
 
674 R. Brusseau and L. Myers, "Developing Consciousness: Fetal Anesthesia and Analgesia," Seminars in 
Anesthesia, Perioperative Medicine and Pain 25, no. 4 (2006): 189-195, 191.  In a similar manner, Shannon 
and Wolter state that “[t]he biological data suggest that the minimal time of the presence of a rational nature 
would be around the 20th week, when neural integration of the entire organism has been established.  The 
presence of such a structure does not argue that the fetus is positing rational actions, only that the biological 
presupposition for such actions is present.”  (Thomas A Shannon and Allan B Wolter.  "Reflections on the 
Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo.”  Theological Studies 51, no. 4 (1990): 603-626, 620.)  On a similar basis, 
J.  Korein concludes that "as a lower limit, brain life can not begin earlier than the twentieth week."  (J. 
Korein, "Ontogenesis of the Fetal Nervous System: The Onset of Brain Life," Transplant Proc 22, no. 3 
(1990): 982-983, 983.)  (Emphasis his).  Similar statements are cited in J. Rubenfeld, "On the Legal Status 
of the Proposition That "Life Begins at Conception"," Stanford Law Review 43, no. 3 (1991): 599-635, 624.   
675 Foetal movements have been detected through ultrasound about 5.5 weeks of gestation.  De Vries J.I.P., 
Visser G.H.A. and Prechtl H.F.R.: ‘The Emergence of Fetal Behaviour.  I.  Qualitative Aspects’, Early 
Human Development, 1982: pp.301-322.  As cited by Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to 
Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness," 10.   
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Once again, recalling that consciousness is supervenient on the cortex will help 
identify when conscious experience first begins.  It begins with the initiation of cortical 
functions, or “…the beginning of ‘cortical life,’” as Burgess and Tawia call it.676  In other 
words, the first activity detected in the cortex signifies the first mental activity to occur, 
i.e. consciousness: “…we first become conscious when the cortical events on which 
consciousness is (largely) supervenient first begin to occur.”677    
However, the term ‘activity in the cortex’ or ‘cortical activity’ may be used to 
denote two different things.  First, it may be used to refer to any activity that occurs in the 
cortex regardless of whether that activity is merely developmental, such as cell division, 
migration, differentiation, and growth, or electrical activity.678  This meaning is, 
nevertheless, not intended.  The second meaning of cortical activity, which is the right 
one, is that of the same type of activity that the cortical brains of adult human beings 
perform or, at least, a rudimentary non-differentiated antecedent of that activity.679  
Nonetheless, the question that arises is how it can be determined whether types of 
electrical activity detected in prenatal cortices, if there any, are uncontentiously of same 
type of activity that the cortical brains of adult human beings perform or, at least, a 
rudimentary non-differentiated antecedent of that activity.  The answer lies in the 
correlation noted by neurophysiologists and psychologists between conscious states and 
cortical brain activity.  Each conscious state is said to correlate with a particular type of 
electrical cortical activity.  Burgess states that “[i]n neuropsychology, it is regarded as 
 
676 Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness," 3.  Emphasis theirs.   
677 Ibid.  Emphasis theirs.   
678 Ibid., 18.  This understanding of the functioning cortex is the main reason, according to them, behind 
locating the first conscious experience at unacceptably earlier stages.  Ibid., 18, 19.   
679 Ibid., 18. 
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uncontentious that there is a link, close enough to amount to supervenience, between 
genuine behavioural evidence of consciousness and electrical activity in the cortex which 
can be measured by an EEG.”680  This view is widely held and, summing up the evidence, 
Swinburne argues that:  
When direct evidence shows that he is conscious, the electrical rhythm of a man's 
brain, his EEG, is found to have a certain pattern.  The EEG varies with the kind of 
consciousness—there is one kind of EEG rhythm for intense thought, another kind 
when a man is mentally inactive but awake, another kind when he is dreaming (as 
evidenced by his own testimony if woken up shortly afterwards); and there are 
different rhythms for sleep of different kinds, when the man has no recollection of 
dreaming (if woken up shortly afterwards).  EEG rhythms are thus indirect evidence 
of consciousness.681    
Foetal behaviour can, then, be used to identify when consciousness first begins when 
looked upon in the light of cortical EEG readings.  The first foetal movement that can be 
seen as conscious is that which is correlated with an EEG rhythm associated with a 
conscious state.682  As a result, prenatal cortical EEGs should be scrutinised in order to 
detect the first foetal conscious state.   
Using EEGs to identify the beginning of consciousness is constrained by two 
considerations.  The first is that no electrical activity detected before the twentieth week 
of gestational age can be used as an indication of any conscious states.  The reason is that 
none of these states is thought to be possible before the acquisition of the necessary 
 
680 Ibid., 8.     
681 Swinburne, the Evolution of the Soul, 175.   
682 Using EEG readings is an indirect way of identifying consciousness; however, unlike the lack of 
certainty the description ‘indirect’ may imply, these readings could be used to question and even correct 
conclusions concerning consciousness drawn by virtue of ‘direct’ methods.  For further explanation, see 
Ibid. 
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physical structure at the twentieth week.683  The second consideration is that from the 
twentieth week onwards, EEG patterns should be read and analysed in the light of the 
knowledge of adult cortical activity, which is paradigmatically indicative of conscious 
states.684   
Doing so has led to locating the first cortical activity that can be considered to 
correlate with a conscious experience at around one of two points, these being the 
twentieth or the thirtieth weeks.  Choosing the twentieth week is the position held by 
several researchers,685 and was the basis for the proposed Unborn Child Pain Awareness 
Act of 2005 in the US,686 which is claimed to be based on scientific facts about 
sensational consciousness.687  Yet, this position has been heavily criticised on the basis 
 
 
683 See page 182 above. 
684 Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness," 7. 
685 Swinburne, the Evolution of the Soul, 176.  After excluding the possibility that consciousness may start 
instantaneously after conception due to the lack of the required infrastructure and the absence of any bodily 
actions indicative of feeling, thinking, or purposings, he concludes that, “[t]he evidence suggests that 
consciousness originates when the foetus has a brain with the kind of electrical rhythms characteristic of 
consciousness, viz. about twenty weeks after conception (the time of quickening, the first muscle 
movements, which are probably connected with the first brain activity).”  See also G. B. Gertler, "Brain 
Birth: A Proposal for Defining When a Fetus Is Entitled to Human Life Status," Southern California Law 
Review 59, no. 5 (1986): 1061-1078, 1067.  Brusseau and Myers consider the twentieth week as well as the 
thirtieth one as the possible starting points of consciousness Brusseau and Myers, "Developing 
Consciousness: Fetal Anesthesia and Analgesia," 189.   
686 Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005) Retrieved from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-51 at 16/12/ 2007.  According to this proposed act, 
which failed to pass ((NRLC), National Right to Life Committee.  "National Right to Life Statement on 
U.S. House Vote on Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act”, retrieved from 
http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/Fetal_Pain/HouseVoteStatement120606.html, at 16/12/07), abortionists would 
be required to inform women seeking an abortion that their foetuses from the twentieth week onwards feel 
unbearable pain during an abortion.  Under sec.  2 entitled ‘Findings’, it says, “Congress makes the 
following findings: (1) At least 20 weeks after fertilization, an unborn child has the physical structures 
necessary to experience pain.  (2) There is substantial evidence that by 20 weeks after fertilization, unborn 
children draw away from certain stimuli in a manner which in an infant or an adult would be interpreted as 
a response to pain.  Anesthesia is routinely administered to unborn children who have developed 20 weeks 
or more past fertilization who undergo prenatal surgery. 
(4) There is substantial evidence that the abortion methods most commonly used 20 weeks after fertilization 
cause substantial pain to an unborn child.”  Therefore, the proposed Act dictates abortion providers to 
inform women seeking abortion about their foetuses capacity to feel pain and the possibility of reducing it 
via administrating anaesthesia and other pain-reducing drugs. 
687 Ibid. Anand KJS: A scientific appraisal of fetal pain and conscious sensory perception.  Written 
testimony offered to the Constitution Subcommittee of the U.S.  House of Representatives, U.S.  House 
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that EEG readings from the cortex at this stage are “…extremely rudimentary and occurs 
only briefly and intermittently.”688  This indicates, according to some researchers, the 
absence of any conscious states,689 while it indicates to others that these readings account 
for nothing but a mere precursor of sleep states, and so the foetus cannot be claimed to be 
conscious at that time.690  
The other point at which the first conscious experience is said to be located is the 
thirtieth week of gestational age.  This is claimed to be the time when EEG readings 
become noticeably more continuous, and precursors of sleep-wakefulness cycles grow.691  
It is also claimed to be the time when readings considered as the first processors of a 
waking state emerge.692  Therefore, this should be chosen as the starting point of 
consciousness,693 as it is claimed that most researchers have already done.694  
Of these two points, the twentieth week of gestational age is for various reasons 
the most plausible one.  First of all, the criticism levelled at choosing this point seems 
unsound.  The discontinuity noted in the EEG rhythms detected in foetuses’ cortices, is 
not a sufficient basis for denying their enjoyment of any conscious states.  The reason is 
that similar discontinuity has been noted in the EEGs rhythms of ordinary full-term 
 
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th United States Congress on October 1, 2005.  Retrieved from 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/anand110105.pdf  at 16/12/2007. 
688 Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness," 24. 
689 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 53.   
690 Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness," 23.   
691 Ibid.   
692 Ibid. 
693 Ibid., 23, 24.   
694 Himma, "A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential 
Subject,” 53.  
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children, without being accompanied by any cortical death symptoms.695  Obviously, this 
proves that such discontinuity per se has no bearing on the issue of deciding on the 
existence or non-existence of conscious states.  It cannot therefore be used to strip the 
twentieth week foetal cortical EEG rhythms of their plausibility as determiners of the 
existence of conscious states.   
In addition, the criticism that electrical readings indicative of consciousness at the 
twentieth week are rudimentary, can be refuted in the light of the soul-body relationship.  
The soul has, in an ultimate sense, all capacities persons enjoy, including consciousness, 
and so from the moment of ensoulment the being acquires them.  However, actualising 
these capacities is contingent on the body’s development and is proportionate to it.  It is 
understandable, then, that while the soul with all its ultimate capacities is embodied at the 
twentieth week of gestational age, consciousness, as one of these capacities, is still at a 
very primitive stage because of the rudimentary developmental stage of the body at that 
time.   
Furthermore, there are non-scientific considerations that can support the choice of 
the twentieth week as the starting-point for consciousness, and hence the timing of the 
ensoulment event.696  These considerations are mainly based on Shari’a as the yardstick 
 
 
695 In mentioning this fact, see Burgess and Tawia, "When Did You First Begin to Feel It?--Locating the 
Beginning of Human Consciousness," 22.   
696 The exclusion of scientific considerations is due to the fact that the issue seems, so far, irresolvable from 
that angle.  Citing an example may clarify this claim.  When ‘the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 
2005’ was proposed, on the basis of claimed scientific findings that foetuses have the capacity for 
experiencing pain from the twentieth week onwards, the American Medical Association (AMA) issued in 
August 2005 a report based on a multi-disciplinary review of foetal pain studies which deduced that a 
foetus cannot consciously suffer pain before reaching the age of twenty nine to thirty weeks.  In their words, 
“[e]vidence regarding the capacity for fetal pain is limited but indicates that fetal perception of pain is 
unlikely before the third trimester”.  S. J. Lee et al., "Fetal Pain a Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of 
the Evidence”, (Am Med Assoc, 2005), 947 & 952.  Also, A. A. Wenger, "Fetal Pain Legislation”, Journal 
of Legal Medicine 27, no. 4 (2006): 459-476, 460.  However, other scientists unsatisfied by the reply 
criticized it and concluded that “[f]etal development … provide[s] the substrate and mechanisms for 
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against which theories and views discussed in this thesis are being measured.  The first of 
these considerations is the concept of a teleological universe.  As previously mentioned, 
everything, from the Islamic perspective, is seen as being created for an aim that gives it 
value and meaning.697  The human body and soul are no exception; each needs the other in 
order to realise its meaningful existence.  Ensoulment becomes, therefore, inevitable once 
bodily readiness is achieved and it makes no sense in a teleological world to claim 
otherwise.  This readiness, as earlier established, is achieved at the twentieth week.   
Another supporting consideration is the concept known in Shari’a as Haream al-
Rouh, or the sanctity of soul, which has been introduced by some jurists when discussing 
the legitimacy of abortion.  These jurists have argued that abortion should be legitimised 
up to the time of the ensoulment event because the foetus is not yet a human being.  Since 
this time, according to their understanding of the tradition, is after one hundred and 
twenty days of gestational age, abortion is regarded as legitimate up to that date.  
However, they have concluded that abortion should be prohibited forty days prior to that 
date, i.e. up to eighty days of gestational age, in case of any miscalculation that may occur 
regarding gestational age and lead to aborting an already ensouled foetus.698  This would 
amount to the killing of a human being, which is equivalent, according to the Qur’an, to 
the killing of all humanity:  
 
conscious pain perception during the second trimester, but not in the first trimester and before the third 
trimester of human gestation.”  (K.J.S.  Anand, A scientific appraisal of fetal pain and conscious sensory 
perception (2005) Written testimony offered to the Constitution Subcommittee of the U.S.  House of 
Representatives, U.S.  House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th United States Congress on October 1.  
Retrieved from http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/anand110105.pdf  at 10/01/2008. 
697 See  3.1.2 The human beings’ raison d’être. 
698 Al-Ramli, Nihayat Nihayat al-Muhtaj, Matba’t al-Babi al- Halabi bi-Miser.  Vol.  2.  P 416.  As cited by 
Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb 
al-ʿlmyt.”  115. 
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We decreed for the Children of Israel that whosoever killeth a human being for 
other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all 
mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of 
all mankind.699 
 Therefore, out of caution these jurists have considered the soul to be embodied at the 
eightieth day and so treated the foetus as a human being from that time.700  
This way of reasoning is similar to that known as the doctrine of tutiorism, which, 
according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, is:  
 The system of moral theology according to which, in cases of doubt, the ‘safer 
opinion’ (i.e. that in favour of the moral principle) must be followed unless there is 
a degree of probability amounting to moral certitude in the ‘less safe opinion’ (i.e. 
that against the principle).701  
Accordingly, whenever there is uncertainty or doubt, one should choose the morally safer 
course of action.  Derived from this tutioristic way of thinking is “the Precautionary 
Principle” that is widely applied in ethical debates.702  Following this way of reasoning 
with regard to human or personal life requires that “…one should not resolve doubts 
probabilistically if the life of a (possible) person is at risk.  As long as there is doubt, one 
may not risk taking a human life.”703  For example, a hunter has an obligation not to shoot 
 
 
699 5: 32.  In a similar meaning, see Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy 
Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb al-ʿlmyt.”  115, 116. 
700 Al-Ramli, Nihayat Nihayat al-Muhtaj, Matba’t al-Babi al- Halabi bi-Miser.  Vol.  2.  P 416.  As cited by 
Yasin, Haqiqat al-Janin: 115.   
701 "Tutiorism" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.  Ed.  E.  A.  Livingstone.  Oxford 
University Press, 2006.  Oxford Reference Online.  Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  19 
March 008  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t95.e5903> 
702 Barbara Skorupinski, "Putting Precaution to Debate–About the Precautionary Principle and Participatory 
Technology Assessment”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 15, no. 1 (2002): 87-102, 89. 
703 Knut W. Ruyter, "Embryos as Moral Subjects and Limits of Responsibility”, in Conceiving the Embryo, 
ed. Donald Evans (The Hague, London, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), 181.  It is noteworthy 
that some ethicists have used a tutioristic way of thinking to solve the issue of the status of the foetus.  For 
them, whenever there is reasonable doubt about the status of the foetus, erring on the safe side requires 
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if they are in doubt whether the moving thing at the edge of the wood is an animal or a 
human being.704  Likewise, if a pharmacist is uncertain whether the content of a bottle is 
the medicine indicated on its label, they are obliged to refrain from giving it to a 
customer.705  Both are obliged to follow the most secure course of action to protect human 
or personal life.   
Following this tutioristic or cautious way of reasoning requires choosing the 
twentieth week of gestational age as the starting point for consciousness, hence the timing 
of the ensoulment event.  Because the twentieth week is accepted as one of the two 
possible starting points for consciousness, there is a possibility that we might be dealing 
with a person from that moment on.  Therefore, erring on the side of caution requires 
considering this possibility and adopting the twentieth week datum rather than the 
thirtieth week.  Choosing the latter instead would potentially endanger personal life that 
might be in existence ten weeks earlier which is an intolerable result.706  Therefore, it is 
safer to choose the twentieth week as the starting point for consciousness and so 
ensoulment.   
What is more, the very rationale behind the concept of Haream al-Rouh is still 
valid and can be used to add a safety margin to the twentieth week datum.  Despite the 
 
treating it as a person (Norman, Ford, Ethics, Science and Embryo: weighing the evidence [letter] The 
Tablet 13 Januray 1990, p.  46.  As cited by Ruyter, "Embryos as Moral Subjects and Limits of 
Responsibility”, 182).  However, while a detailed discussion of this idea is beyond the scope of this 
research, it is important to emphasise that no such reasonable doubt about the status of the foetus is held in 
this research and so there is no need to rely on this concept to attribute moral or legal personality to the 
foetus.  The only reasonable doubt is that about the accuracy of calculating the age of the foetus and it is, 
indeed, taken into account by adding a safety margin to the estimated age (see page 193 below).  
704 Ruyter, "Embryos as Moral Subjects and Limits of Responsibility”, 182. 
705 Ibid. 
706 There are two assumptions here.  First, personality is conferred at the beginning of consciousness, the 
latter being a proxy for the timing of the ensoulment event and so foetuses prior to that beginning are non-
persons.  Second, abortion is likely to be legitimised before having personality and its associated rights and 
protection.  See  2.2.1 The importance of the status of the foetus.   
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scientific advancement in methods of calculating the age of the foetus, they are still far 
from being perfect.  Summarising these methods and their limitations, Courtney D.  
Lynch and Jun Zhang say that:   
There are three primary methods of gestational age estimation: dating based on last 
menstrual period (LMP), ultrasound-based dating and neonatal estimates.  …  
Limitations associated with the use of menstrual-based dating include reporting 
problems such as uncertainty regarding the LMP date, possibly due to bleeding not 
associated with menses, as well as concerns about the incidence of delayed 
ovulation, which can result in invalid estimates of gestation, even for women with 
certain LMP dates.  …  To calculate gestational age with the use of ultrasound, fetal 
measurements are compared with a gestational age-specific reference.  The primary 
limitation of this method is the fact that the gestational age estimates of 
symmetrically large or small fetuses will be biased.  Further, given that ultrasound 
references were developed using pregnancies that were dated according to reliable 
LMP dates, they are potentially biased in the same direction as dates calculated 
according to LMP.  Neonatal estimates of gestational age have been shown to be the 
least precise dating method.707  
Therefore, there is still a possibility that a foetus’s age might be miscalculated.  As put by 
the ProLife Alliance, “[e]ven with today’s sophisticated diagnostic tools we still cannot 
be 100% accurate in assessing gestational age, with significant margins of error 
acknowledged as many studies have highlighted.”708  As one of these studies has shown, 
“[b]eyond 20 weeks, accuracy of ultrasonic gestational age assessment is limited to ± 10-
 
707 Lynch and Zhang, "The Research Implications of the Selection of a Gestational Age Estimation 
Method”, 5.  For how the age of the foetus from fertilisation is calculated, see supra fn.  666.   
708 ProLife Alliance (PLA), "Memorandum 6”, in Scientific developments relating to the Abortion Act 1967 
evidence (London: House of Commons Science & Technology Select Committee, 2007), 37. 
 192
5. Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus  
 
                                                
14 days.  A fetus deemed to be 22+ weeks may therefore be more mature than expected 
and viable.”709 
 Erring on the safe side, as in the core theme of the concept of Haream al-Rouh, 
requires considering a safety margin when the age of the foetus is being calculated.  This 
safety margin should be equivalent to the margin of error associated with calculating 
gestational age.  Since the margin of error can be up to two weeks,710 an eighteen-week- 
old foetus should be considered as if it were twenty weeks old, that is, it should be treated 
as a person as this is the standing that should be accorded to the twenty-week-old foetus.  
Still, this calculation does not mean relocating the beginning of consciousness, 
and so ensoulment, beyond the threshold of twenty weeks of gestational age.  This datum 
is the absolute minimum before which no consciousness is possible, and so the eighteen-
week-old foetus is undoubtedly non-conscious and so non-ensouled.  The extension of the 
treatment of the twenty-week-old foetus to the eighteen-week-old foetus, simply means 
protecting personal life that might be in existence.  Therefore, the twentieth week will still 
be considered as the starting-point for consciousnesses, and so ensoulment, while the 
eighteenth week will be deemed as the point at which the safety margin starts.  In 
addition, whenever the possibility of personal life being in existence is excluded, i.e. the 
age of the foetus is uncontentiously determined to be less than twenty weeks old, no 
safety margin should be added, and a clear distinction in treatment between eighteen- or 
nineteen-week-old foetuses, and twenty-week-old foetuses should be drawn.   
 
709 P. Clarke et al., "An Infant Who Survived Abortion and Neonatal Intensive Care”, Journal of Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology 25, no. 1 (2005): 73-74, 74. 
710 Ibid. Engle, "A Recommendation for the Definition of "Late Preterm" (near-Term) and the Birth Weight-
Gestational Age Classification System”, 3, 4.  Carol Sakala, "Carol Sakalas Letter from North America: An 
Uncontrolled Experiment: Elective Delivery Predominates in the United States," Birth 33 (2006): 332-335, 
333.  King, "The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn," 1678. 
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However, the adoption of the twentieth week of gestational age as the starting 
point for consciousness, and so the timing of the ensoulment event, can be seen to be in 
direct contradiction to the Prophetic tradition concerning the timing of ensoulment, hence 
islamically unacceptable.  This tradition is widely interpreted to locate the timing of the 
ensoulment event after one hundred and twenty days of gestational age.711  It says:   
(The matter of the Creation of) a human being is put together in the womb of the 
mother in forty days, and then he becomes a clot of thick blood for a similar period, 
and then a piece of flesh for a similar period.  Then Allah sends an angel who is 
ordered to write four things.  He is ordered to write down his (i.e. the new 
creature's) deeds, his livelihood, his (date of) death, and whether he will be blessed 
or wretched (in religion).  Then the soul is breathed into him …712  
The apparent meaning of this tradition is that the ensoulment event occurs after one 
hundred and twenty days from conception, i.e. approximately seventeen weeks of 
gestational age.713  Obviously, the previous conclusion that the ensoulment event, can 
never occur before twenty weeks of gestational age is not consistent with this meaning 
and so cannot be supported in Islam.   
Indeed, some commentators have argued that the previously cited tradition is 
conclusive in determining the timing of ensoulment after the hundred and twentieth day 
 
711 Yasin has claimed that this position is consensually adopted by Moslem scholars.  Yasin, "Hqyqh 
al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb al-ʿlmyt," 76. 
712 Bukhari, Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ismail. Sahih Bukhari.  Translated by M. Muhsin Khan. Vol. 4, 
Book 54, Number 430.  Available online at 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/054.sbt.html#004.054.430, retrieved at 
05/08/2008.  This is considered to be the only one of its kind, i.e. the only one to deal with the issue of 
embodiment timing.  (Al-Sāwy, ʿbdāl Jwād. "ʾthr Bḥwth al-ʿjāz al-ʿlmy fy bʿḍ 
al-Qḍāyā al-Fqhyt”.  Mwswʿh al-ʿjāz al-ʿlmy fy al-Qrʾān w āl-Snt. 
Retrieved from http://www.55a.net/firas/arabic/?page=show_det&id=1250&select_page=2, at 20/12/07.  
Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb 
al-ʿlmyt," 79. 
713 Citing many scholars indicating this understanding, see Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-
Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb al-ʿlmyt," 76, 86. 
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of gestational age.714  Accordingly, while they adopt the brain death definition and justify 
it on grounds similar to those highlighted in this thesis,715 they claim that there is no 
reason to rely on those grounds when it comes to the issue of determining the inception of 
life, as there is a conclusive Prophetic tradition solving this issue.716  However, while I 
agree with them about the first claim, I think the second one is unsatisfactory.  As will be 
explained presently, the tradition cited is not conclusive regarding the timing of the 
ensoulment event, and so setting a different timing in the light of linguistic, scientific, and 
philosophical grounds is perfectly plausible.   
The tradition at hand can be read in a way that reconciles it with the conclusion 
adopted in this thesis.  While the tradition is quite clear regarding the denial of any 
possibility that ensoulment can take place before a hundred and twenty days, it does not 
state when exactly it happens.  The way the tradition is reported indicates that ensoulment 
occurs sometime after one hundred and twenty days.  This is proven through the use of 
the adverb ‘thumma’, which is translated into English as ‘then’: it indicates as known in 
Arabic, the language of the tradition, that the ensoulment event happens in a slow 
sequence.717  How slow it is, is contentious.  While some scholars have said it takes place 
within the following ten days,718 others have claimed it happens “… in the fourth forty 
after a hundred and twenty days,”719 that is, it can happen up to a hundred and sixty days.  
 
 
714 Yasin, "The End of Human Life in the Light of the Opinions of Muslim Scholars and Medical Findings", 
375. 
715 Ibid.  
716 Ibid., 375. 
717 Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb 
al-ʿlmyt," 80. 
718 So the ensoulment can happen up to the nineteenth week of gestation.  This view is attributed to Ibn 
Abbas, the greatest companion of the Prophet.  See Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami' Li Ahkam Al-Quran, Beirut: Dar 
Ihya’ al-Turath al-`Arabi Vol.  12, p 6.  As cited by Yasin, "The Inception of Human Life in Light of 
Statements of the Quran and Sunnah and the Opinions of Muslim Scholars ", 85. 
719 This means that the ensoulment event can happen up to the twenty third week.  This view is attributed to 
Ibn al-Qiyam, the greatest medieval scholar.  See Ibn al-Qiyam, al-Tibian fi Aqsam al-Qur’an: 337, 338.  
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In view of these different interpretations and different determinations, it can be concluded 
that while the tradition concerned is conclusive in excluding any possibility that 
ensoulment can take place before a hundred and twenty days, it is, however, inconclusive 
regarding when it happens after that day.  So then, the previous conclusion that 
ensoulment happens at the twentieth week of gestational age bears no contradiction to 
that tradition.   
Regardless of this, in the light of this research the seventeenth week, implied by 
the tradition to be the threshold before which ensoulment can never happen, needs to be 
changed to the twentieth week.  The rationale behind delaying ensoulment as implied by 
the tradition can help reach this new understanding.  This rationale is that the ensoulment 
event can occur only when the body is ready to receive and execute the soul’s 
instructions, which requires that the body undergo some developmental phases prior to 
being ensouled.  The tradition specifies some phases and accordingly determines the 
period of time they take to complete as the threshold before which ensoulment cannot 
occur.  I maintain that another developmental phase should be added and, accordingly, a 
different period of time should be set.  This phase is the acquisition of the cortex, which is 
proven to be necessary for ensoulment, and the period is that which it takes to develop, 
i.e. twenty weeks of gestational age.  The twentieth week of gestational age, rather than 
the seventeenth week, therefore becomes the threshold before which ensoulment can 
never occur.   
The previous attempt to understand differently the time set out for the 
developmental phases necessary for ensoulment is not the first of its type.  Some 
 
As cited by Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-
Tjārb al-ʿlmyt," 84. 
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commentators inspired by the embryological facts that indicate that foetal development is 
completed by forty days, have claimed that the ensoulment event can occur after that time 
rather than in the traditional one.720  They have used other traditions which, although they 
do not deal specifically with the issue of the timing of the ensoulment event, detail 
different times for the formation phases.721  This view indicates correctly the importance 
of the completion of physical development for the ensoulment event.  However, adding 
the other important developmental phase, i.e. the acquisition of the cortex, will lead to 
setting the timing of ensoulment at twenty weeks rather than at its suggested date, i.e. 
forty days of gestational age.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the adoption of the 
twentieth week of gestational age as the starting point for consciousness and hence the 
ensoulment event timing, can be supported by Shari’a-based considerations.   
Another concept that has been relied on in understanding the beginning of 
consciousness is quickening.  Quickening is “… the first movement of a fetus in the 
uterus that is felt by the mother.”722  It is significant since, it is argued, it initiates 
awareness of the development of the foetus in both the pregnant woman and doctors, 
which results in increasing the respect due to the foetus.723  Quickening is implied by 
Richard Swinburne to support the adoption of the twentieth week as the time when 
consciousness first begins: 
The evidence suggests that consciousness originates when the fetus has a brain with 
the kind of electrical rhythms characteristic of consciousness, viz.  About twenty 
 
720 Al-Sāwy, "ʾthr Bḥwth al-ʿjāz al-ʿlmy fy bʿḍ al-Qḍāyā al-Fqhyt”. 
721 Ibid.  
722 "Quickening n."  A Dictionary of Nursing.  Oxford University Press, 2003.  Oxford Reference Online.  
Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  2 March 
2008  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t62.e7634 accessed 
2/3/2008.  A similar definition is given by Cameron and Williamson, "In the World of Dolly, When Does a 
Human Embryo Acquire Respect?”  218. 
723 Ibid., 219. 
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weeks after conception (the time of quickening, the first muscle movements, which 
are probably connected with the first brain activity).724  
Nevertheless, this implication is implausible.  Quickening as just defined is not the 
first foetal movement, but rather the first movement to be felt by the pregnant woman.  
Indeed, foetal movements have been detected by ultrasound at as early as 5.5 weeks of 
gestational age.725  Put another way, quickening signifies the pregnant woman’s 
perception of her foetus’s movements, not the time when these movements first take 
place.  The fact that they take place long before the twentieth week, as the time when the 
cortex starts functioning, indicates without doubt that they have no link with conscious 
states.  Accordingly, they can have no weight in deciding when consciousness first 
begins.   
Furthermore, the argument about quickening is implausible since its timing is far 
from being non-contentious.  It might be said that quickening can, because of its moral 
plausibility, lend support to the adoption of the twentieth week; yet, this cannot be the 
case since the issue of when quickening occurs is as contentious as that of the beginning 
of consciousness.  For example, while some commentators consider its location around 
the twentieth week to be the typical stance on the issue,726 others, lower this determination 
to the fifteenth week,727 or sixteenth week.728  As Cameron and Williamson rightly state, 
 
724 Swinburne, the Evolution of the Soul, 176. 
725 Supra fn. 675.  
726 M. C. Kearl, "The Abortion Issue in the United States”, in Handbook of Death & Dying, ed. Clifton D. 
Bryant (California Sage Publications Inc, 2003), 387. 
727 Cameron and Williamson, "In the World of Dolly, When Does a Human Embryo Acquire Respect?”  
218. 
728 "Quickening n."  A Dictionary of Nursing.  Oxford University Press, 2003.  Oxford Reference Online.  
Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  2 March 
2008  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t62.e7634 accessed 
2/3/2008. 
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quickening “…is variable in timing between individuals.”729  As a result, quickening 
cannot be used to solve the contentious issue of determining the beginning of 
consciousness since it is in itself, contentious.   
The other considerations explained earlier should be sufficient to adopt the 
twentieth week of gestational age as the beginning of consciousness and so the timing of 
the ensoulment event.  However, if another point is discovered to be more plausible, e.g.  
the thirtieth week, this should not be considered to strip the view adopted in this thesis of 
all of its credibility.  That is to say, if it is discovered, after obtaining new scientific 
knowledge or apparatus for example, that consciousness starts at a time different from 
that put forward in this thesis, all that is needed is to adopt the new timing.  The whole 
theory about the nature of being human, the soul (or mind) being the ultimate seat of all 
capacities, and the cortex being the direct seat of those capacities and the soul’s means in 
performing them, need not be changed.  In the meantime, the twentieth week is the most 
plausible point at which the beginning of consciousness and the timing of the ensoulment 
event can be located, and so it is the one that will be adopted here.   
The conclusion reached in this section that is the soul, along with all its capacities 
including that for moral agency, is embodied at the twentieth week of gestational age, and 
should be the basis for determining the status of the foetus, which is the theme of the 
following section.   
 
729 Cameron and Williamson, "In the World of Dolly, When Does a Human Embryo Acquire Respect?”  
219.   
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5.2 Assessing the status of the foetus 
Now that is has been concluded that ensoulment occurs around the twentieth week 
it is necessary to ascertain the status of the foetus.  This will be discussed in terms of 
whether it should properly be categorised as a person, a species of property, or, if it does 
not fit into either category, some other interim status.  This status will be assessed both 
before, and after, ensoulment takes place. 
5.2.1 The status of the foetus after ensoulment  
The ensouled foetus, I hold, should be attributed moral and legal personality, the 
latter being based on the former.730  This conclusion can be upheld despite the doubt cast 
on how the status of actual persons can be attributed to entities lacking those persons’ 
actual capacities.  This conclusion can also be legally accepted.   
On the first point, the rationale behind the suggestion that the ensouled foetus 
should be accorded the status of a person, is that s/he meets the criterion of that stance731 
by acquiring ultimate moral agency along with an active potentiality for transforming it 
into actual moral agency.  Active potentialities are the first category in a classification of 
potentialities built on whether external intervention is required to initiate the process that 
will ultimately lead to actualising them.732  If no such intervention is required and the 
 
 
730 See  4.2.1 Basing legal personality on moral personality.  
731 See  4.2.2 Basing moral personality on moral agency. 
732 M. Tooley, "Personhood", in A Companion to Bioethics, ed. H. Kuhse and P. Singer.  (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1998).  122. This distinction is also attributed to Aristotle, see M. Massimo Reichlin, 
"The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal," Bioethics 11, no. 1 (1997): 1-23, 13.  He cites, Aristotle, 
Metaphysica, Trans.  by A.  Platt in W.D.  Ross (ed.), The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, vol.  
IX, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.  Some, however, think otherwise, that is, potentialities are always the 
same.  As one Supreme Court justice has stated: “[p]otential life is no less potential in the first weeks of 
pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward.  At any stage in pregnancy, there is the potential for human 
life.”  City of Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S 451, 461 (1983) (dissenting opinion).  
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entity can, autonomously and by itself, bring the potentiality it has into actuality, it is then 
an active potentiality; otherwise, it is passive.733  Twenty weeks old foetuses exemplify 
this type of potentiality.  They have, by virtue of their very nature as ensouled foetuses, 
an ultimate capacity for moral agency, along with the ability to realise that capacity.  As 
Reichlin puts it:    
Active potencies in a literal sense are those inherent to the nature of the being, 
whose principle of actualization is the very nature of that being … Here we do not 
simply have the capacity to be subject to transformation by an external agent in 
action, nor the capacity to act in order to specify a tendency, but rather the capacity 
to express and actualize inherent potentialities towards which the being in question 
has a natural tendency – i.e. , a tendency which is dependent on its very nature.  
What we have here is the potentiality to complete oneself, to act in view of one’s 
specific perfection.734  
From ensoulment onwards, the foetus starts his/her journey towards actualising his/her 
inherent ultimate capacity for moral agency, and only a negative causal factor such as 
abortion can prevent him/her from that.735  Thus, s/he should be deemed a person and 
 
As cited by C. Perry and L. K. Schneider, "Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their Fate?" 
Journal of Legal Medicine 13, no. 4 (1992): 463-500, 486.  (Emphasis his).  This, however, is inaccurate as 
will be explained in the text.  
733 Reichlin, "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal," 4.  In his words, “…active potentiality … 
means a being’s inherent capacity to autonomously develop itself.”  (Emphasis his)  
734 Ibid., 14, 15.  In The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy there is implicit criticism that the potentiality 
concept equates fallaciously the potential subject with the future one.  It says, “[t]he adjective ‘potential’ 
sets a logical trap.  A potential x is not a kind of x, but at best a thing of a different kind that is capable of 
becoming an x (so, for example, the destruction of a potential x is not the same as the destruction of an 
actual x).  ("Potentiality"  The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy.  Simon Blackburn.  Oxford University 
Press, 1996.  Oxford Reference Online.  Oxford University Press.  Lancaster University.  17 January 
2008 <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e1876”.  However, 
this criticism is not levelled at the active potentiality.  Rather, it is true of the passive potentiality as it will 
be explained below. 
735 According to Michel Tooley, the external component required to act upon the subject so it may actualise 
its potential is called “positive causal factor”.  It is, however, called “negative causal factor” if the subject is 
able to actualise its potential, and only that factor can prevent it from so doing.  The potentiality is passive 
in the first case while it is active in the second.  M. Tooley, "Personhood,” 122.  Michael Tooley Abortion 
and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), at 166-8.  As cited by Jason Eberl, "The Beginning of 
Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis," Bioethics 14 no. 2 (2000): 134-157, 152, 153.      
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accorded all rights enjoyed by virtue of having personality, the right to life and that to 
bodily integrity included.736    
Admittedly, the ensouled foetus needs external factors to actualise his/her actively 
potential capacities, yet these should not be taken to deprive him/her of personality.  The 
reason is that these factors are not causal, that is, they are needed only for the 
development of an already existing process of actualising these capacities rather than the 
initiation of that process.  An obvious example of these factors is the womb.  It is needed 
to supply warmth, nutrition, and oxygen so that the ensouled foetus can develop and 
realise his/her ultimate capacities including that for moral agency.  Still, the womb, along 
with other environmental factors, is necessary for the accomplishment of the process of 
realising ultimate moral agency that is already in place, not the initiation of the process 
per se.  Hence, that capacity can be deemed an active potentiality and so the foetus can 
still be deemed a person.  In Reichlin’s words:    
The sense in which the embryo is already what it will be is the project which it 
contains: it has all the information needed in order to accomplish the projected 
person it is.  It is obviously true that this accomplishment is dependent on several 
external conditions as well.  However, these conditions, including a uterus to 
develop and the oxygen and nutritional support from the mother, are not 
constitutive of the personal quality of the process: they are necessary conditions for 
the development of an already existing human vital process, not necessary 
conditions for the existence of a project of full personal life.737  
 
736 A detailed discussion of the effects of personifying the foetus will be held later in this chapter.  
737 Reichlin, "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal," 16.  Notice that he believes that conception 
marks the beginning of personality as the foetus, according to him, acquires at that time all that is needed 
for personality.  ———, "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal," 22, 23.  For me, ensoulment 
marks the beginning of the foetus’ active potentiality for moral agency since before it, it has passive 
potential only.   
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Accordingly, the lack of any of any environmental factor should not lead to weakening 
the status of the ensouled foetus as a person.   
The previous discussion showed that personifying the ensouled foetus is morally 
founded.  This conclusion is also plausible enough to be enshrined in law.  The 
plausibility intended here means practicality.  Law is a practical discipline, that is, a 
discipline that is intended to be applied in everyday life, and there is no point in reaching 
an impractical conclusion, no matter how theoretically strong it is.  However, the 
conclusion being practical does not mean that it can be readily fitted into the current law, 
as it is inevitable in a system built on the born alive rule738 that locating personality at the 
twentieth week of gestational age would require changes.  It means, simply, being legally 
feasible or possible.  This remark seems necessary since some commentators739 use the 
first meaning of practicality to deny the possibility of legally personifying the foetus.740   
In order for an entity to have legal personality, it must satisfy certain technical 
requirements.  These requirements, as proposed by Wieslaw Lang, are:   
1.  The entity must as a practical matter be identifiable and labeled or named as a 
discrete, individual object, distinct from its environment.741  
2.  The entity must be amenable to legal procedures; in particular, the rules of 
evidence must be applicable to it.742 
3.  Legal actions or decisions must be capable of being taken with regard to the 
entity, at least through its legal representative.743     
 
738 The conferral of personality in English law is conditioned by being born alive and separated from the 
mother’s body, see page 110 above.  In Libyan law, being born alive is also required, see page 109 above.   
739 Wieslaw Lang, "The Legal Status of the Human Foetus. A Comparative Analysis" in Conceiving the 
Embryo, ed. Donald Evans (The Hague, London, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), 437.  
740 See the following discussion for further details.   
741 Lang, "The Status of the Human Fetus”, 437. 
742 Ibid.   
743 Ibid.   
 203
5. Applying the Definition of Legal Personality to the Foetus  
 
4.  Its legal subjecthood considered in practical terms should consist of the legal 
capacities of the entity qualified as a legal subject.744  
With regard to the first requirement, the foetus at the twentieth week can easily be 
indentified.  The uncertainty surrounding the identification of foetuses at conception is
irrelevant here745 since the development of the foetus can accurately be monitored
through, for example, ultrasound scanning, and so determining whether a twenty-week-
old foetus is in existence can accurately be decided.746  Still, Lang argues that under 
current law deeming the foetus a legal person, and so subjecting it to the legal
requirements of identification would entail unbearable results:  
[C]onclusive proof of pregnancy is not sufficient to qualify the fetus for legal 
subjecthood since under present law identification of human “entities” is achieved 
through compliance with local requirements relating to the registration of births.  To 
satisfy the identifiability requirements, then, the fetus would have to be named and 
pregnancy registered (registration of conception being technically unfeasible) 
pursuant to appropriate legislation.  Such a measure not only would carry enormous 
social costs but would infringe impermissibility on the fundamental human rights of 
women and jeopardize the rule of law.  That is, creating and enforcing the legal 
mechanism necessary to put the fetus on a par with living persons with regard to 
identifiability (so as to qualify for full legal subjecthood) would entail full legal 
control of the woman’s body on the part of the state.747    
Nevertheless, this objection is implausible.  As concluded here, the twenty-week-
                                                 
744 ———, "The Legal Status of the Human Foetus. A Comparative Analysis ", 251.   
745 One of the criticisms levelled at choosing conception as the starting point for legal personality concerns 
the non-identifiability of the foetus at that moment.  It is said that the decisive determination of its existence 
can only be achieved through testing its mother’s blood nine days post conception; prior to that the foetus is 
unidentifiable.  We may extrapolate backward in time to the conception moment and deem the foetus to be 
in existence as a legal person from that moment on.  Still, that does deny the fact that it was unidentifiable.  
Lang, "The Status of the Human Fetus,” 437. 
746 See for example, "Ultrasound Imaging," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2008, retrieved 
from http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761579899/Ultrasound_Imaging.html, at 11/03/2008.   
747 Lang, "The Status of the Human Fetus", 437.   
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old foetus deserves to be attributed legal personality because of his/her intrinsic nature 
and should, accordingly, be treated on the same footing as born persons.  That
personifying him/her and so subjecting him/her to the rules regulating identification 
procedures may entail restrictions on another person’s rights, i.e. the pregnant woman, is
not a sufficient reason to ignore his/her intrinsic nature.  In fact, some restrictions in 
varied degrees on the pregnant woman’s rights are inevitable when the protection of the
foetus is intended.  For example, the pregnant woman’s right to autonomy is restricted by
the prohibition of abortion even if such prohibition is limited to the last trimester of
pregnancy.  Admittedly, the fact that the ensouled foetus, unlike born persons, is based 
inside another person’s body should be taken into account when his/her legal treatment is 
regulated, but this cannot plausibly be taken to strip him/her wholly of personality.748  
The requirement that the being must be an “… individual object, distinct from its
environment”749 in order for it to be a legal person is also met by the twenty-week-old 
foetus.  The identity of the foetus as an ontologically distinctive human being starts from 
ensoulment and is not affected by the fact that s/he is located in a natural or artificial 
womb and so dependent upon external factors.   
 The second requirement that the being “… must be amenable to legal procedures; 
in particular, the rules of evidence must be applicable to it”,750 is also met by the ensouled 
foetus or can easily be made so.  If the aim is to prove the existence of the twentieth week 
foetus, this, as has just been explained, can accurately be determined by using reliable 
scientific methods.  If, however, there happen to be detailed rules in specific cases that are 
                                                 
748 A detailed discussion of the treatment that should be accorded to the foetus will be undertaken later in 
this chapter.  
749 Supra fn. 747. 
750 Lang, "The Status of the Human Fetus", 437. 
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inapplicable to the ensouled foetus, which is possible in a system built on the born alive 
rule, these rules should be adapted to accommodate the newly defined legal personality.   
The third and fourth requirements are related and can also be satisfied by the 
twenty-week-old foetus.  According to Lang, in order to be a legal person an entity must 
have a passive capability to acquire rights and an active one to execute them.751  It must 
also be possible that legal actions concerning that entity can be taken.  Yet, he also admits 
that the lack of active capability does not affect legal personality since rights can be 
executed on their behalf by legal representatives, as in the case of children and the 
comatose.752  So, the foetus’s apparent lack of active capability cannot be taken as an 
indication of any lack of personality.  However, he proceeds to claim that, unlike children 
and the comatose, the foetus has “…limited, conditional or relational passive capability,” 
[hence, it does not have] “…the right to be a person before the law.”753  To examine this 
claim a distinction should be made between the law as it stands, and the law as it should 
be.  Indeed, it is the case that the foetus’s capability to have rights is, unlike that of 
children, restricted under current law.  Yet, in terms of law as it should be, which is the 
concern of this thesis, there should be no problem in endowing the ensouled foetus with 
legal personality and amending the law accordingly.  This amendment should take the 
form of according the foetus a passive capability to have rights, and as in the case of 
children, attributing the capability to execute those rights to legal representatives such as 
guardians or testamentary guardians.754   
 
751 Lang, "The Legal Status of the Human Foetus.  A Comparative Analysis ", 116. 
752 Ibid 
753 Ibid. 
754 See the discussion about Ahlyiat al-ada or the capacity for executing rights page 60 above. 
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Another reason for not implementing the foetus’s moral personality into law is 
related to the lawmaker’s choice.  While, according to Stanton and Harris, foetuses can 
perfectly well be endowed with legal rights, conferring legal personality on them is not 
preferable since it may bring their interests into conflict with those of existing legal 
persons:    
It is of course impossible for the fetus itself to be able to exercise any rights while 
in the womb.  However, it is perfectly possible to ascribe rights to an embryo, 
which must then be protected by others.  It is the extent of these rights which the 
law seeks to set out.  To date ...  English law does not deem an embryo a legal 
person.  One reason for this is that if embryos were afforded legal personhood, this 
would lead to the existence of competing legal interests.  For example, English law 
respects the right of a competent adult to refuse treatment.  Thus, a competent 
pregnant woman advised to undergo a caesarean section is lawfully entitled to 
refuse her consent to the operation.  If the fetus were to be deemed a legal entity, 
this would lead to the mother’s rights conflicting with the fetus’ right to life.  To 
date English law has not wanted to create such a conflict.755  
Two remarks can be made about this statement.  The first is that the undesirable 
conflict is already possible under the current English law, as has previously been 
demonstrated.756  The second remark is about the plausibility of not personifying the 
foetus to avoid possible conflict of interests.  If the foetus is discovered to satisfy, by 
virtue of his/her intrinsic nature, the criterion of legal personality, I think it is 
unsatisfactory to deprive him/her of such a standing because of other persons’ interests.  
Any potential conflict between the interests of the person foetus and other persons can be 
solved through weighing them up in the light of certain criteria and subordinating some of 
 
755 Stanton and Harris, "The Moral Status of the Embryo Post-Dolly”, 222, 223.  
756 See pages 14-16 above.    
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them to the others.  Depersonifying one party in the conflict seems to be an invalid 
recourse for solving the problem. 
 The conflict of rights with regard to abortion is a clear example.  Seeing the 
ensouled foetus as a person should result in subordinating any right to abortion that any 
party, including the pregnant woman, may claim to have, to the foetus’s right to life.  
Accordingly, absolute prohibition on post-ensoulment abortion should be applied.  This is 
the position upon which all Moslem jurists agree as they see the foetus as a human being, 
the killing of whom is prohibited except for specific reasons, none of which is applicable 
to the foetus, e.g.  in retaliation to murder.757  
This position has been recently re-emphasised with regard to the issue of aborting 
pregnancies resulting from rape.  The Grand Mufti of Egypt, as reported in the issue of 4th 
December 2007 of the Ahram newspaper, issued a fatwa allowing such an act at any time 
during pregnancy even if after ensoulment, which is believed, as previously mentioned,758 
to occur after 120 days.  However, his fatwa was condemned by the scholars for departing 
from the consensus.  They allowed abortion in such a case only before ensoulment, while 
they prohibited it after that since the foetus becomes a human being the killing of whom 
constitutes murder.759 
 
757 Mḥmd Nʿym Yasin. "Hkm al-Ājhāḍ fy al-Fqh al-Āslāmy." In Abḥāth Fqhyh 
fy Qḍāyā Tbyh Mʿāṣrt, edited by Mḥmd Nʿym Yasin, 191-226. (Amman: Dār 
al-Nfāʾs, 1999), 194. 
758 See page 194 above.  
759 Sbḥy Mjāhd. Al-Zhr: lā l-Jjhāḍ al-Mghtṣbh bʿd 120 Ywmanā. 23/12/2007, 
retrieved from 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1196786464318&pagename=Zone-
Arabic-Shariah%2FSRALayout, at 21/05/08.   
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 However, the consensus ends when abortion is required to save the pregnant 
woman’s life.  Some scholars such as ibn Nujaim al-Hanafi sustain the original position 
and refuse to allow abortion in such a case: 
If a pregnant woman’s life is threatened by her foetus and the only solution is to kill 
it, that is permissible if the foetus is dead while it is not if it is alive because 
sustaining one life through killing another is not approved by Shari’a.760   
 Commenting on ibn Nujaim’s statement, Ibn 'Abdeen says: 
If the foetus is alive and there are fears for the mother's life if it continues to 
survive, it is not lawful to abort it, because the mother's death is only suspected.  It 
is not permissible to kill a human being for a probability.761  
 However, such justification is unsound.  The statement that “…the mother's death 
[because of the continuation of pregnancy] is only suspected … [and it] …is not 
permissible to kill a human being for a probability” can be easily refuted because it is 
always possible through medical examination to determine whether the threat is real.762  
Additionally, though Shari’a, as ibn Nujaim argues, does not approve of sustaining one 
life through killing another, it does, as Yusuf al-Qaradawi says while commenting on ibn 
Nujaim’s statement, approve of committing the lesser harm and lesser evil, the death of 
the foetus in this case, to avoid the greater harm and greater evil, the death of the pregnant 
 
760 Hāshyh abn ʿābdyn, al-Jzʾ al-Āwl, 2nd edition, 1966, Dār al-Tbāʿh al-
Mṣryt, page 602. As cited by Yasin, "Hkm al-Ājhāḍ fy al-Fqh al-Āslām,”  
194. 
761 Ibid.  As translated by Osama Muhammad Al-'Abd, "Islamic Law Rulings on Certain Medical Questions 
the Arguments and the Supporting Evidence," in International Conference on Islamic Code of Medical 
Ethics (Cairo: The Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences [IOMS] 2004). Retrieved from 
www.islamset.com at 21/05/2008.   
762 Yasin, "Hkm al-Ājhāḍ fy al-Fqh al-Āslāmy." 195, 196. 
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woman and the foetus.763  This is the basis upon which post-ensoulment abortion can be 
legitimised.  
 Allowing post-ensoulment abortion to save the pregnant woman’s life has also 
been the position of some other scholars.  For example, the Legal Opinion (Fatwa) 
Authority at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Endowments (Waqfs) states that “…if continued 
pregnancy poses a threat to the mother, preservation of her life should take priority, 
because she is the source and her life is perceived with absolute certainty.”764  Other 
commentators provide different justification for the preference given for saving the 
pregnant woman’s life.  They try to justify this preference through giving examples from 
Islamic jurisprudence showing that the life of the foetus is not treated in the same way as 
the lives of other human beings are treated.  The first justification is the juristic rule that, 
though the law of retaliation, qsās as it is known in Arabic, whereby the death penalty as 
a punishment similar to the offence in kind and degree ought to be applied in cases of 
murder, murders committed by ancestors against their descendants are exempt.  It is said 
that since a parent, for example, gave life to their son, they should not be deprived of their 
own life when murdering this son.  This, however, does not mean that they will not be 
punished; other punishment, less grave than death penalty is due.  This logic can help to 
give a preference to saving the pregnant woman’s life: she has given life to the foetus and 
should not be deprived of her own because of it.  The second reason, according to these 
commentators, is the concept of the status of foetuses as separate persons in one respect 
but not in another.  They are persons in that they have human souls, but they are not in 
 
763 Al-Qrḍāwy, Ywsf ʿbd Allāh. Al-Jhāḍ bnā ʿlā Tshkhyṣ Mrḍ al-Jnyn. Fatwa 
published in Arabic, retrieved from 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-Arabic-
Ask_Scholar/FatwaA/FatwaA&cid=1122528600958, at 21/05/2008. 
764Al-'Abd, "Islamic Law Rulings on Certain Medical Questions the Arguments and the Supporting 
Evidence". 
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that they are part of the pregnant woman’s womb.  This concept might be the reason 
behind the rule that, though their act is forbidden, no retaliation against a foetus’s killer is 
required.  This rule can also be used to justify the preference given for saving the 
pregnant woman’s life.765 
  Nevertheless, though agreeing with this opinion, I see the reasons given for it as 
unsound.  Firstly, the two rules cited are not adopted by all scholars.  Ibn Hazm, for 
example, believes that retaliation against the killer of a foetus is required even if the 
pregnant woman was the person responsible.766  In addition, seeing the foetus as part of 
the pregnant woman’s body is not accurate because s/he has already been shown to have 
his/her own independent existence.  The alternative basis for legitimising abortion is, as 
established above, the juristic rule stating that ‘the greater evil should be warded off by 
the lesser evil’, the greater evil being the loss of the lives of the pregnant woman and the 
foetus while the lesser one is the loss of the life of the foetus only.  No other reason is 
acceptable here.  Therefore, abortion should not be permitted if the continuation of 
pregnancy imperils only the health of the woman.  In addition, abortion should not be 
allowed if an alternative is available.  Every effort should also be made to sustain the 
foetus’s life after abortion as if s/he was viable, or the application of ectogenesis has been 
perfected enough to host the foetus until s/he is able to survive on his/her own. 
The foetus, then, should be deemed as a legal person from the twentieth week of 
gestational age onwards.  What remains to be discussed is the status of the foetus prior to 
ensoulment.  This will be tackled in the following subsection.   
 
765 Yasin, "Hkm al-Ājhāḍ fy al-Fqh al-Āslāmy", 196.  
766 Al-Qrḍāwy, “Al-Jhāḍ bnā ʿlā Tshkhyṣ Mrḍ al-Jnyn”. 
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5.2.2 The status of the foetus before ensoulment   
The main question that arises with regard to the status of the foetus prior to 
ensoulment is whether, since it is not a person, it is a species of property.  The answer to 
this question should, I argue, be in the negative because of the intrinsic nature of the 
foetus as a passively potential moral agent and person.  This nature should grant the 
foetus a status less than that of a person but higher than that of a property species, i.e. an 
interim status.  In order to justify this answer, the meaning of passive potentialities and 
the treatment their possessors should be accorded will be explained.  Following that, the 
interim status of the non-ensouled foetus and the treatment it should be accorded will be 
determined.   
The essence of passive potentialities is the indispensability of external causal 
intervention for the initiation of the process of realising them.  That is to say, while the 
subject by itself cannot realise its relevant potentialities, it has a capacity to undergo 
changes caused by external causal factors leading to such realisation.767  According to 
Massimo Reichlin, Aristotle sees a passive potentiality as, “extrinsic, in that the principle 
of actualization comes from outside the body which is transformed … this meaning of 
potency is simply the disposition to receive modifications.”768  
The reliance of passive potentialities on external causal factors makes it plausible 
to equate them with possibilities and probabilities.769  ‘A’ is potentially ‘B’ if there is a 
 
 
767 Reichlin, "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal," 4. 
768 Ibid., 13.  He cites, Aristotle, Metaphysica, Trans. by A. Platt in W.D. Ross (ed.), The Works of Aristotle 
Translated into English, vol.  IX, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.   
769 It is worth mentioning that Reichlin, whose article is used heavily here, considers the foetus as having an 
active potentiality for personality from fertilisation, hence, he does not equate its potentialities with 
possibilities or probabilities and discusses the viewpoints that do so just to refute them.  What is passive, 
according to him, is the potentiality of the gamete for personality (Ibid., 4, 6).  However, since this thesis 
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possibility that it could be so through the intervention of an external causal factor; ‘B’ is 
seen as “a possible outcome of a process involving an entity [A].”770  A tree is a potential 
table in that it could be so if subjected to an artisan’s work via which a table can be made, 
yet it cannot be said to be already a table.  Without the external intervention, i.e. the 
artisan’s work, the potentiality of the tree to be a table cannot be achieved since nothing 
in its nature can lead to that.771  A passive potentiality can also be understood as a 
probability.  How likely is it that a subject may develop its relevant potentialities?  This 
possibility or likelihood is contingent on external causal factors and so varies in 
accordance with them.772  The same equation cannot be made regarding active 
potentialities, since no external causal intervention is required to actualise them; the 
environmental factors needed have no affect on the ontological nature of the subject.773  
The clear example of this is the ensouled foetus that has, by virtue of his/her soul, an 
active potentiality for autonomous moral agency.  The need of such a foetus for a womb 
to survive and grow, does not affect his/her ontological nature as an actively potential 
moral agent.774        
The essence of passive potentialities determines the way according to which their 
possessors should be treated.  The starting point for deciding on the type of treatment that 
should be accorded to a passively potential subject is the fact that its potentiality is 
contingent on extrinsic causal factors.  As such, it can by no means be treated like the 
 
takes another stance and locates the beginning of personal and human life at ensoulment, which is 
determined to be at the twentieth week of gestation, the potentiality of the non-ensouled foetus can be 
classified as being passive and so equated with a possibility and probability (See  5.1 Determining the 
timing of the ensoulment event).   
770 Ibid., 2.   
771 Ibid., 13.  
772 Ibid., 9, 12.   
773 Ibid., 11, 12.  
774 See  5.2.1 The status of the foetus after ensoulment. 
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entity into which it may develop.  A passively potential subject, thus, has no importance 
in itself; its importance derives from being a step towards the future entity.775 
However, this does not mean that no variable derivative importance can be 
assigned to passively potential subjects in their development towards actualising relevant 
potentialities.  Such a claim has been implied by Massimo Reichlin, who, in terms of 
passively potential persons, says:  
[T]here seems no reason to believe that stopping the process through which a 
person is formed in a certain moment could be morally more objectionable than in 
some other moment: if we have a moral duty to pursue the final result, anything 
preventing it from being accomplished should be equally banned.776  
This claim is unsound because the potential subject derives its importance from being a 
step amongst others, that may lead to the future entity, and so such importance should 
increase in accordance with how close to the future entity that step is.  The closer it gets 
the more importance the potential subject should be accorded.  Put another way, the 
importance should vary in accordance with how possible and probable the actualisation of 
the relevant potentialities are.  Therefore, the importance attributed to passively potential 
subjects is derivative and degreed.777   
Seeing the non-ensouled foetus in the light of the preceding discussion, reveals its 
nature as an entity possessing a passive potentiality for personality.  It has the potential 
for developing into an autonomous moral agent and so becoming an actual person if, and 
 
775 It is worth mentioning that what is being denied here is that passively potential entities may have 
importance stemming from the future position.  They, however, may have importance stemming from 
another source.  For example, a tree has no intrinsic importance as a future table; still, it has its own 
importance as a tree.   
776 Reichlin, "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal," 3. 
777 Eberl, "The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis," 50. 
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only if, subjected to external intervention, i.e. the addition of the soul to the foetal body.  
The addition of the soul is extrinsic in the sense that it requires the intervention of an 
external agent, i.e. God, as Islamic traditions indicate.778  This is supported by the fact that 
the soul is an extra-biological or incorporeal object that cannot emerge out of the body’s 
development.779  Undergoing the act of ensoulment causes a substantial change in the 
foetus’s nature: it transforms it into a human being with an inherent tendency to develop 
into an autonomous moral agent.   
The non-ensouled foetus’s possession of a passive potentiality for personality 
entitles it to a special status.  It can neither be deemed a person since it lacks the ultimate 
capacity for moral agency, nor can it be classified as a species of property since it is the 
origin of a future person.  Considering the future person’s interests requires excluding the 
non-ensouled foetus from the property category.  That is to say, whereas the passive 
potentiality for being a person justifies the exclusion of the non-ensouled foetus from the 
property category, it cannot justify its inclusion in the person category.  The most 
plausible class, I think, is an interim one wherein it is assigned significance that varies in 
accordance with how strong the probability of it developing into a future person is.  This 
conforms to the fact that it is just a passively potential person and so has no importance in 
itself; the only importance it acquires is that it is attributed as a step towards bringing a 
person into existence.   
Admittedly, the interim status attributed to the non-ensouled foetus cannot be 
given a theoretically clear-cut definition.  It is clearly not enough to say that the non-
 
778 See  3.1.1 The nature of human beings.  
779 Compare Jan Deckers who claims that “[t]he birth of the soul is best understood as a natural event 
occurring when the right materials … are placed in the right environment and start to interact with each 
other by embarking on a path necessary for further development of life.” Jan Deckers, "Why Eberl Is 
Wrong.  Reflections on the Beginning of Personhood”, Bioethics 21, no. 5 (2007): 270-282, 278. 
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ensouled foetus enjoys a significance less than that of a person but higher than that of a 
property species.  This has led to the accusation by some commentators that the concept is 
too vague.780  This vagueness, it is claimed, could affect its ability to solve important 
practical issues, such as the permissibility of creating, freezing, donating, genetically 
modifying, or utilising the foetus in research, as well as solving conflicts between the 
parents’ choice and the special respect due to the foetus.781  “The notion ...  will seem like 
empty rhetoric if it leads to no limits at all on what may be done with embryos”, they 
argue.782  
However, this criticism is not a valid reason for rejecting the concept.  The 
theoretical ambiguity the concept suffers does not necessarily lead to depriving it of any 
practical utility.  It is possible to set out standards determining how the foetus should be 
treated in practice.  Such standards should be set out in the light of the conclusion that a 
passively potential subject should be accorded derivative and degreed significance.  That 
is to say, the higher the possibility that it may realise the relevant potentialities and so 
develop into the future entity, the more importance it gains.  
In view of that, variable degrees of significance or respect should be accorded to 
the non-ensouled foetus in proportion to its development.  In this regard, the fourteenth 
day of gestational age signifies a decisive point in this development.  As indicated in the 
forthcoming statement by Mary Warnock, it is the time when a great deal of development 
takes place as well as being the stage at which biological individuation of the foetus is 
determined:  
 
780 Kristine E. Luongo, "the Big Chill: Davis V. Davis and the Protection of Potential Life", New England 
Law Review 29 (1995): 1011-1053, 1023. 
781 Robertson, "In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos," 449.  
782  Ibid., 448, 449. 
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Fourteen days was decided on as the limit [on research on embryos in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990] because of the great change in the 
development of the embryo heralded by the development of the primitive streak.  It 
is only after that that an individual exists with its own now quickly developing 
central nervous system, its own limbs, its own brain.  Even though before that an 
embryo has a genetic individuality, it has no pattern of human identity, any more 
than human tissue has.  ...  Before that [the development of the primitive streak] 
there could have been two or three people formed of the same material.  It is 
because of the enormous change that comes at this stage of development that 
scientists generally prefer to think of the embryo as actually beginning to exist at 
this stage.783 784     
Since these important developmental aspects follow the implantation of the foetus 
into the womb, C Cameron and R Williamson consider it to be the starting-point for 
respecting ex utero foetuses.  In their words: 
The most important stage in the development of an embryo created outside the 
womb, such as a Dolly embryo, is implantation, as without successful implantation 
the embryo cannot develop into a human being.  Its potential to develop is 
theoretical until it is implanted; on implantation, it becomes real.  Upon the 
successful act of implantation the embryo will begin to acquire respect, because 
after implantation development takes place (at least in principle) which, if 
uninterrupted, leads to the birth of a human being.  The embryo is also at the stage 
when the primitive streak appears, the cells begin to differentiate, there is no longer 
any chance of twinning, and the embryo thereafter develops into a recognisable 
fetus.785 
 
783 Mary Warnock, "Experimentation on Human Embryos and Fetuses," in A Companion to Bioethics, ed. 
Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 390-396, 394.  
784 It is worth mentioning that while the current research agrees about the significance of the fourteenth day, 
it disagrees about Warnock’s claim that this day is the starting-point for the individual’s human identity if it 
is taken to mean non-biological human identity.  The human being’s identity, as such, starts at ensoulment.    
785 Cameron and Williamson, "In the World of Dolly, When Does a Human Embryo Acquire Respect?”  
218. 
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Nevertheless, this claim is inaccurate.  First of all, it is possible, theoretically at 
least, that an ex utero foetus could develop in an artificial womb and would thus never be 
implanted.786  Implantation, therefore, is not a necessary developmental step in each 
foetus’s life.  Still, development such as the appearance of the primitive streak and 
biological individuation can still take place.  Therefore, while the increase in respect can 
be timed at implantation in the case of foetuses placed in natural wombs, similar respect 
can also plausibly be timed at the fourteenth day in the case of those placed in artificial 
ones.   
Secondly, the difference in the way in which foetuses have come into existence 
does not justify locating the points at which they begin to attract respect differently.  
Foetuses can be formed as a result of fertilisation, either in sexual intercourse or by an in 
vitro procedure, or cell nuclear replacement.787  In each case, the formation of the foetus 
marks the starting-point for the acquisition of the passive potentiality for personality, 
hence the acquisition of an interim status and degreed respect.  Thus, it is inaccurate to 
argue, as Cameron and Williamson do, that fertilisation marks the beginning of in utero 
foetuses’ due respect, while implantation is that point with regard to ex utero ones.788  
Implantation, if it happens, is just a point at which the respect that has already begun 
should start to increase.   
Nevertheless, the method of formation can still lead to a variation in the degree of 
respect that foetuses are owed.  This is the case when foetuses are formed outside the 
body and have not yet been placed in natural or artificial wombs.  Though they should be 
 
786 Stanton and Harris, "The Moral Status of the Embryo Post-Dolly”, 222. 
787 Ibid.   
788 Cameron and Williamson, "In the World of Dolly, When Does a Human Embryo Acquire Respect?”  
218.   
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respected, this respect will be less than that due to foetuses already placed within wombs, 
because their realisation of the relevant potentialities requires an additional factor, i.e. the 
placing of them into a womb.789  Admittedly, this placement is not causal, that is, it does 
not give rise to a new ontological entity, but it does make the required actualisation more 
possible.790  
Another factor in varying the treatment of the non-ensouled foetus is the safety 
margin added when the age of the foetus is being estimated.  As previously explained,791 
the margin of error in calculating gestational age is two weeks and, out of caution, an 
equivalent margin of safety should be added.  A foetus should therefore be deemed 
twenty weeks old when it is estimated to be eighteen weeks old.  Accordingly, the 
eighteen-week-old foetus should be treated in the same way the twenty-week-old foetus is 
treated, i.e. as a person.  However, this precautionary course of action is contingent on the 
age calculation being uncertain.  So, if this uncertainty is eliminated and so the age is 
undoubtedly determined to be eighteen or nineteen weeks, no such an action is required 
and a treatment proportional to being non-ensouled should be accorded to that foetus. 
Furthermore, considering these standards, while applying Shari’a rules of 
evaluating benefits and harm, the rules of masalih and mafasid as known in Arabic, 
should help determine the treatment of the non-ensouled foetus on a case by case basis.  
These rules aim to determine the judgement of acts by evaluating their benefits and harm.  
This evaluation should make clear the outcome of the act concerned: more harm or more 
benefit, and accordingly, whether it should be allowed.  It should be allowed if it is shown 
 
789 The theoretical possibility of artificial wombs has been mentioned before, see supra fn. 466. 
790 Detailed explanation of how these standards can be set and applied in the case of abortion will be made 
later in this chapter.   
791 See page 193 above. 
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to generate more benefit than harm, and vice versa.  If, however, an act is found to 
produce equal amounts of harm and benefit, it should be deemed impermissible.  The 
reason is the Shari’a ruling that dictates that harm-prevention takes priority over benefit-
attainment except when the benefit is greater.792  
This evaluation is based on qualitative and quantitative criteria.  The qualitative 
criteria measure harm or benefit according to the effect they have on the five principle 
values of religion, self, reason, reproduction, and property.  As previously explained, the 
preservation of these values is believed to be the ultimate aim of Shari’a.793  This 
preservation takes three forms; saving the five values from destruction, removing any 
hardship caused to them, and enhancing and bettering them.  In direct proportion to these 
forms, harm or benefit is classified into three categories; essential, complementary, or 
amelioratory.  For example, saving a human being’s life is an essential benefit, while 
destroying it is essential harm.  The quantitative criteria, on the other hand, aim to 
measure the number of people affected by the harm, or benefit, the act produces.  In this 
regard, Shari’a rules that the broader the effect of the benefit or the harm is, the higher 
the priority for attaining or preventing it, and that if a complementary benefit or harm 
becomes general, it should then be re-classified as essential.794  
In the light of these rules, the determination of any act or application concerning 
the non-ensouled foetus can be decided.  Taking the example of pre-ensoulment abortion, 
the major harm it causes is the destruction of the foetus.  In evaluating this harm 
 
792 Aḥmd Shrf Aal-dyn. Al-Āḥkām al-Shrʿyh ll-Āʿmāl al-Tbyt. (n.p.), 1987, 
79, 80.  
793 See supra fn. 283. 
794 Yasin, "Hqyqh al-Jnyn w Hkm al-Āntfāʿ bh fy Zrāʿh al-Āʿḍāʾ w al-Tjārb 
al-ʿlmyt," 108. 
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qualitatively, the fact that the foetus is not yet a person should be taken into 
consideration.  Accordingly, while ending the life of a person is essential harm, ending 
that of a non-ensouled foetus is not.  It might be classified as complementary or 
amelioratory according to how strong the possibility that the foetus develops into a person 
is.  The strength of this possibility varies, as earlier mentioned, in accordance with factors 
such as the developmental phase of the foetus and its location.   
The other harm that might result from abortion is that caused to the pregnant 
woman.  It varies in accordance with whether an abortion is performed with or without 
her consent.  Though the assumption is that less harm is expected if she has consented to 
abortion, there might still be a possibility of future psychological harm.  As the 
psychiatrist Patricia Casey says in her evidence to the British Parliamentary Science and 
Technology Committee while discussing scientific developments relating to the Abortion 
Act 1967:  
A number of well designed recent studies confirm the view that adverse 
psychological outcomes occur after abortion and are not just related to prior 
psychiatric history.  A range of disorders including depressive illness, substance 
abuse and self-harm have been identified.  There is evidence for an increase in 
psychiatric service utilization (in-patient and out-patient) also.  Suicide rates are 
higher in women post-abortion when compared to pregnant women and non-
pregnant women.  [However, she adds that] … whether this is due to the abortion or 
to some preexisting common factor associated with both abortion seeking and 
suicide (mental illness or impulsivity) is as yet unanswered.795  
 
795 Patricia Casey, "Memorandum 30” in Scientific developments relating to the Abortion Act 1967 evidence 
(London: House of Commons Science & Technology Select Committee, 2007), 199, 200.  Retrieved from 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/SDAevidence.pdf, at 16/07/2008. 
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Abortion is also said to risk the woman’s future pregnancies.  As John Wyatt, a 
neonatal physician from University College London says in his supplementary evidence: 
There is strong, robust and widely accepted scientific evidence that induced 
abortion leads to an increased risk of premature birth in subsequent pregnancies.  
The increased risk of a preterm delivery is between 1.3 and 2.0 and rises with the 
number of abortions.796 
Physical harm is also conceivable if an abortion is poorly, or negligently, performed. 
Abortion can also result in harming parties other than the pregnant woman and the 
foetus such as the putative father and society as a whole.  Harm caused to the putative 
father can vary according to different factors, for example, whether he has consented to 
the abortion and whether he has any other children.  The harm caused to him can be 
deemed essential if he, for example, has become infertile for any reason and so the foetus 
concerned is his last hope to have a child of his own.797  
Society as a whole can also be harmed by the act of abortion; after all foetuses are 
its future individuals and allowing abortion on a large scale may endanger its very 
existence.  Taking the example of the UK, there have been 6 million legal abortions since 
 
796 John S Wyatt, "Memorandum 37”, in Scientific developments relating to the Abortion Act 1967 evidence 
(London: House of Commons Science & Technology Select Committee, 2007), 242.  Retrieved from 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/SDAevidence.pdf, at 16/07/2008.  
797 Interestingly enough, as Marion Holmes Katz has rightly noted, some Moslem jurists seem to suggest 
that the putative father’s interest in the survival of the foetus is stronger than that of the mother’s.  She 
quotes the following statement from the Fatawa al-hindiyya: “[i]f a woman strikes her own belly or takes 
medicine to abort the child intentionally, or if she gives a treatment to her vagina so that the child is 
stillborn, her kin group is liable for the ghurra*, if she did it without her husband's permission; if she did it 
with his permission, nothing is due.”  Al-Fatawa al-'Alamgiriya al-marufa bi'l-Fatawa al-Hindiya (Cairo: 
Bulaq, 1310 A.H), 6: 35-36.  As cited by Marion Holmes Katz, "The Problem of Abortion in Classical 
Sunni Fiqh”, in Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia, ed. Jonathan E Brockopp 
(Columbia, South Carolina University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 25-50, 37.  (Emphases hers) 
* Ghurrai in Islamic jurisprudence is “monetary recompense for the death of a fetus”.  Jonathan E. 
Brockopp, ed., Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia (Columbia, South Carolina 
University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 222. 
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1967, a rate that is claimed to have had a greatly harmful impact on the total population 
and future generations.798  In fact, the concern for the welfare of a society that might be 
harmed by abortion, has been the prime preoccupation of modern Moslem thinkers when 
discussing the issue of family planning in general, and abortion in particular.  As Donna 
Lee Bowen rightly says: 
The second area799 where ethics interests with abortion is the concern Muslims 
demonstrate for community welfare.  …  I am speaking about opposition to 
abortion, ulema [Moslem scholars] first mention the need to protect the community 
from its danger.  Their first concern, which is often implicit, is the need to 
recognize that respect for life is the basis of all community action.  Without a 
reverence for life, the very existence of the community is endangered.  Both ulema 
and local religious leaders cite the increased use of abortion as a prime factor in 
increasing social disintegration.  Abortion, they claim, jeopardizes the self-evident 
truth that Islam is predicated upon recognition of the divine spirit in humankind.800  
 
798 The Maranatha Community, "Memorandum 39”, in Scientific developments relating to the Abortion Act 
1967 evidence (London: House of Commons Science & Technology Select Committee, 2007), retrieved 
from http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/SDAevidence.pdf at 16/07/2008, 260, 261.  After stating 
the number of legal abortions since 1967, they ask a question about “what has been the demographic impact 
of abortion on the total population and what are the projections for the next decade?” Their answer is that 
“[i]t is beyond doubt that the increase in the abortion rate has contributed to the decline in the birth rate 
since 1968.  For several years after 1968, the shortfall of fertility below replacement level was 
approximately equal to the abortion rate.  However in recent years the abortion rate has exceeded this.  
Using a mathematical model in order to assess the demographic impact of abortion, “Lost Generations” 
have been computed to illustrate what the population might have been had there not been legalised abortion.  
The First Lost Generation is based on abortion numbers, assuming that 90% of abortions could have been 
live births six months later.  The Second Lost Generation is then the children of the First Lost Generation 
whose fertility follows a birth rate augmented by 90% of the abortion rate.  The Third Lost Generation is 
the children of the Second and grandchildren of the First.  The 10% of abortions assumed not to have been 
possible live births are assumed to have been miscarriages or stillbirths, legal abortions on limited grounds 
or illegal abortions under the old law had it been enforced after 1968.  The absence of the Lost Generations 
results in the working age population that is 6.07 million (or 6.7%) smaller than it would have been had 
90% of the aborted foetuses become live births.  As a result of abortion, the working age population in 2017 
is forecast to be 10.9% smaller (7.56 million in absolute numbers) than it might have been.  The projection 
for 2027 is a reduction of the working age population of 11.3% (or 9.54 million) than it might have been 
without abortion.” 
799 The first one is respect for life.  Bowen, "Contemporary Muslim Ethics of Abortion”, 60. 
800 Ibid., 66. 
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 In terms of this thesis, the general prohibition of pre-ensoulment abortion should 
alleviate such harm.  However, if the harm caused to society is less than the benefit 
attained from a pre-ensoulment abortion, abortion can be legitimised.  Society as a whole 
can benefit from abortion, as will be explained.  The decision about this can be made on a 
case by case basis by applying the qualitative criteria of harm-benefit-evaluation, which 
have just been explained, and the quantitative criteria that take into account how many 
people are affected by the harm or benefit that abortion generates.   
On the other hand, the benefit sought from abortion should be measured.  
Qualitatively, the benefit can be essential, complementary, or amelioratory.  For example, 
the use of embryonic stem cells, as an application that requires destroying the foetus, is 
claimed to have many promising applications.  Some of these applications can produce 
essential, or at least complementary, benefits such as curing diseases like diabetes, 
Parkinson's disease, stroke, arthritis, multiple sclerosis, heart failure, and spinal cord 
lesions.801  However, other applications such as using the stem cells for cosmetic 
rejuvenation can produce only amelioratory benefit.802  Quantitatively, the number of 
people benefiting from performing an abortion should be measured.  For instance, 
notwithstanding the benefits expected from treatment are greater than those expected 
from research, research using aborted foetuses would generally have more beneficiaries 
than would treatment using these foetuses.  In the light of these qualitative and 
quantitative criteria, the strength of the benefit that might be generated from an abortion 
should be measured. 
 
801 See  2.1 Foetus-related new technological applications and their associated moral and legal dilemmas. 
802 E. D. Gol'dberg, A. M. Dygai, and V. V. Zhdanov, "Modern Views on the Problem of Stem Cells and 
Potentialities of Their Use in Medicine," Bulletin of Experimental Biology and Medicine 140, no. 5 (2005): 
588-592, 589.  
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The determination of the legitimacy of a particular abortion can be ascertained in 
the light of the assessment of the benefit and the harm.  If, after comparing them, the 
benefit is found to outweigh the harm, abortion can be legitimised and vice versa.  This is 
a general account of how the determination of abortion can be carried out.  The specific 
determination cannot be ascertained beforehand, it depends on the surrounding factors in 
general, and the status of the foetus in particular.  The latter, as previously detailed, varies 
in proportion to how strong the potentiality for developing into a person is.  However, this 
account should be sufficient to show, on the one hand, the effect of the status of the foetus 
in solving its related issues, and, on the other, to negate the accusation of vagueness 
levelled at the concept of the interim status.   
However, this way of tackling the issue of abortion is different from that which 
Marion Holmes Katz attributes to the medieval Islamic jurists.  She criticises the way the 
American debate on abortion is generally conducted.  It is overwhelmed by a tendency to 
base the status of the foetus on its biological development, and an individualistic 
approach whereby the interests of each individual are weighed against those of another 
individual.  She then cites as an ideal the way followed in the medieval Islamic 
discussions of the issue that depend on relation-based perspectives.  Islamic medieval 
jurists, according to her, place the foetus, since ensoulment, within a complex set of 
relationships: with its parents, with God, the parents with God, the parents with each 
other, and all of these individuals with the entire Muslim society.  These relationships are 
taken into account, and weighed against each other while making any decision concerning 
the foetus’s status and any potential abortion case.  Biological markers are also used to 
indicate the timing of ensoulment, the time when the foetus starts its role in the relational 
web, but the use of these markers is considered with regard to the relational ones.  The 
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reliance on the latter, according to Katz, helps with evading the individualistic approach 
embodied in the current American debate on abortion and adopting a sociocentric one.803 
Nevertheless, such an opinion is not entirely accurate.  I agree that medieval 
Moslem jurists considered relational factors regarding the foetus while discussing the 
legitimacy of abortion.  However, I believe that this consideration was limited to pre-
ensoulment abortion.  As previously detailed,804 medieval Moslem jurists distinguished 
clearly, in terms of legitimacy, between pre-ensoulment and post-ensoulment abortion.  
While subjecting the former to the evaluation of harm and benefits that may result in 
allowing abortion, they applied absolute prohibition on the latter.  Therefore, it seems 
inaccurate to claim, as Katz does, that those jurists placed the ensouled foetus, from 
ensoulment, in a web of relationships with God, parents, and the whole society, that might 
result in legitimising aborting him/her.   
However, the consideration of relational factors with regard to pre-ensoulment 
abortion that this thesis adopts, is different from the relational approach of John Seymour 
in dealing with moral and legal dilemmas associated with the foetus.805  Unlike Seymour’s 
approach, the status of the foetus is still influential in abortion decision making.  How 
close it is to developing into a person affects the harm-benefit evaluation, hence the 
legitimacy of abortion.  In fact, the exclusion of the status of the foetus from the 
discussion as present in that approach is not justified.  It is not sufficient justification to 
say that such exclusion allows the law to consider relative factors in each case a claim is 
made on behalf of the foetus, such as the context, parties involved, their relationships, and 
 
803 Katz, "The Problem of Abortion in Classical Sunni Fiqh”, 45, 46. 
804 See page 208 above.   
805 See page 40 above. 
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the principles upon which the considered law is based before deciding whether to 
interfere.  Why is it that the person foetus, (assuming that his/her status as a person is 
confirmed), but not other born persons, is subject to such an approach?  If it is the status 
of the latter that protects them from such subjection, then it ought to be the same for the 
foetus. 
    Another criticism that may be levelled at the interim status concept is that it 
provides no real alternative to the property one.  A reference might be made to the 
Warnock Committee 1984 that is claimed to regard the foetus as an entity of interim 
status.806  However, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990, which is 
based on the Report of the Committee,807 invests progenitors with the right to control their 
foetuses’ fate.808  Granting dispositional control over foetuses implies, according to John 
Robertson, a classification of them as a property species for this is simply the meaning of 
the term property:  
The question of decisional authority is really the question of who owns or has a 
property interest in early embryos.  Applying terms such as 'ownership' or 'property' 
to early embryos risks misunderstanding.  Such terms do not signify that embryos 
may be treated in all respects like other property.  Rather, the terms merely 
designate who has authority to decide whether legally available options with early 
embryos will occur, such as creation, storage, discard, donation, use in research, 
and placement in a uterus.  Although the bundle of property rights attached to one's 
 
806 Robertson, "In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos," 446, 447.  He cites Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology, 1984, Cmnd. 9314, at 36. 
807Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 776, 777. 
808 Fox, "Pre-Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the 
Embryo," 178.  
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ownership of an embryo may be more circumscribed than for other things, it is an 
ownership or property interest nonetheless.809  
Admittedly, the interim status concept is similar to the property concept in 
endowing persons with dispositional control over the non-ensouled foetus; yet, 
distinguishing it, the interim status concept, is still possible, and even desirable.  As an 
entity of interim status, the non-ensouled foetus can, unlike if it is seen as a species of 
property, be accorded respect proportional to its development.  It will become immune 
from all social and legal connotations entailed in categorising an object as a property 
species.  Truly, endowing some parties with decisional authority concerning, for example, 
creating, storing, discarding, donating, using the non-ensouled foetus in research, or 
placing it in a womb seems inevitable when decisions regarding these issues are needed.  
Nonetheless this endowment does not necessarily signify that the decision makers are the 
owners of the foetus.  It merely signifies a response to the pragmatic need for determining 
who can decide on these practical matters when they occur, as John Robertson himself 
states in the quote cited earlier.  Indicating this meaning, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
in the celebrated case of Davis v Davis concluded that: 
[P]reembryos are not, strictly speaking, either “persons” or “property,” but occupy 
an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential 
for human life.  It follows that any interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis 
have in the preembryos in this case is not a true property interest.  However, they do 
have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision 
 
809 Robertson, "In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos," 454, 455.  Though Robertson is not 
talking about the HFEA 1990, his words apply to it as Maria Fox rightly cites them.  Fox, "Pre-Persons, 
Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the Embryo," 178.   
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making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within the scope of 
policy set by law.810  
This practical decisional authority is far from being, as the current understanding of 
property presumes, “… exclusive, unqualified and individualistic.”811    
The other important criticism levelled at arguing for potentiality in general, is 
based on the concept of the transitivity of potentiality.  According to the critics, 
attributing a special status to the foetus because of its potentiality should be extended to 
the gamete that has it too; yet, they continue, since this entails unbearable consequences, 
the argument as a whole should be rejected.812  As summarised by Alfonso G َ◌mez-Lobo:    
The potentiality argument is understood as moving backwards in the following way: 
if a human person deserves respect, then a potential human person …, i.e., a human 
embryo, also deserves respect.  But …, by virtue of the transitivity of potentiality, 
one should take a further step backwards and hold that if a human embryo deserves 
respect, then the sperm and the ovum also deserve respect.  This conclusion and its 
implication that gametes deserve the same respect as people amounts to … a 
perfectly absurd position.813  
However, this criticism can be plausibly rejected.  In the first place, the criticism 
is unsound with regard to the argument of active potentiality.  Personality attributed to the 
ensouled foetus cannot be extended to the non-ensouled foetus, let alone the gamete, 
since it lacks the virtue by which such a standing is gained, i.e.  an active potentiality for 
 
810 Davis v Davis, (1992) 842 S.W. 2d 588, 597.  In commentating on this case, see C. M. Jordan Jr and C. 
J. Price, "First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn’t It Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and 
Gametes?”  Real property, probate, and trust journal 37, no. 1 (2002): 151-190, 180. 
811 J. Nedelsky, "Property in Potential Life--a Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories”, 
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 6 (1993): 343-365, 353.    
812 A. Gَmez-Lobo, "Does Respect for Embryos Entail Respect for Gametes?” Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 25, no. 3 (2004): 199-208, 200, 201. 
813 Ibid., 200.  
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actual moral agency.814  Yet the case is slightly different with regard to the argument of 
passive potentiality.  The gamete, whether a sperm or an egg, shares the same type of 
potentiality with the non-ensouled foetus, because the gamete can develop into an 
autonomous moral agent and so become a person, if subjected to external intervention 
through sexual intercourse, or an in vitro procedure and then ensoulment.  So it could be 
said that the gamete should be accorded the same standing and respect accorded to the 
non-ensouled foetus.  Though this conclusion is not as horrifying as it appears regarding 
the argument of active potentiality, since the gamete is not claimed to have the same 
standing and respect due to the ensouled foetus, i.e. actual personality, it is still 
intolerable.  Besides countering our intuition that gametes are different from foetuses,815 it 
may entail morally intolerable consequences such as restricting one’s ability to dispose of 
gametes, if that is considered to contradict the respect that they should be accorded 
because of their passive potentiality for actual moral agency.  This may lead to rejecting 
the argument of passive potentiality as a whole.   
Nevertheless, while admitting that the gamete and the non-ensouled foetus share 
the passive potentiality for actual moral agency, a distinction between them can still be 
held.  This distinction is based on the quality of the passive potentiality possessed.  The 
passive potentiality for personality the non-ensouled foetus has is far more certain than 
that of the gamete.  This certainty derives from two facts: the foetus’s acquisition of an 
active potentiality for the biological structure necessary for ensoulment, and ensoulment 
being a rule-based intervention.   
 
814 See  5.2.2 The status of the foetus before ensoulment.   
815 Eberl, "The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis," 153.   
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The first fact is based on having the programming necessary for all future 
biological development.  Following fertilisation, the foetus acquires DNA programming 
wherein all future biological development, including that necessary for ensoulment, is 
determined.816  So, if all goes well, the foetus will realise this development and reach the 
stage at which ensoulment is possible, i.e. the twentieth week of gestational age.  In other 
words, the foetus has an inherent tendency to develop the biological structure of 
ensoulment, and unless is prevented from so doing by a negative causal factor, it will 
definitely actualise it.  The gamete, on the other hand, lacks such programming, since it 
has only half of the chromosomes required, i.e. twenty three instead of forty six.817  Hence 
there is nothing in its nature that gives rise to the biological development required.  Only 
an external positive causal factor, namely sexual intercourse or an in vitro procedure, will 
endow it with such a capacity.  Its potentiality for the structure necessary for ensoulment 
is, hence, purely passive.   
The second fact that confers more certainty on the foetus’s passive potentiality for 
personality is that despite being an external intervention, ensoulment is rule-based.818  It is 
external in the sense that it requires that God intervene each time to ensoul the foetal 
body.819  However, it is also arguable that this intervention is rule-based: it is an event that 
occurs regularly at a particular time, i.e. the twentieth week of gestational age, as the time 
when the condition of bodily readiness for ensoulment is met, and the conclusive 
indications of the soul’s existence are detected.820  Therefore, it can plausibly be argued 
 
816 Ibid., 154. 
817 Gَmez-Lobo, "Does Respect for Embryos Entail Respect for Gametes?”  200.   
818 Cf. Deckers, "Why Eberl Is Wrong. Reflections on the Beginning of Personhood”, 277. 
819 See footnotes 778 &779 above.  
820 See  5.1 Determining the timing of the ensoulment event. 
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that God will intervene by ensouling every foetus whose body becomes developed 
enough to receive the soul.   
Therefore, after fertilisation, the foetus commences actualising its inherent 
potentiality for the biological structure of ensoulment, and if all goes well, will develop it 
to the required degree at the particular time at which ensoulment is inevitable.  This 
confers more certainty on its passive potentiality for actual moral agency and justifies 
treating it differently from the gamete.   
The other important issue concerning the conferral of an interim status on the non-
ensouled foetus concerns the legal plausibility of such a measure.  This thesis claims that 
such a measure is plausible for two reasons.  The first is the theoretical merit of the 
concept as has been previously explained.  The other is the fact that this measure has 
already been the position held by several significant advisory bodies and courts.821  For 
example, in the US the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare concluded that “… the human embryo is entitled to profound respect, but 
this respect does not necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed to 
persons.”822  In a similar manner, the American Fertility Society concluded that: 
The preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not 
the respect accorded to actual persons.  The preembryo is due greater respect than 
other human tissue because of its potential to become a person and because of its 
symbolic meaning for many people.  Yet, it should not be treated as a person, 
 
821 It is noteworthy that these bodies, courts, and commentators focused on the status of the embryo, qua 
embryo, rather than that of the foetus.  However, the distinction between the embryo and the disensouled 
foetus according to their developmental stage has no special significance in the current research since they 
share the same sort of potentiality.   
822 Protection of Human Subjects; HEW Support of Human in Virtue Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: 
Report of the Ethics Advisory Board, 44 Fed.  Reg.  35, 033, 35,056 (1973).  As cited by Robertson, "In the 
Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos," 446. 
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because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as 
developmentally individual, and may never realize its biological potential.823  
Another example is that of the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies that concluded that: 
Commissioners believe that it would be highly undesirable for zygotes or embryos 
to be characterized as property, with all the social and legal implications such a 
classification implies.  Rather, we think that legal rules relating to the zygote and 
embryo should be designed to ensure that they are treated with respect as a form of 
potential life.824  
Adopting the concept of the interim status of the foetus has also been the position 
of some courts, and the clear example of this is the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the 
celebrated case of Davis v Davis.825  The US Supreme Court also claimed to take a similar 
stance on its decisions concerning abortion including that in the landmark case of Roe v 
Wade.826  So it seems plausible to admit the interim status of the non-ensouled foetus into 
law.   
To sum up, this chapter set out to apply moral agency to foetuses as the criterion 
upon which personality is based, and to determine their status accordingly.  Since moral 
agency is seated in the soul, the search for whether foetuses have acquired it, in an 
ultimate sense, was conducted through the search for whether and when they have souls.  
It was concluded that the timing of ensoulment coincides with the timing of the first 
 
823 Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society (AFS), Ethical Considerations of the New 
Reproductive Technologies, 53 Fertility & Sterility 37S, 58S (Supp.  2 June 1990).  As cited by Perry and 
Schneider, "Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their Fate?," 486. 
824  Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993: 627. As cited by Fox, "Pre-
Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the Embryo," 179.  
825 Davis v Davis.  The case has been previously cited, see supra ft. 810. 
826 K. Schaefer, "In-Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, and the Right to Privacy--Are Mandatory 
Donation Laws Constitutional?”  Pacific Law Journal 22, no. 1 (1990): 87-121, 97.  She claims also that the 
interim position appeals to most commentators because it considers all parties’ interests.  Ibid. 
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conscious experience, which, in turn, was demonstrated as occurring at the twentieth 
week of gestational age.  In the light of this conclusion, a distinction was drawn between 
foetuses aged twenty weeks or more, and younger foetuses.  The former were attributed 
the status of persons on account of their acquisition of an active potentiality for moral 
agency and hence personality.  By contrast, it was decided that the latter have not attained 
such standing.  However, non-ensouled foetuses were attributed an interim status because 
of their passive potentiality for personality.   
6. Conclusion 
 
6 Conclusion     
 This thesis set out to determine the legal status of the human foetus as it should 
be in Libyan law.  This status is widely and reasonably argued to be the starting-point for 
solving foetus-related dilemmas revived or created by new reproductive technologies, 
such as abortion and foetal research.  However, as it stands in Libyan law, this status is 
problematic because it is based on the outdated born alive rule that deprives the foetus of 
legal personality.  Therefore, establishing what the Libyan legal standing on the status of 
the foetus should be, seems relevant and necessary. 
 In pursuit of this aim, the thesis examined the Western moral and legal debate on 
the status of the foetus from an Islamic perspective.  The examination of the moral debate 
was based on the assumption that law should be assessed and reformed, if found to be 
unsatisfactory, according to ethics.  In these circumstances, the problematic standing of 
Libyan law on the status of the foetus should be reformulated from an ethical viewpoint.  
In this regard, the relevant Western debate offered, through its richness and diversity, a 
good starting-point.  Indeed, it is within this debate that the born alive rule has been 
carefully assessed and proven to be no longer satisfactory.  However, since the 
applicability of arguments and views deployed in this debate to Libya was potentially 
contentious, the thesis chose to assess them from an Islamic perspective, Shari’a being 
the source of Libyan law.  This also offered the opportunity to examine the capability of 
Shari’a to rise to the moral and legal challenges associated with new reproductive 
technologies. 
 Applying this methodology has enabled the thesis to achieve its aim.  It has 
concluded that the human foetus should be accorded the moral and legal status of a 
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person from the twentieth gestational week onwards, and an interim status granting it 
gradual and derivative respect prior to that.  The following summary of the various 
conclusions reached, and how they contributed towards ascertaining the status of the 
foetus in such a way, should clarify this point.  The main body of the thesis was divided 
into four chapters wherein the first two laid down the foundations for the discussions 
carried out in the rest.  Chapter One focused upon the existing Western moral and legal 
literature devoted to the subject of the moral and legal status of the foetus, and determined 
that the main controversies pertaining to this status concern whether the foetus is a 
person, property, or something else; whether humanity is significant for such 
determination; whether the moral status of the foetus is related to its legal status, and if 
so, how;  and what the implications of the status of the foetus are for its related dilemmas.  
Identifying these controversies provided the thesis with a framework from which it 
became possible to develop its own discussions and arguments in Chapters Three and 
Four.   
Having identified the main controversies pertaining to the issue of the moral and 
legal status of the foetus in Western literature, the thesis moved on to introduce Shari’a as 
the basis upon which it would examine them.  This took place in Chapter Two and started 
with explanations of the Islamic views on the nature of human beings and the rationale 
behind creating them, as necessary introductions to understanding Shari’a.  It was shown 
that human beings are composites of biological components or bodies, which they share 
to a great extent with other animals, and intellectual components or souls, that are the 
seats of the capacities that distinguish them from animals and other entities.  These 
capacities, namely, those of cognition and volition, were concluded to be the rationale 
behind choosing human beings to be God’s vicegerents on earth, that is, to be the entities 
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who can, freely and consciously, realise and implement the ethical imperatives that 
constitute the ethical arm of God’s will.  These ethical imperatives were shown to be 
discernible through either divine revelation or human reasoning.  Shari’a, as embodied in 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammad, was demonstrated to be a 
representation of the former.  As such, contrary to the widespread understanding of it as 
law, Shari’a was concluded to be first and foremost an ethical system whose core or spirit 
is the conservation of the five principal ethical values of religion, self, reason, 
reproduction, and property.  However, the law was shown to be important for Shari’a as a 
means of preserving these values.  The second way of knowing the ethical divine 
imperatives was shown to be human reasoning.  This means that, whenever Shari’a is 
silent, human reasoning can play an important role in identifying these imperatives.  
Accordingly, Western theories and arguments could be seen, and adopted, as a method of 
applying human reasoning in cases where Shari’a offers no guidance.  However, this is 
conditional upon not contradicting the spirit of Shari’a. 
 After determining the main issues to examine, and the basis for doing so, the 
thesis started to ascertain the moral and legal status of the foetus.  Since the first possible 
embodiment of the legal status of the foetus is being a person, it was necessary to define 
what is meant by legal personality.  For this purpose, the thesis examined the existing 
definitions, namely, the positivist and the humanity-based definitions, and concluded that 
neither is satisfactory.  The first claims that legal personality is a purely legal concept that 
should not be built on any extra-legal factors, and a device that the lawmaker can deploy 
to fit certain purposes.  As such, it can be conferred on, or withdrawn from, any entities or 
things regardless of any intrinsic qualities they may have.  As a result, the intrinsic quality 
of being human does not give the foetus, if it is discovered to have it, any privilege.  The 
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positivist definition, therefore, places the foetus on the same footing as other beings and 
things in terms of the chance of being attributed legal personality.  In addition, being a 
mere device utilised to fit the lawmaker’s purposes means that any personality attributed 
can vary from one context to another.  It is possible, therefore, to attribute the foetus 
personality in one law, and deprive it of such a standing in another.  Such inconsistency 
may even become desirable because it may fit more properly the lawmaker’s purposes.  
However, the positivist definition was proven unsatisfactory mainly because it is 
impractical.  The conferral or withdrawal of legal personality cannot be undertaken 
without considering extra-legal factors.  More importantly, the definition is based on a 
separation between law and other disciplines, including ethics, which cannot be accepted 
by Shari’a since this is a system wherein law is founded upon ethics.   
Having rejected the positivist definition of legal personality, the thesis moved on 
to assess the second definition that bases it on humanity.  According to this definition, 
legal personality is a mere representation of what is inherent in human beings.  It follows 
that, in order to be a legal person, or a real legal person, the foetus must be proven to be 
human.  It would then enjoy consistent personality throughout law since it would be 
founded on an invariable intrinsic trait.  However, although the humanity-based definition 
seemingly gives the foetus stronger chances of being a person, compared to the positivist 
definition, it was shown to be dominated by a particular understanding of humanity that 
deprives the foetus of personality.  According to this understanding, the human being is 
any human organism capable of independent integrated functioning.  Other non-
biological attributes such as intelligence or sentience are irrelevant.  This understanding is 
embodied in the born alive rule whereby legal personality starts upon live birth.  This rule 
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was shown to be enshrined in many laws and jurisdictions, English law, Libyan law, and 
Islamic jurisdiction included.   
Nevertheless, the humanity-based definition of legal personality was proven to be 
ill-founded.  The first possible basis for this definition is that live birth signifies the 
moment when the foetus is separated from the pregnant woman, which the analysis in 
Chapter Three proved to be inadequate since the foetus is biologically separate from 
around the time of conception.  The second basis is that live birth designates the point at 
which the foetus can exist independently from the pregnant woman, while the necessity of 
such independence for legally defined personality is strongly questioned.  Many human 
beings are attached to, and so dependent on, heart/lung or dialysis machines or other 
forms of life support; still, it is generally accepted that they are legal persons.  Further, if 
it is the independent existence from the pregnant woman that matters, the foetus was 
shown to be capable of that long before being born alive, that is, from the time of 
viability.  Additionally, the perfection of ectogenesis, artificial wombs, which, according 
to many scientists, is only a matter of time, will make it possible for the foetus be born 
and separated from the pregnant woman at any stage of pregnancy and kept alive.  
Furthermore, the biological definition of humanity values the physical component of 
human beings while it is the intellectual aspect that really matters to their identity as 
vicegerents.  No reason, therefore, justifies the preservation of the born alive rule as the 
starting point for legal personality.   
Having discarded the existing definitions of legal personality, a different 
definition was proposed, which bases legal personality on moral personality, and equates 
both with humanity.  Basing legal personality on moral personality was justified by the 
proven inseparability of legal personality from extra-legal considerations, as well as the 
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strong argument that many Western legal theories, including that of personality, are, in 
fact, based on their moral counterparts.  More importantly, it was supported by the fact 
that law is based on ethics in Shari’a.  Equating moral and legal personality with 
humanity was a result of basing the former on a human-specific criterion, i.e.  moral 
agency.  This establishment was justified by the fact that in Shari’a personality is 
intimately connected to vicegerency, that is, personality has been conferred in the first 
place on human beings to enable them to bear and fulfil their duties as the only 
vicegerents.  Hence, personality presupposes vicegerency.  Since vicegerency, in turn, 
presupposes moral agency, personality too presupposes it.  Put another way, moral 
agency becomes the criterion of personality.   
Regarding the argument that the adoption of moral agency as the sole criterion of 
moral personality is absurd because it leads to depriving many human beings that lack 
this capacity, such as infants and cognitively impaired adults, of personality, I utilised the 
concept of the nature of being human.  According to this concept, the soul is deemed to 
be the seat of all mental capacities, including those necessary for moral agency, while the 
body is the means used to actualise them.  Therefore, while there are human beings who 
have no actual moral agency because of their bodily inabilities, all human beings do have 
ultimate moral agency because of the simple fact that they have souls and so are humans.  
Having ultimate moral agency was deemed sufficient to consider a being a person.  
Consequently, all human beings, including many of those lacking actual moral agency, 
were deemed persons.   
This argument being made, Chapter Four focused first on whether, and from 
when, the foetus has a soul, and hence is a moral agent, in the ultimate sense, and a 
person.  Since Shari’a was shown to have no conclusive statement on the timing of 
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ensoulment, the thesis relied in determining that timing on the general concept of the 
nature of being human and human reasoning-based arguments as deployed in relevant 
Western debate.  The first of these arguments was the Cartesian causal concept of 
ensoulment that maintains that a soul cannot pertain to a body unless the soul is capable 
of influencing that body.  This means that ensoulment cannot occur unless the body is 
sufficiently developed to receive and execute the soul’s instructions.  This readiness was 
understood as the acquisition of the cortical brain, being the organ responsible for 
executing the soul-specific functions, i.e.  cognitional and volitional functions.   
Upon the potential argument that the acquisition of the cortical brain means 
merely that ensoulment can happen, but not that it will necessarily happen, and therefore 
it cannot be equated with the timing of ensoulment, I deployed a principle called the 
principle of the indicatory role of the soul’s functions.  According to this principle, 
because cognitional and volitional functions are exclusively soul-based functions, they 
indicate its existence beyond any doubt.  Hence, the ensoulment timing can be determined 
through determining the time when these functions first begin.  Since consciousness was 
concluded to be the first of these functions to occur, its beginning was used as an 
indicator of the ensoulment timing.  After discussing its different proposed starting-
points, consciousness was concluded to first begin at the twentieth week of gestation.  
This time was therefore deemed the timing of ensoulment, hence the timing of the 
acquisition of ultimate moral agency, along with an active potentiality for actualising it, 
that is, a potentiality that the entity can actualise by itself in the absence of external 
obstacles.  The foetus, consequently, was accorded the moral and legal status of a person 
from the twentieth week of gestation onwards.   
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Prior to that, as the foetus has not yet been ensouled, it cannot be accorded the 
moral and legal status of a person.  However, neither can it be accorded the status of a 
property species since it has a passive potentiality for moral agency.  It is passive because 
it requires the intervention of an external causal factor to actualise it, namely, the infusion 
of a soul into the foetal body by God.  Being a passively potential moral agent was 
concluded to give the non-ensouled foetus an interim status, granting it derivative 
importance that stems from the fact that it is the origin of the future person.  In other 
words, the foetus is important not because of its intrinsic nature, but because of the future 
person it will become.  As such, this significance is graded in proportion to its proximity 
to having ultimate moral agency: the closer the foetus gets to being an actively potential 
moral agent, the greater the respect it should be accorded.   
This interim status is unattributable to the gamete though it shares, to some extent, 
the passive potentiality for moral agency.  The reason for this is that its passive 
potentiality is far weaker than that of the non-ensouled foetus, as it requires two causal 
factors, i.e.  sexual intercourse or an in vitro fertilisation procedure, plus ensoulment.  
That of the non-ensouled foetus, however, requires only ensoulment and this was 
concluded to be a rule-based intervention, that is, it happens regularly whenever the body 
becomes sufficiently developed to receive the soul, which was concluded to occur at the 
twentieth week of gestation.  This difference in the strength of passive potentialities 
makes it implausible to accord the gamete the same status and treatment accorded to the 
non-ensouled foetus.   
Having determined the moral and legal status of the foetus, the thesis then 
proceeded to assess what implications this determination has for dilemmas concerning the 
foetus.  A distinction was made between the status of the foetus before and after 
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ensoulment.  After ensoulment, the foetus is a person entitled to persons’ rights, the rights 
to life and bodily integrity included, and so, like these persons, his/her life cannot be 
sacrificed to protect or promote any rights or interests of others, including the pregnant 
woman.  The only possible qualification is that where the latter’s life is endangered by the 
continuation of pregnancy.  In such a case, if both the life of the pregnant woman and that 
of the foetus are threatened, an abortion can be performed on account of the juristic rule 
stating that ‘the greater evil should be warded off by the lesser evil’, not as a result of an 
evaluation between the value or worth of the two individuals’ lives.   
However, before ensoulment, the case was shown to be different.  While the 
gradual and derivative respect the foetus commands requires that abortion be prohibited, 
this prohibition is not absolute.  It was demonstrated that there are rules whereby any 
harm or benefit resulting from an abortion are measured qualitatively, i.e.  whether the 
harm predicted or benefit sought is necessary, complementary, or amelioratory, and 
quantitatively, i.e.  how many people will be harmed or benefited by an abortion.  If the 
benefit of an abortion is shown to outweigh the harm, it can be performed.  This 
evaluation should be conducted on a case by case basis, where one of the important 
qualitative factors to be considered is the developmental phase of the foetus concerned.  
The more the foetus develops, the greater the harm caused to it becomes.  Accordingly, 
benefits proposed to legitimise a late pre-ensoulment abortion, must be greater than those 
proposed to legitimise an earlier one.  However, the mere fact that pre-ensoulment 
abortion can be legitimised, compared to post-ensoulment abortion that is subject to 
absolute prohibition, proves how central the moral and legal status of the foetus is for 
deciding on any of the foetus-related dilemmas.  This status should, therefore, be deemed 
the starting-point for resolving these issues. 
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Though the announced aim of the thesis was to determine the legal status of the 
foetus as it should be in Libyan law, the conclusion it reached is not limited to the Libyan 
legal system.  On the one hand, the congruence of argument from Shari’a, philosophy, 
and science should make this conclusion valid in any country whose legal system is 
derived from Islamic tradition.  On the other, as developed in Chapters four and five of 
the thesis, the argument about foetal personality, while influenced by Shari’a, is also 
supported by independent scientific and philosophical arguments and so should be taken 
into account in England and other legal systems as well.    
In terms of Libyan law, the proposed legal status of foetuses should be taken into 
account when any regulations concerning them are made.  Admittedly, as of yet, the legal 
status of the foetus has not become a significant legal issue as it is the West in general, 
and the UK in particular, since many foetus-related dilemmas, such as foetal research, 
have not become reality in Libya yet.  Still, this does not deny the need for re-determining 
the legal status of the foetus because, on the one hand, issues, such as abortion, prenatal 
invasive therapy, and those associated with IVF, are already in place in Libya, and, on the 
other, the inadequacy of the born alive rule remains.  Indeed, regulating foetus-related 
issues needs further study, that this thesis was unable, due to time and space limitations, 
to conduct.  Yet, the conclusions that it reached should suffice in solving those dilemmas 
in general, and paving the way for any future detailed study upon which regulations can 
be made 
Indeed, the research that this thesis carried out could be taken further by study 
which focuses upon particular applications related to the foetus, such as abortion or foetal 
research.  Certainly, though it is relatively brief, the study of abortion conducted in this 
thesis showed that pre-ensoulment abortion raises questions of extreme importance, such 
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that a separate study seems justifiable, even necessary.  Examples of these questions are: 
what is the standing of Libyan law and Shari’a on the powerful right to autonomy that the 
pregnant woman is generally accorded in the West?  If it exists, does that right justify 
abortion, and to what extent?  Does the putative father have any say in abortion decision-
making and, if so, does he have a right of veto over the will of the pregnant woman?  This 
thesis, with its unique method of examining Western moral and legal literature from an 
Islamic perspective, can help, not only with these questions, or even other foetus-related 
dilemmas, but also with a wide range of bioethics and biolaw dilemmas.   
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